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ABSTRACT
The purposes of this thesis are first, to provide a general framework to analyse the 
location of financial activity, second, to study the emergence and evolution of banking 
centres centres and finally, to test empirically several hypotheses related to banking 
centres and their links with regional economies. In the first part of the thesis, we 
examine the impact of information asymmetry on the degree of centralisation of 
banking activity by incorporating spatial factors in a model of credit rationing. We 
next discuss the main factors that push bank to locate near each other and explore how 
pecuniary externalities in the form of backward and forward linkages can generate a 
powerful agglomeration force in the banking industry. We also analyse the path 
dependence process in financial centres and the conditions under which this process 
can be broken. In the second part of the thesis, we make an important contribution to 
the literature by providing an original theoretical framework to explain the emergence 
and evolution of banking centres. Unlike the existing literature which attributes the 
emergence of banking centres only to differences in regulatory and tax structure or 
other inherent geographical attributes, our model emphasises the importance of 
economies of scale in financial intermediation as being the major determinant of 
emergence. This allows for an element of indeterminacy in the model and hence other 
factors such as historical chance or “first mover” advantage can play an important role 
in determining which country emerges as a financial centre. The theoretical framework 
is then extended to examine the evolution of cross border banking over time and the 
determinants of the nature of banking systems; issues which remain unexplored in the 
literature on banking centres. In the last part of the thesis, we provide an empirical 
analysis on the main determinants of banks’ location using new data series and a novel 
empirical approach which takes into account the major features of banking centres. 
Finally, we provide a novel empirical analysis of the links between banking centres’ 
financial development and regional economic activity, using Hong Kong as a study 
case.
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TO MY FATHER
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Banks have never confined their activities to the national economy. From the early 
days of their existence, banks have always engaged in international activity (Davis 
and Lewis, 1987). What immediately distinguishes the post war period from earlier 
periods however is the massive increase in the scale of banks' international operations. 
According to the BIS statistics, in 1977 banks’ holding of international assets1 
amounted to 770.5 billion dollars, increased to more than 5 thousand billion dollars in 
1987 and by 1998, international assets of banks amounted to more than 10 thousand 
billion dollars.
But the great increase in the volume of international banking is not the only feature 
that characterises the "modem" system of international finance. There have also been 
major structural changes in the nature of banking activities (Pecchioli, 1983). Many 
factors such as transformations in most economies’ real sector, advancements in 
information and telecommunication technology, a general movement towards 
financial liberalisation, financial innovation, and higher competition within the 
financial sector have greatly affected the nature of international banking (Davis and 
Lewis, 1987; Pecchioli, 1983). In the early sixties, the bulk of traditional foreign 
banking2, which consists mainly of providing credit for imports and exports purposes, 
was located in the home country. In the late sixties onwards, traditional foreign 
banking declined in importance, accounting only for 20% of total international 
banking assets. Instead, Eurocurrency activity3 has dominated international finance
1 International assets correspond to cross-border claims in all currencies plus claims in foreign 
currency. Cross-border claims refer to claims against non-residents (Byrant, 1987; Dennis, 1984).
2 By traditional foreign banking, we mean claims made by non-residents in domestic currency.
3 Eurocurrency is usually defined as the denomination of assets and liabilities o f bank offices in 
currency other than the currency unit o f the nation where the office is located i.e. claims in foreign 
currency against resident and non-residents.
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accounting for more than 80% of total international bank assets. A related 
development in the last decade or so has been the massive increase in cross-border 
banking flows. This is reflected in the massive increase in the size of international 
banks’ cross-border assets, which increased from 2.5 thousand billion dollars in 1985 
to more than 9 thousand billion in 1998. It is important to note that most of these 
flows take place between developed countries. In fact, the ratio of cross border assets 
to total cross border assets against developing countries has declined dramatically 
from around 30% in 1980 to less than 14% in 1998. The reduction in the debt flows to 
developing countries was partially offset by an increase in private capital flows during 
the 90s.4
Securitisation, the process of turning bank loans into tradable debt, has also changed 
the nature of financing in international markets. During the late 70s and early 80s, 
bank financing constituted almost 85% of total net international financing. The ratio 
declined drastically during the period 1982-1986 due to the debt crisis and reached 
very low levels of 60% in that period. During the late 80s, the percentage of bank 
lending out of net international finance increased, and in 1990 the pre-1982 level was 
once again attained, but later in the mid 1990s fell again. By 1998, this ratio stood at 
only about 50% of net international financing (BIS, 1999). The declining importance 
of international bank lending has been met by an increase in the significance of 
international bond and Euronote financing which became very important elements of
4 IMF (1999) cites some interesting figures: “Net private capital flows to developing countries trebled 
to more than $150 billion a year during 1995-1997 from roughly $50 billion a year during 1987-89. At 
the same time the ratio of private capital flows to domestic investment in developing countries 
increased to 20% in 1996 ffom only 3% in 1990” (p.l). It is important to note that foreign direct 
investment constitute the most important component o f private flows during the 90s.
international financing, accounting for almost 50% of net international financing in
1998.5
The 1980s and 1990s have also witnessed an explosive growth in various types of 
financial transactions. During the last decade, the foreign exchange market has grown 
enormously. According to the latest BIS survey (1998a), the total reported foreign 
exchange market turnover6 adjusted for local double counting reached an 
unprecedented level of a daily average of $1572 billion in April 1995, increasing to 
$1917 billion in 1998. These figures exceed by far the volume of international trade 
and total world’s GDP. Another important feature of this market is the declining 
importance of spot transactions relative to outright forwards and foreign exchange 
swaps. In 1989, the turnover volume of spot transactions was larger than the turnover 
of outright forwards and foreign exchange swaps. In 1995 and 1998, forward 
1 instruments consolidated their leading position, pushing the share of spot turnover
down to 44% in 1995 and 40% in 1998 (BIS, 1998). Within the former group, foreign 
exchange swaps continued to be the dominant instrument, overshadowing outright 
forwards by a large margin (BIS, 1998). The derivative market has also grown 
enormously. Increasing volatility in the world financial markets and financial 
innovation, which allowed investors to obtain a combination of desired return, risk 
and liquidity, have contributed greatly to the growth of this market. According to the 
) BIS survey (1998), the average daily turnover of notional amounts of over-the-counter
(OTC) derivative market activity amounted to $474 billion in 1998.7 An
5 It is important to note the increasing involvement of banks in the issue and purchase of debt 
securities.
6 Data include spot, outright forwards, and foreign exchange swaps activity.
7 These figures include only OTC derivative activity for two main categories: Foreign exchange 
derivative instruments (currency swaps and options) and single-currency interest rate derivative
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accompanying development is the increasing volume of transactions in related 
payment and settlement systems which amounts to more than $10 trillion a day 
(White, 1999).
Although the massive growth of international flows, the major transformations in 
various markets, and the main risks and challenges associated with globalisation of 
financial transactions are well recognised in the literature on international finance 
(White, 1999; Smith and Walter, 1991; BIS, 1988b), the centralisation of international 
financial activity and financial players in a few major geographical locations is not. 
One stylised fact is that international financial activity has been centralised for a very 
long time in a few financial centres (Kindleberger, 1983; Daly, 1991). Chapter 2, 
which examines the geographical distribution of different types of financial services, 
confirms this observation. For instance, around 70% of cross border assets and 
liabilities are concentrated in the leading financial centres of the world (United 
Kingdom, United States, Japan, Germany and France, Hong Kong and Singapore). 
The geographical concentration of foreign exchange transactions is even more acute, 
for these centres capture more than 80% of global market turnover. The same pattern 
can also be observed in over-the-counter derivative activity where around 85% of 
total trading takes place in these centres. The available data on futures and options 
trading also suggest a similar pattern with more than 90% of this activity concentrated 
in the world’s leading financial centres.
Some economists have argued that agglomeration of financial institutions and 
international financial activity in a few centres has a bearing on the functioning of the
instruments (forward rate agreements, swaps, and options such as options on traded securities, interest
14
world economy. Reed (1983) for instance develops what he calls a "financial centre 
theory of foreign direct investment." By attracting large amounts of foreign assets and 
liabilities, he argues, financial centres are in a position to manage a global portfolio, 
create a market with high liquidity and provide investors with competitive returns on 
investment. In order to perform these functions efficiently, financial centres evaluate 
projects all over the world and monitor the activities of multinational borrowers, 
mainly multinational corporations (MNCs). Having the complex physical 
infrastructure, the skilled labour and the professional expertise, financial centres 
gather and analyse information which is essential for the evaluation of global 
investment opportunities on a continual basis. Based on this evaluation process, 
financial centres allocate resources towards and between MNCs and hence can 
determine the flow of foreign direct investment (Reed, 1983).8 In a separate work, 
Reed (1989) explores the possible association between a financial centre’s behaviour 
and interest rates. His basic premise is that financial centres have the power to 
influence or even determine the level of future interest rates. Based on this 
proposition, Reed explains how London’s “misguided behaviour” of raising interest 
rates during the two oil shocks in the 1970s exacerbated the problems in the global 
economy.
In a less extreme position, Sassen (1991) describes the importance of these centres in 
terms of their role in organising the processes of production which have become
rate options, interest rate cap, interest rate floor, etc).
8 Reed argues that the " underlying determinants of foreign direct investment activity are best explained 
(and understood) by determining the motives and methods o f evaluation employed by supranational 
financial centres as they appraise on continuing basis, the activity of internationally active institutions" 
(p. 223).
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highly internationalised.9 The increased mobility of capital and the structural 
transformations that have accompanied this stage, such as the dispersion of production 
all over the globe, the transnationalisation of ownership and the reorganisation of the 
sources of profits, required a new set of inputs that are capable of controlling, 
managing and organising these new production processes. In particular, the 
organisation of global production is made possible by the provision of financial 
services and establishment of a network of financial markets that speed up and extend 
the circulation of commodities and speed up the process of capital accumulation. 
These complex networks of financial institutions and markets show a high degree of 
agglomeration in a few financial centres enhancing the importance of these centres in 
the world economy.
The study of financial centres and the location of financial activity in general are also 
i relevant for policy makers all over the world. In Europe, economic and financial
integration raises questions about the future role of London as an international centre. 
Will European integration cause a greater dispersion of financial activity? Conversely, 
can London attract footloose international financial activity and reinforce its 
supremacy as an international financial centre? Or could we witness the decline of 
London and the rise of alternative centres such as Frankfurt and Paris? In Asia, the 
financial map has changed dramatically during the last two decades. During the 
I 1980s, Tokyo established itself as one of the leading financial centres of the world. In
the 1990s, Japan’s position as international financial centre is much in doubt. During 
the last decade, Japan’s shares of all types of financial activity have been declining. 
For instance its share of cross border liabilities declined from 18% in 1987 to 10% in
9 Sassen describes the current stage of global production as characterised by "a complex duality: a
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1997. In terms of foreign exchange activity, its share of global foreign exchange 
turnover has declined from 11% in 1992 to 8% in 1998. The same pattern is observed 
in the case of OTC derivative activity where Japan’s share declined from 12% in 1995 
to 9% in 1998. The most astonishing development however is the rapid decline of 
Japan’s stock market turnover both in absolute and relative terms which did not only 
affect Japan’s global position, but also its position relative to the region. The question 
is, can Tokyo maintain its position as a financial centre or has it declined with Japan’s 
economic recession? This is an important question not only for policy makers, but 
also for economists since it raises other questions about the relationship between the 
domestic economy’s strength and the centre’s success, especially at times when the 
links between the strength of the domestic “real” economy and the success of an 
international financial centre in many countries have become very weak. Another 
important development in Asia is the future of Hong Kong under the rule of China
, and whether this is likely to affect its position as a financial centre. Also important is
the impact of the recent crisis in the region on Hong Kong’s financial development. 
Given Hong Kong’s links with the region, one would expect the crisis to have an 
adverse impact on banking developments there. In the Middle East, the financial map 
is far from being settled. In the mid 1970s, we witnessed the decline of Beirut as a 
financial centre and the emergence of Bahrain as an important “collection” centre 
channelling surplus funds to Euromarkets. Nowadays, there are doubts about
I Bahrain’s future as a financial centre. The deregulation of financial markets in many
parts of the Middle East, structural transformations in international financial markets, 
and the poor performance of the regional economy raise questions not only about 
Bahrain’s future as a financial centre, but also whether the existing conditions permit
spatially dispersed, yet globally integrated organisation of economic activity" (p.3).
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the region to maintain a financial centre whether in Bahrain or elsewhere (Fattouh, 
1998).
The study of financial centres is also relevant in the context of many developing 
countries. Many governments in the developing world have engaged in deliberate 
policies aimed at attracting financial activity and financial institutions. These policies 
range from offering financial institutions regulatory and fiscal incentives (such as low 
taxes or no taxes on income, profits, earnings, and capital gains) to providing a 
complex infrastructure that facilitates financial institutions’ operations. An important 
issue is whether there are any substantial benefits associated with attracting a large 
number of foreign banks which could justify such efforts. Few studies have assessed 
the impact of bank agglomeration in a centre on economic development 
(Bhattacharya, 1989; Chang, 1989; Johnson, 1976). These studies examine the ability 
of banking centres to generate local employment, revenues, and foreign exchange 
earnings to host governments. The impact of operating expenditures associated with 
financial activity such as salaries to bank employees, rents, administrative 
expenditures, and telecommunication expenses, are also examined in some of these 
studies. One trend in the literature emphasises the significance of such benefits and 
considers the establishment of a banking centre as a part of a development strategy 
aimed at the diversification of the economic base (Essayad, 1989). Despite the 
dominance of this trend in the literature, some economists are doubtful about banking 
centres’ contribution to the domestic economy. For instance, some argue that foreign 
banks operating in these centres inhibit the development of the domestic financial
sector (Odle, 1981). Others consider that banking centres play a passive role in large 
economies (Verghese, 1989). 10
1.1 Scope of the Thesis
Despite their importance, economists have not given the study of financial centres 
much attention.11 This neglect is consistent with the absence of spatial dimensions 
from economic models in general; for example the main body of theories of trade, the 
firm or production fail to provide a coherent theory of the location of economic 
activity (Krugman, 1995). The neglect of the spatial dimension in economic models is 
mainly the consequence of the assumption of non-increasing returns to scale, which is 
widely used in these models. Fujita and Thisse (1996) argue that under the 
assumptions that there are non-increasing returns to scale and that resources are 
uniformly distributed, “the economy is reduced to a Robinson Crusoe type economy 
where each individual produces his/her own consumption” (p.342). In such a 
framework, any point in the map can form the basis of an autarkic economy, where 
goods are produced in small scale unless the economy is open to trade. It is obvious 
that in such a setting, the concepts of location and agglomeration become redundant 
(Krugman, 1995).
10 In this context, it is important to note that most of the debate has focused on the “direct” benefits and 
costs associated with establishing a banking centre. A more fruitful avenue to explore is to examine the 
indirect effects of attracting foreign banks. First, attracting foreign banks may allow national 
governments and domestic corporations to have a greater access to international capital markets.
 ^ Second, foreign banks may improve the efficiency of the domestic banking system by inducing
competition and introducing new banking practices and financial products. These two benefits are quite 
substantial and can provide justification for some policy makers to pursue policies aimed at 
establishing a banking centre. Recent work (Fattouh, 1999) examines empirically the impact of 
attracting foreign banks on the probability o f a country’s access to international capital markets. 
Fattouh finds that attracting foreign banks to a national economy improves local firms and national 
governments’ chances of access to international capital markets, other things being equal. Using 
cointegration analysis and employing quarterly data from Hong Kong, Fattouh (1999) also shows that 
there is a stable relationship between the number of banks in a centre, the development of the domestic 
banking system, and economic development.
11 The lack of interest to study financial centres was observed first by Kindleberger (1974) who wrote, 
"the formation of financial centres is no longer studied in economics" (p.l).
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Despite the general neglect from economists, the literature on financial centres grew 
considerably during the last two decades. The initial and main contribution to this 
literature came from economic historians who were interested in explaining the major 
factors that contribute to the emergence of international financial centres and 
identifying the major agglomeration forces in financial activity (Kindleberger, 1974; 
Jones, 1992). For instance, Jones (1992a) provides a useful account of the history of 
banking centres in Asia and the Middle East. Based on this historical account, Jones 
(op.cit.) argues that the emergence of these centres rests on features such as stability, 
low tax rates, secrecy, etc. Once the centre is established, external economies of scale 
(agglomeration economies) would contribute further to the growth of the centre. 
Kindleberger (1974) argues that international financial activity is subject to 
economies of scale which would ultimately result in the supremacy of a single centre 
in each domestic economy. He goes on to argue that the same agglomeration forces 
are likely to generate a hierarchy of international financial centres with one or two 
centres at the top of the hierarchy. Kindleberger analyses qualitatively these processes 
in the context of European centres. Reed’s study (1981) reaches similar conclusions 
regarding the hierarchy among centres. Using cluster analysis and data pertaining to 
80 cities over the period 1900-1980, Reed provides a very comprehensive analysis on 
the evolution of financial centres and the development of hierarchy amongst these 
centres.
In the early 80s, the literature became dominated to a large extent by empirical 
studies. The rapid growth of multinational banking during the 70s and 80s has 
encouraged many economists to provide a general framework to explain the major
20
factors responsible for multinationalisation of banks (Grubel, 1977; Gray and Gray, 
1981; Aliber, 1984; Sabi, 1987; Goldberg and Saunders, 1980, 1981). Part of this 
wide literature addressed the issue of bank location (Choi et al, 1986; Grosse and 
Goldberg, 1991). Given that multinational banks are likely to establish offices in 
major international financial centres, few surveys were constructed to examine in 
detail the centres’ main features which are responsible for attracting banks (Daniels, 
1986). Other studies employed econometric techniques to study the major 
determinants of banks’ location (Choi et al, 1986, 1996). Despite their usefulness, 
these studies were not aimed at explaining financial centres and in a sense they are a 
product of a diffused literature on multinational banking. For instance, there have 
been no attempts to study systematically the major factors responsible for the 
centralisation of financial activity or analyse the emergence of these centres. In fact, 
most studies limited the study of financial centres to the analysis of the pattern of
, trade in bank offices. It is not until very recently that economists have provided a
general theoretical framework to analyse the location of financial activity, building on 
the insights of industrial location theory (Davis, 1990) and the literature on 
information asymmetry (Scholtens, 1992).
The present thesis is a contribution to the study of banking centres.12 It aims to study 
banking centres theoretically and empirically, focusing on several key issues:
>
12 It is important to stress that in this thesis banking markets are broadly defined and comprise various 
activities such as international lending and borrowing, risk and liquidity management, advisory 
services, and trading and dealing in foreign exchange and derivatives markets. Based on this broad 
definition, it is possible to argue that banking markets dominate financial centres. Hence, although in 
the thesis, we use “financial centres” and “banking centres” interchangeably, the discussion is virtually 
about banking centres.
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• The major processes responsible for the agglomeration and dispersion of financial 
activity and the conditions necessary for the operation of these processes
• The impact of distance on the bank-borrower relationship and the implication of 
this relationship on the degree of agglomeration of banking activity
• The path dependence process in financial centres and some of its possible 
consequences
• The major functions of banking centres, the conditions necessary for their 
emergence, and how these centres evolve over time
• The links between banking centres and their regional economies
In what follows, we provide a summary and layout of the main issues and arguments 
in the thesis.
1.2 Agglomeration and Dispersion Forces in Financial Activity
The first part of the thesis contributes to the existing literature by analysing 
systematically the major agglomeration and dispersion forces in financial activity, 
using insights from the theories of financial intermediation and economic geography. 
Given the importance of information in financial intermediation, chapter 3 analyses 
the impact of information asymmetry on the degree of centralisation of lending 
activity. Specifically, Chapter 3 addresses the following questions: Does information 
asymmetry act as a centralising or decentralising force? How does the location of the 
bank relative to the borrower affect the relationship between the two agents and what 
is the implication of this relationship on the degree of centralisation of lending 
activity? Which types of lending activity are likely to be associated with the 
emergence of financial centres? Finally, will recent advances in information
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technology undermine the position of financial centres? In line with chapter 3, chapter 
4 analyses the main agglomeration and dispersion forces in the financial industry, but 
without any reference to the bank-borrower relationship. Specifically, chapter 4 
addresses the following questions: Why do banks want to locate near each other? 
Chapter 5 analyses the path dependence process in financial industry and the possible 
consequences of such a process on the location and agglomeration of financial 
activity.
1.2.1 Information Asymmetries and the Degree o f Centralisation of Lending Activity 
Recent models of financial intermediation stress the importance of banks as monitors 
and information gatherers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Diamond and Dyvbig, 1983; 
Williamson, 1986). Given the importance of information in financial intermediation, 
we study the impact of information asymmetry on the location of financial activity 
which requires that we examine first the interaction between information and distance. 
This is in contrast with existing models which analyse this relationship in a space - 
dimensionless world.
Theoretically, it is possible to distinguish between highly standardised financial 
products that require low investment in local information and non-standardised 
financial products which utilise information to a high degree. While the location of 
the bank relative to the borrower plays a minor role in the delivery of standardised 
products, we assume that the distance between the bank and the borrower still matters 
for the delivery of non-standardised financial products, mainly bank loans.13 It is true 
that recent advances in information technology mean that much information can be
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obtained at low costs, but the quality of information may deteriorate the further the 
bank is from the ultimate source of information i.e. the borrower. This may be the 
case because information is usually produced within a local context which can not be 
transmitted with the piece of information. Consequently, the ability of financial 
institutions to process and evaluate information in an efficient or even in an accurate 
manner is adversely affected (Porteous, 1995). Proximity is also important in cases 
where information produced is not highly reliable. In these cases, banks must collect 
their own information which requires direct contact with borrowers. This applies 
mainly to borrowers from countries in which there are doubts about the quality of 
information, the accounting and auditing procedures and/or the entire legal system. In 
these circumstances, even when information can be obtained cheaply due to advances 
in information technology, its usefulness is limited and hence banks will not be in a 
position to base their decisions on such information. The costs involved in the 
monitoring stage can also be highly location dependent since the information required 
at that stage is highly non-standardised (Porteous, 1995). Obtaining such information 
may require frequent visits to borrowers which is costly in terms of time and 
transportation. These costs may increase in cross-border banking since banks may 
face additional costs arising from dealing with a different legal system and 
institutional infrastructure.
Chapter 3 analyses the lender-borrower relationship using Wiliamson’s (1986, 1987) 
model of credit rationing. Under the assumption that monitoring costs are increasing 
and convex with distance (Porteous, 1995), it can be shown that there is a distance
13 An implicit assumption in this discussion is that non-standardisation is due to information 
asymmetry.
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(d*) beyond which a bank may decide to ration credit to certain borrowers.14 In other 
words, the location of the bank relative to the borrower can affect the profit function 
of the former and/or the latter’s access to credit.15 Hence, banks may have the 
incentive to locate near borrowers, especially if the bank wants to increase its share of 
the credit market.
The idea that banks want to locate near their main borrowers has been analysed in the 
context of the theory of bank multinationality. It its crudest form, this theory applies 
the elements of manufacturing multinational corporation (MNC) theory to the banking 
firm, with a few modifications to take into account the importance of trust and 
information in the business of banking (Dunning, 1988). One important hypothesis 
that emerges from this literature is that a bank has the incentive to follow its main 
borrowers abroad in order to maintain an “ownership advantage” in terms of 
information stock (Gray and Gray, 1981). Despite its usefulness, the “eclectic” 
approach to bank location suffers from many shortcomings. For instance, in this 
paradigm, the decision of banks to locate near their main borrowers is not optimal. As 
in the case of manufacturing firms, the decision of banks to locate near multinational 
borrowers is mainly to protect their market shares from local and other foreign banks. 
More importantly, this paradigm neglects many special features of financial 
intermediaries such as their monitoring and information processing functions and 
treats the bank as any other manufacturing firm.
14 This analysis has wider social and economic implications at the national level. Chick and Dow 
(1988) for instance develop a model in which low credit to borrowers in the periphery results in low 
growth in that region which in turn would translate into low demand for credit. In this thesis, the 
emergence of national centres and the regional effects o f financial activity are not discussed. Instead, 
the analysis is limited here to international financial centres. Specifically, we study the impact of 
information asymmetry on the agglomeration o f international financial activity.
15 It is important to note that distance does not necessarily refer to mere geographical distance. It is 
more general and captures features such as language and culture, consistency o f accounting standards, 
similar business environment, etc.
Using recent models of financial intermediation to analyse the lender-borrower 
relationship permits an examination of the impact of information asymmetry on the 
degree of centralisation of lending activity. But first, it is useful to make the 
distinction between retail and wholesale banking. Retail banking involves dealing 
with households and small and medium firms which are numerous and distributed all 
over the world while wholesale banking deals with fewer borrowers, mainly MNC 
headquarters, other banks and wealthy individuals. Given that retail borrowers follow 
a scattered distribution, non-standardisation, due to information asymmetries, can act 
as a powerful dispersion force in lending activity. In fact, existing evidence suggests 
that despite the fact that many retail products are “technically tradable” and hence do 
not require proximity between the bank and the customer, actual trade in most retail 
products is negligible (UN, 1994). Hence, in order for banks to establish a competitive 
edge in other markets, they must have a wide network of bank offices. As such, the 
emergence of financial centres can not be linked to the internationalisation of retail 
banking which occurred all over the world. On the other hand, wholesale banking 
shows a high degree of centralisation. Many of the wholesale customers such as MNC 
headquarters and other financial institutions are headquartered in few financial 
centres. Furthermore, many of the wholesale banking products are more standardised 
than retail financial products.16 These two factors contribute to the centralisation of 
wholesale banking and hence by locating in a certain geographical location (i.e. a 
financial centre), a bank can service its regional borrowers without its optimal profits 
being affected. Hence, it is legitimate to conclude that wholesale banking activity is 
the main activity associated with emergence of financial centres. In fact, the
16 Exceptions are OTC derivatives and swaps which are non-standardised.
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internationalisation of wholesale banking was manifested in the emergence of these 
centres.
1.2.2 Information Technology: An Agglomeration or Dispersion Force?
The tension between centralisation and decentralisaton within the financial industry 
has been intensified by recent developments in information technology. The “end of 
geography” thesis may suggest that recent advances in information technology 
undermine the location of financial activity and as a consequence it renders financial 
centres obsolete by exerting pressure on the financial industry towards 
decentralisation (O’Brien, 1991). In the first instance, the argument seems valid. After 
all, recent advances in information technology mean that financial institutions could 
obtain all the relevant information from a distance at a very low cost. However, the 
impact of information technology on the financial industry is not that straightforward. 
Information technology can also enhance centralisation (Martin, 1992). Being able to 
provide services at a distance means that banks can service far away customers from a 
centre and at the same time benefit from the various externalities that financial centres 
can offer. It was argued in the previous section that banks by locating in regional 
financial centres are able to provide their service to regional borrowers without their 
cost structure being affected. As far as this type of activity is concerned, advances in 
information technology do not necessarily undermine these centres. On the contrary, 
information technology may have intensified the centralisation of this type of activity 
by reducing the cost of obtaining information about these borrowers. In the case of 
transparent financial services, information technology can enhance the degree of 
centralisation. It is true that the provision of these services does not require physical 
proximity to the market or the customer, but precisely because of this fact banks can
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provide these services from a financial centre and benefit from other externalities that 
arise from centralisation such as access to deeper and more liquid markets, highly 
specialised intermediate inputs and skilled labour, and highly sophisticated public 
infrastructure.
The treatment of the financial firm as a single entity obscures an important aspect of 
the impact of information technology on the financial industry. In fact, the impact of 
information technology has been significant on the separation of front office activities 
(funding, raising capital, issuing bonds, etc.) from back office activities (data 
processing, check processing, credit card operations, etc.), which traditionally were 
located together or near each other. Some banks have already shifted part of their 
back office activities to cheaper locations. This was made possible by recent advances 
in information technology which enabled managers to connect different parts of the 
bank. However, this separation effect has been limited only to a small number of large 
banks. Other factors such as lack of resources and unavailability of skilled labour 
seem to prevent the relocation of small and medium sized banks to more cost- 
effective locations. As far as front office activities are concerned, these still show a 
high tendency to centralise mainly because sunk costs in terms of loss of established 
relationships with main borrowers and other banks remain substantial (Jacobs et al, 
1990; Edwards, 1998).
1.2.3 Informational Spillovers Among Banks as an Agglomeration Force 
A major agglomeration force can be found in the existence of externalities. It is 
usually the norm to distinguish between two types of externalities: Technological 
externalities and pecuniary externalities. Technological externalities refer usually to
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non-market interactions which can affect directly the production function of a firm or 
the utility function of a consumer. Pecuniary externalities on the other hand occur 
through market interactions via the price mechanism (Krugman, 1991). Although both 
types of externalities can create agglomeration forces, the literature on financial 
centres has mainly focused on technological externalities. Specifically, studies that 
deal with financial centres usually equate technological externalities with 
informational spillovers among banks (Davis, 1990; Code, 1991). The main argument 
is that face to face contact and physical proximity still form the major source of 
information (Code, 1991). In a similar vein, Davis (1990) argues that informational 
spillovers reduce the costs associated with information asymmetry. These effects are 
likely to increase the size and enhance the liquidity of interbank markets providing 
banks with an incentive to locate near each other. These arguments are based on the 
assumption that spillovers between banks decline rapidly with distance.
i
There are two main shortcomings of such explanations that are worth mentioning in 
this introduction. The first is that this type of externality enters the model as an 
imposed or arbitrary assumption. Second, it is very difficult to quantify the 
importance of these informational spillovers or their influence on the degree of bank 
agglomeration.
I 1.2.4 Demand for Specialised Intermediate services as an Agglomeration Force
Another type of externality, pecuniary externality, has been neglected as a possible 
source for agglomeration in financial activity. As Krugman (1991) emphasises, 
pecuniary externalities are real and are as important as technological spillovers in 
explaining the economics of agglomeration. For instance, linkages between the
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financial sector and the intermediate service sector can generate a powerful 
agglomeration force in both industries. This aspect of agglomeration however is not 
fully explored in the literature on financial centres. There are two main reasons for 
this neglect. The first is related to the fact that pecuniary externalities do not coexist 
with a competitive market structure. Under the assumption of perfect competition, all 
firms are price takers and hence the benefits of interaction can not arise through the 
usual market mechanism via the mediation of prices (Krugman, 1991). Hence, in 
order to examine the impact of pecuniary externalities on the agglomeration of 
economic activity, it is essential to assume imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale in production which complicates the analysis since it introduces non­
convexities. The second factor is related to the fact that the financial industry is 
usually considered as pail of the producer services sector (Daniels, 1993). While 
credit products such as loans can be considered as inputs necessary for the production 
of a firm, many types of financial products (shares, bonds, option, etc) are closer to 
commodities rather than to intermediate inputs in the sense that utility from these 
services is not obtained from their consumption like in the case of other services such 
as accounting or advertising, but from their tradable nature. The main implication of 
such treatment of financial services is that it does not allow for the possibility of 
identifying a distinct producer service complex in financial centres similar to the one 
found in industrial centres (Sassen, 1991).
Taking these two factors into account and using the insights of the emerging literature 
of economic geography, chapter 4 provides a model in which financial firms’ demand 
for differentiated services can generate a powerful agglomeration force in the 
financial industry. In particular, agglomeration of financial activity, which creates a
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localised demand, can support the establishment of a highly specialised service 
complex which in turn improves the productivity of financial institutions. This 
process has been recognised previously in the literature on international financial 
centres (Davis, 1990; Daniels, 1986; Grilli, 1989). However, the conditions under 
which these channels operate were not explored or formalised. The model developed 
in Chapter 4 fills this gap in the literature. The model shows that in order for this 
agglomeration force to work, certain conditions are required the most important of 
which is that the intermediate sector must operate under conditions o f monopolistic 
competition. Without the assumption of imperfect competition, agglomeration forces 
of that type can not arise. This fact has been completely ignored in the qualitative and 
historical analysis of financial centres.
1.2.5 Demand for Skilled labour as an Agglomeration Force
The provision of financial services depends to a large extent on a highly qualified and 
specialised labour force. In fact, Walter’s survey (1988) shows that skilled labour is 
the most important input for the provision of most types of financial services. Hence, 
the desire to acquire skilled labour can provide an incentive for banks to locate in 
certain geographical areas. There are strong reasons to think that agglomeration of 
financial institutions allows for a pool of highly skilled labour (Grilli, 1989). First, 
competition among a larger number of banks may push wages upward in the market 
for skilled labour giving an incentive for skilled labour to centralise around these 
firms. Second, skilled workers have the incentive to centralise around a cluster of 
banks because the probability of being unemployed is much lower than other areas 
characterised by smaller number of banks.17 Finally, a market for skilled labour
17 This result is attained because o f the assumption of uncertain demand for labour.
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provide banks with incentive to locate near that pool not necessarily because wages 
are lower, but because the availability of skilled labour increases the expected profit 
for banks providing them with the incentive to locate near a pool of skilled labour.18
1.2.6 Path Dependence as an Agglomeration Force
Financial centres are also characterised by path dependence which could act as a 
powerful agglomeration force. Path dependence can be defined as a process in which 
the initial conditions of the process determine the outcome (Porteous, 1995). To put it 
differently, once a centre has established an early advantage, it can sustain that 
advantage over a long period of time. Despite its importance, path dependence has 
been largely ignored in the literature on financial centres (with the exception of 
Porteous, 1995). Using the general framework suggested by Arthur (1988a,b, 1989), 
Chapter 5 contributes to the existing literature by examining in detail path dependence 
in the financial services industry and some of its possible consequences. One such 
consequence is that that the location of economic activity can no longer be explained 
solely by economic determinism. We can show that one region is able to "lock-in" 
financial activity, but we can not predict which region will assume this role since self­
reinforcing mechanisms create multiple solutions for the location problem.
Many factors interact to determine the location of financial activity. These factors can 
be purely geographical, historical, institutional, or cultural (Grilli, 1989). Arthur 
(1988a) focuses on "historical chance" as a very important determinant of the location 
of economic activity. Although chance may have contributed to the emergence of a
18 For instance, financial firms’ access to professional expertise in the major international financial 
centres is cited as the main factors responsible for the centralisation of derivative activity in those 
centres. The incapability o f other banking centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore to increase their 
share of derivative activity is due to the lack of such professional expertise (Cassard, 1994).
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certain city as a financial centre, there is no doubt that there are some inherent 
characteristics or geographical benefits in a location that have attracted the “first 
movers”. Chapter 5 describes few of these inherent static characteristics suggested in 
the literature. It is argued that the static approach resulted in a very fixed 
understanding of financial centres while in reality financial centres are dynamic 
establishments. This suggests that some locational advantages can become obsolete 
while others may be created and hence the importance of introducing dynamic 
advantages into the picture.
The introduction of dynamic locational benefits into the model is also required to deal 
with another major shortcoming of Arthur’s framework; the issue of path dependence 
reversal. Specifically, the general framework does not allow for the path dependence 
process to be broken, but historical and empirical evidence suggests that shifts to a 
new negative growth path do occur. An important example is Beirut which has lost its 
role as the financial centre of the Middle East as a result of strong shocks, mainly 
political instability and civil war. Another example from the same region is Bahrain 
which has failed to diversify its financial infrastructure and has lost a large part of its 
banking activity to other centres. Unlike Beirut, Bahrain did not witness a strong 
shock, but rather a series of small shocks. The empirical evidence presented in 
Chapter 2 also suggests that the importance of Japan as a financial centre has declined 
considerably. Such evidence suggests that shifts to a new negative growth path do 
occur and hence the above framework must take into account this fact if it is to be 
applied to financial centres.
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Chapter 5 identifies there locational dynamic advantages. These are the ability of the 
centre to reduce the cost structure of financial firms, to generate profitable business 
opportunities and to attract information flows. It is argued that these features are the 
major determinants of the location of financial activity and more importantly these 
features are dynamic in the sense that they can change over time. Hence, their 
inclusion in the general payoff function allows the possibility of a shift to a new 
negative growth path. Specifically, if these benefits decline overtime due to strong 
shocks -such as war, political instability, severe crisis- or due to a series of cumulative 
shocks, enough to offset the benefits that arise from agglomeration, a financial centre 
can find itself on a negative growth path.
1.3 Emergence and Evolution of Financial Centres
Recent movements towards liberalisation of financial services and implementation of 
financial sector reforms in many parts of the world have intensified the degree of 
competition in the provision of financial services. One aspect of this competition has 
been manifested in the increasing importance of cross border banking flows i.e. the 
flow of deposits and loans between geographical regions. Financial centres play a 
vital role in the process of transferring funds between geographical regions. In fact, it 
could be argued the network of financial centres was established in the first place to 
overcome the barrier of distance.
Despite their importance, the literature has provided very few theoretical models to 
explain the emergence and function of these centres. In fact, these important aspects 
of financial centres were mainly analysed by economic historians (Jones, 1992a,b) 
although recently some economists have analysed this aspect in a more formal
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manner. The historical studies have identified many conditions that a geographical 
location must satisfy in order to emerge as a financial centre. These conditions can be 
very general (strategic location, historical character, political stability) or more 
specific (favourable regulatory and tax environment for the financial industry). Recent 
theoretical work explains emergence in terms of differences in regulatory and tax 
structure (Eaton, 1994; Cassard, 1994). Countries with lower tax rates and flexible 
regulatory environment, reflected for instance in lower reserve requirements tend to 
have lower spreads and hence would specialise in the provision of both deposits and 
loans. For instance, in Eaton’s (1994) over lapping generation model, countries in 
which monetary authorities place less weight on seigniorage revenue (i.e. systems 
which rely less on the taxation of the financial system) can achieve higher rates of 
return on deposits and lower rates of return on loans. As a result, such countries are 
able to attract deposits from abroad and finance non-resident borrowers.
Chapter 7 contributes to this literature by providing a theoretical model to explain the 
emergence and evolution of financial centres. Specifically, it addresses the following 
questions: What are the main conditions required for a country to emerge as a 
financial centre? How does the function of these centres evolve over time?
Although the model analyses the emergence of financial centres in general, it focuses 
more on regional banking centres (such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Bahrain) which 
play an important role in linking regional domestic capital markets to international 
capital markets (Hodjera, 1978). These links can take three important forms (Eaton, 
1994). First, a banking system may be acting as a financial intermediary for the region 
or the rest of the world by attracting deposits and then channelling these funds as
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deposits and loans to non-fmancial enterprises in their regional economies or to that 
same region where funds were attracted from originally. These countries we refer to 
as regional banking centres. Second, a banking system may be attracting both loans 
and deposits from international financial markets. We refer to this type of banking 
systems as inward transformers which are likely to emerge in countries with large 
investment opportunities such that an inflow of deposits and loans are required to 
meet the demand for credit. Finally, a banking system may be transferring funds from 
domestic economies to international financial markets both by depositing and lending 
funds abroad. These centres are mainly known as collection centres or outward 
transformers which are likely to emerge in countries with excess savings and little 
investment opportunities or low absorptive capacity (Eaton, 1994).
In our model, the emergence of banking centres is based on a combination of 
efficiency and economies of scale in intermediation. In our story of emergence, we 
capture three important features of financial centres. The first feature relates to the 
possibility of indeterminacy. In cases where the centres do not have the required 
amount of savings to fund a critical mass of investment opportunities, the emergence 
of a certain country as a financial centre is not straightforward. Unless a centre is able 
to attract a certain critical mass of saving from a sufficient number of countries, it will 
not emerge as a regional centre. A second related feature is that it is not necessarily 
true that the country which provides the most efficient intermediation would 
necessarily emerge as a regional centre. A country with less efficient financial 
intermediaries can also emerge as a regional centre although the amount of savings 
needed to be intermediated through the centre must be larger for such emergence to 
occur. This allows for some element of indeterminacy in the model. This aspect of
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emergence has been neglected in the literature on financial centres. The third feature 
relates to the possibility of a reinforcing mechanism which allows for the case that 
once a centre has been established, it would continue to attract funds to the region 
unless a strong shock occurs which reverses the flow of savings. This is much related 
to the concept of path dependence which was discussed previously in section 2.
Chapter 7 makes an additional contribution by examining the evolution of cross 
border banking flows. Specifically, it tries to explain the various categories of banking 
systems. Under certain assumptions related to transferability of knowledge, it is 
possible to identify three possible processes of cross border lending activities. In case 
of complete transferability of knowledge, domestic and cross-border lending activities 
tend to co-exist. In other words, the intermediary would finance both domestic and 
foreign production. This situation can go on indefinitely as long as the economy is not 
i saving constrained. On the other hand, when transferability of knowledge is
incomplete such that countries can grow at different rates, a financial intermediary 
could polarise and as a consequence two extreme cases can emerge by which the 
financial intermediary either supports domestic production (an extreme case of an 
inward transformer where the intermediary transforms all foreign inflows into 
domestic loans) or foreign production (an extreme case of an outward transformer 
where the intermediary transforms all inflows into foreign loans).
1.4 Empirical Literature
The last part of the thesis examines empirically some hypotheses that emerge from the 
theoretical discussion of previous chapters. Specifically, chapter 6 provides empirical 
evidence on the major determinants of banks’ location in a centre while chapter 8
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provides empirical evidence on the links between banking centres and regional 
economic activity, using Hong Kong as a study case.
1.4.1 Determinants o f Financial Centres' Competitiveness
Empirically, the issue of bank location has been approached in two complementary 
ways. The first approach consists of organising open interviews with bankers and 
constructing questionnaires aimed at identifying the major factors that push 
multinational banks to establish bank offices in financial centres (Daniels, 1986; Ter 
Hart and Piersma, 1990). The second approach uses econometric analysis to study the 
major determinants of the location pattern of the world’s largest banks across centres 
(Choi et al 1986, 1996) or to examine the major factors responsible for banks locating 
in major international financial centres, mainly New York and London (Grosse and 
Goldberg, 1991; Fisher and Molyneux, 1996).
Despite its usefulness, empirical work on financial centres remains highly scattered 
and highly uninformative. Given the large number of hypotheses these studies attempt 
to test, one can not reach definite conclusions regarding the major determinants of 
financial centres’ competitiveness. The only explanatory variable that seems to be 
significant in most studies is the volume of trade. That is to say that countries with 
large volumes of trade are likely to attract large number of banks and higher levels of 
financial activity and/or trade links between countries are likely to result in trade in 
bank offices. Chapter 6 provides a critical review of the empirical literature which 
allows us to identify the major determinants of the competitiveness of a financial 
centre and to examine the main problems associated with testing empirically these 
determinants. As will become clear from the discussion, these studies were not aimed
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at explaining the existence of financial centres and in a sense they were a product of a 
diffused literature on multinational banking. For instance, there was no attempt in 
these studies to address systematically the major features of financial centres and 
instead this empirical work limited the study of financial centres to the study of 
pattern of trade in bank offices.
Chapter 6 addresses the issue of bank location using a different approach which takes 
into account the special features of financial centres and is based on the theoretical 
discussion of previous chapters. Specifically, rather than examining banks’ location 
all over the world, which is more related to the internationalisation of retail banking 
activity, the focus of this chapter is on the factors that determine banks’ decision to 
establish in the world’s leading centres. The alternative approach also rests on the 
observation that financial activity related to trade or foreign direct investment should 
not be considered as the main component of financial centre’s activity (Brealey and 
Kaplanis, 1996; Thrift, 1987), Instead, according to the models developed in this 
thesis financial institutions also locate in financial centres in order to access the 
centres’ financial markets and to benefit from the various externalities that these 
centres offer, such as access to deeper and more liquid interbank markets, specialised 
intermediate inputs and a highly skilled labour force. Using data from the largest 
fifteen centres in the world, we test whether after controlling for bilateral trade, 
foreign direct investment, and size of the country of origin, agglomeration benefits 
and greater access to deeper and liquid markets are important determinants o f banks ’ 
location in a centre. In order to test for this hypothesis, an agglomeration-diversity 
index is constructed using new data series.
39
This chapter makes additional contributions to the literature which are worth 
mentioning in this introduction. First, it differentiates between the different forms of 
physical presence. We expect the impact of the explanatory variables to be different 
across branches, subsidiaries, and representative offices. Second, this chapter utilises 
more than one econometric technique (linear and probit and logit estimation) to test 
for the proposed hypotheses. Because of the nature of the hypothesis being tested, it 
would be more meaningful to examine the impact of explanatory variables on the 
probability that a bank would establish in a certain centre. The probit and logit models 
used in this chapter allow us to carry such an exercise.
1.4.2 Links Between Banking Centres and Regional Economies 
The fact that banking centres are linked to regional economic activity is well 
recognised in the literature. However, few attempts have been made to formalise this 
\ feature of regional centres.19 Equally important, there have not been any attempts to
establish empirically the links between a banking centre’s level of financial 
development and regional economic activity. Chapter 8 contributes to the literature by 
providing empirical evidence on the links between Hong Kong’s banking activity and 
regional economic activity. Specifically, we explore this relationship using two pieces 
of empirical evidence. First, we examine the relationship between the number of 
banks in Hong Kong and regional trade. We test for the hypothesis that the large 
\ number of banks in Hong Kong is associated with regional trade activity, rather than
bilateral trade. The second piece of empirical evidence examines the relationship 
between financial and economic development in the case of Hong Kong. One major 
feature of banking centres is the size of their banking system which is usually much
19 This issue was discussed extensively in section 5.
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larger than the size of their local economies. More importantly, the banking system is 
likely to be linked with its regional economies. As suggested in this introduction, the 
strength of the national economy is playing a diminishing role in the success of a 
centre. Any empirical analysis that examines the relationship between financial and 
economic development must take into account these two important features. In order 
to do this, we distinguish between the level of development of the domestic banking 
system and that of the external banking system. We also introduce regional economic 
activity into the picture. We expect domestic lending activity to be linked with 
domestic economic development, but not necessarily with regional economic activity. 
On the other hand, we expect a centre’s financial development to be linked with the 
region’s economic activity. Hence, we test for two related hypotheses. The first 
concerns the relationship between domestic economic and financial development. 
This is in line with the existing empirical literature on finance and development 
(Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). The second hypothesis concerns the relationship 
between external banking development and regional economic activity. In chapter 8, 
these two hypotheses are tested jointly using cointegration analysis.
1.5 Conclusion
This introductory chapter has set out some of the issues and questions that have 
motivated this thesis. It also provides a summary and layout of its main arguments. 
Specifically, it sets out the problem of the location of financial activity in terms of 
agglomeration and dispersion forces in the financial industry. It also discusses the 
issues of emergence and evolution of financial centres. Finally, it states the main 
hypotheses that we intend to test empirically.
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Chapter 2 - Centralisation of International Financial Activity:
Some Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
As a first attempt, financial centres can be defined as geographical locations where 
financial activity and financial institutions centralise. This definition however 
obscures some important aspects of financial centres. First, it is not clear what is 
meant by "financial activity" in the above definition. In order to arrive at a more 
accurate definition of a financial centre as well as to make a useful distinction 
between the different types of centres, it is important not to treat financial services as 
a homogenous category. 1 Instead, it should be stressed that financial services are 
diverse. Financial services utilise inputs such as skilled labour and local information 
at different intensity and require different modes for their delivery either through a 
physical establishment or by trade.
Second, the above definition does not take into account the heterogeneous nature of 
the centres themselves. The conditions under which financial centres emerge and their 
roles vary considerably across centres (Kindleberger, 1974). More importantly, the 
functions and the variety of services offered by these centres and the complexity of 
their financial structure differ substantially. This heterogeneity principle does not 
apply only when comparing financial centres in developing countries with those of the 
developed world, but also among financial centres in the developing world.2 A similar 
treatment of financial centres without any attempt at differentiation would seriously
1 Lee et al (1992) argue that " the category financial services can not be regarded as a rational 
abstraction or taken to indicate a unitary set o f activities.”
2 This has also been emphasised by Byrant (1987) who argues that " the offshore financial centres are 
diverse in nature... A  careful analysis o f the offshore centres should differentiate among them 
according to their economic and financial structures and the types of regulatory, tax, and supervisory 
environments they have established.” (p. 140).
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limit our understanding of the nature of these centres and the determinants of their 
competitiveness.
Third, the above definition obscures the fact that financial centres are not locally 
oriented in the sense that they do not provide services for their local national economy 
only, but mainly extend their services to regional clients. However, the ability of these 
centres to provide services to their regional clients depends primarily on the nature of 
the financial product. In particular, it depends on whether the provision of the 
financial product requires heavy investment in local information and on the ability of 
financial institutions to acquire the necessary information without increasing financial 
institutions’ cost structure or affecting their profitability.
Finally, the above definition does not specify the customers that are likely to demand 
► financial centres' services. These customers do not form a homogeneous group. The
distinction between different types of customers, such as the distinction between retail 
and corporate customers, is important because the nature of information required in 
the provision of a financial service and its tradability depend to a large extent on the 
type of customer.
This chapter has two main objectives. First, it provides the empirical background for 
|  the problems examined in subsequent chapters. Specifically, this chapter establishes
some stylised facts regarding the centralisation of international financial activity. 
Second, based on the empirical evidence, this chapter analyses some of financial 
centres’ main features discussed above.
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This chapter is divided into three main sections. In section 2, a classification of 
international financial services is presented, while section 3 provides empirical 
evidence on the extent of centralisation of different types of financial activity. In the 
last section, a distinction between banking centres and international financial centres 
is made. The last section contains my conclusion.
2.2 Diversity of Financial Products
Financial institutions provide a very wide range of financial services which makes it 
very difficult to examine each financial product on its own. Given this constraint, this 
chapter adopts a more functional approach. This approach consists of grouping 
different types of international financial services into a few categories. Based on 
Smith and Walter (1997) and UN (1994), it is possible to classify international 
financial activity into the following categories:
a. Credit and deposit taking activity: This activity still forms the core of banking 
business. Credit activity varies from extending loans to small customers to a more 
specialised form of funding such as export financing, or syndicate lending. 
Deposit taking activity consists of offering deposits of different maturities (current 
account, time deposits, demand deposits, overnight etc.) sizes (CDs, retail 
deposits), and marketability or liquidity.
b. Advisory Services: Financial institutions provide advisory services to meet the 
complex needs of their clients. The products in this category vary from corporate 
cash management and general corporate financial services to more specialised 
services such as real estate and trade advisory services.
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c. Liquidity Management. Due to the increased volatility of international financial 
markets since 1973, customers have increased their demand for services in the 
area of risk and liquidity management. Financial institutions offer a variety of 
products such as swaps, options, and futures that enable customers and financial 
institutions to shift various types of risks (credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange risk, country risk, etc.) to those who are willing to assume them.
d. Trading and Dealing: Financial institutions are active traders in many markets 
such as the foreign exchange market, securities market, bond market and 
interbank markets. Financial institutions trade on behalf of their customers such as 
importers, exporters, and multinational borrowers or for their own account.
e. Payment clearing activity'. Financial institutions provide a variety of financial 
products for effecting payment transactions. These products are diverse (cheques, 
debit cards, bank drafts etc.) and can be tailored to meet the demands of their 
customers (letters of credit, international collections). This category also includes 
payment transfers such as domestic funds transfer, international fund transfers as 
well as international payment clearing.
Table 2.1 shows the main products involved in each of these categories. Two points 
are worth mentioning regarding this classification. First, the categories suggested are 
not rigid in the sense that a few financial products can be grouped under more than 
one category. Second, this categorisation does not include all types of financial
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services. Given that the main objective of this chapter is to study aspects of the 
centralisation of financial activity, these problems of classification are not binding.
Table 2.1 - Classification of International Financial Products
Lending Activities Advisory Services
Financial Loans Corporate Cash Management
Equity Financing Corporate Fiscal Planning
Export Financing General Corporate Financial Services
Project Financing Real Estate Advisory
Venture Capital Financing Mergers and Aquisition
Real Estate Financing Legal and Investment Advisory Services
Leverage Buyout Financing General Financial Advice
Liquidity and Risk Management Trading and Dealing Activity
Swaps Money Market
Futures Securities
Options Foreign Exchange
Forwrad contracts Swaps
Payment Transactions Futures
Funds Transfer (Domestic and International) Options
International Collections Bullion
Letters of Credit Business
Based on Smith and Walter (1997) and UN (1994)
The distinction between different types of financial services has three major benefits. 
First, it allows us to make a useful distinction between the various types of financial 
centres. In particular, the diversity of financial services, which also reflects the 
complexity and level of the development of financial markets, is used to differentiate 
an “international financial centre” from a “banking centre”. Second, this distinction 
allows us to examine more accurately the fact that centres specialise in different types 
of financial activity. Finally, treating financial services as a heterogeneous category 
enables us to specify what types of financial activity are likely to show the highest 
degree of centralisation. In order to capture more fully the extent of these benefits, it 
is useful that we first provide some empirical evidence on the extent of centralisation 
of different types of financial activity. The evidence would also help us establish 
some stylised facts regarding the centralisation of financial activity.
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2.3 Centralisation of International Financial Activity: Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical evidence on the agglomeration of different types of 
financial activity. When data permit one or two main activities are chosen for analysis 
from each category specified in the previous section. Other than the fact that it is not 
possible to provide empirical evidence on all categories of financial services due to 
data unavailability, there are other general data problems that should be emphasised.
4
First, data are not presented with respect to the same reference year or period. For 
instance, data on international bank lending are compiled regularly by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in its Quarterly Review, International Banking and 
Financial Market Developments. Hence, it is possible to provide time series data on 
the concentration of cross border assets which allows us to examine the change over 
time in the geographical distribution of international lending. Data on foreign 
exchange and over-the-counter derivative activity, on the other hand, are collected 
once every three years. In some activities, such as bond trading, data are available for 
one year or two years at most. In such cases, it is not possible to examine the major 
developments in the geographical distribution of financial activity over a period of 
time.
Second, data are obtained from different sources. This usually affects the extent of 
coverage as well as certain definitions. For instance, BIS provides data on the 
developed world and major offshore centres, excluding countries with insignificant 
amounts of international financial activity. The International Financial Corporation 
(IFC) in its annual report Emerging Stock Markets Factbook provides data on stock 
market capitalisation and turnover from developed and emerging markets. The unit of 
analysis in both these sources is the whole country rather than a city in that country.
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On the other hand, the Federation Internationale des Bourses De Valeures (FIBV) 
divides countries according to their time zone rather than their level of development. 
Furthermore, FIBV provides data on main stock exchanges’ activity only. Since these 
exchanges are located in cities, data obtained are at the city level rather than at the 
country level. However, given that comparisons are made only using data from the 
same source and the fact that financial activity tend to show a high degree of 
centralisation within a country, such data problems do not restrain us from drawing 
some conclusions regarding the centralisation of financial activity.
The last and most serious limitation is that in some markets, data on market activity 
do not include over-the-counter market activity. Given the growing importance of 
OTC activity, this is quite binding since it is not possible to determine with accuracy 
the actual size of the market. This is particularly binding in the case of bond turnover 
I data where most trading in international bonds is over-the-counter.
2.5,1 Credit and Deposit Taking Activity
In this category, the focus of the discussion is on international bank lending and 
deposit taking. Cross border lending and deposit taking constitute the major parts of 
international banking and hence can give us an indication of the centralisation of 
international banking activity.
Cross Border Lending
Cross border assets consist of claims against non-residents including banks and non­
banks both in domestic and foreign currency. The geographical distribution of cross 
border assets (or external bank lending) can act as a comprehensive measure of
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centralisation of international banking activity. Table 2.2 reveals the following facts 
regarding international lending. First, the bulk of cross border bank assets are 
centralised in the major financial centres of the developed world (United Kingdom, 
United States, Japan, France and Germany). In 1998, these centres captured more than 
55% of the world’s cross border assets. Another interesting observation is the 
declining share of major developing world banking centres (Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Bahrain and the Caribbean Islands). In the early 1980s, banking centres’ share of total 
cross border assets was 25%. In the last decade, as a result of the shift of cross border 
assets towards financial centres of the developed world, the share of banking centres 
in the developing world declined considerably and by 1998, their share of world’s 
cross border assets stood at below 20%. Second, the degree of geographical 
concentration of cross border assets within the developed world is very high. In 1998, 
the major financial centres of the developed world (United Kingdom, United States, 
Japan, France and Germany) constituted around 70% of cross border assets with UK's 
share alone accounting for 25% of total cross border assets in the developed world. 
This makes the UK the biggest centre for international lending, followed at a distance 
by Japan, Germany and the United States. It is noteworthy that in 1998, Germany has 
surpasses the US as the 3rd banking centre. Third, in the developing world, the 
supremacy of Hong Kong and Singapore is evident. In 1998, Hong Kong and 
Singapore captured around 10% of total cross border assets. However, as the table 2.2 
shows, Hong Kong’s share has been declining recently. While in 1994, Hong Kong 
was the third biggest centre for international banking (after United Kingdom and 
Japan), in 1998 it has been overtaken by the United States, France, Germany, and 
Switzerland.
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Table 2.2 -  Geographical Distribution of the World’s Cross Border Assets
(vis-a-vis all sectors)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria 0.90% 0.93% 0.93% 0.91% 0.92% 0.95% 0.91% 0.80% 0.85%
Belgium 3.13% 3.18% 3.15% 3.18% 3.24% 3.22% 3.11% 2.82% 2.73%
Denmark 0.67% 0.67% 0.66% 0.83% 0.65% 0.65% 0.69% 0.67% 0.71%
Finland 0.18% 0.19% 0.18% 0.19% 0.18% 0.19% 0.23% 0.21% 0.19%
France 6.75% 6.61% 7.43% 8.11% 7.61% 7.73% 7.15% 7.15% 6.85%
Germany 6.03% 6.13% 5.91% 6.84% 6.59% 6.98% 7.17% 7.17% 8.60%
Ireland 0.17% 0.20% 0.27% 0.36% 0.40% 0.53% 0.78% 1.02% 1.28%
Italy 1.47% 1.72% 1.68% 2.29% 1.92% 2.01% 2.58% 2.20% 2.32%
Luxembourg 4.70% 5.00% 5.33% 4.91% 5.49% 5.25% 5.16% 4.59% 4.61%
Netherlands 2.76% 2.88% 2.79% 2.63% 2.46% 2.49% 2.45% 2.43% 2.90%
Norway 0.12% 0.14% 0.17% 0.10% 0.09% 0.07% 0.09% 0.09% 0.11%
Spain 0.62% 0.75% 1.10% 1.79% 1.55% 1.81% 1.56% 1.24% 1.32%
Sweden 0.55% 0.55% 0.51% 0.40% 0.35% 0.45% 0.54% 0.50% 0.53%
Switzerland 6.47% 6.33% 6.09% 5.50% 5.68% 5.42% 5.83% 5.87% 6.14%
United 17.00% 15.72% 16.34% 16.12% 16.86% 16.73% 17.53% 18.86% 19.71%
Kingdom
Canada 0.85% 0.76% 0.76% 0.64% 0.78% 0.81% 0.97% 0.99% 0.95%
Japan 15.10% 15.08% 14.10% 14.09% 14.16% 15.09% 13.49% 13.48% 12.96%
United 9.19% 9,39% 8.95% 8.32% 7.47% 7.44% 8.01% 8.75% 8.38%
States
Bahamas 2.94% 3.06% 2.71% 2.56% 2.73% 2.34% 2.40% 2.58% 2.43%
Bahrain 0.89% 0.80% 1.06% 0.86% 0.86% 0.74% 0.76% 0.76% 0.93%
Cayman 6.54% 6.61% 6.49% 6.04% 6.15% 5.67% 5.75% 5.66% 5.57%
Islands 
Hong Kong 7.37% 8.04% 8.14% 7.96% 8.64% 8.12% 7.31% 6.65% 5.18%
Singapore 5.52% 5.17% 5.11% 5.24% 5.10% 5.20% 5.34% 5.30% 4.52%
Other 0.07% 0.09% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.11% 0.18% 0.24% 0.23%
Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Various Issues.
The centralisation within the developing world’s major financial centres is very 
evident (Table 2.3). The growth of some banking centres and the decline of others 
have resulted in a major centralisation of assets in a few banking centres. In 1983, 
Hong Kong's cross border assets amounted to US$67.5 billion, then increased to 
US$655 billion in 1995 before declining to US$500 billion in 1998. The same pattern 
can be observed in Singapore where its banks' cross border assets amounted to around 
US$89.4 billions in 1985 and increased dramatically to US$437 billion in 1998. This 
dramatic increase consolidated the positions of Hong Kong and Singapore as the
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leading banking centres for international banking in the developing world. This is 
reflected in the increasing share of total international banking activity of both these 
centres. In 1983, Singapore and Hong Kong's share amounted only to 30%. In 1998, 
more than 50% of cross border assets were concentrated in these two banking centres. 
If we take into account the Cayman Islands1 share, this ratio increases to more than 
80%. Hence, it could be safely stated that the Caribbean centres, Hong Kong and 
Singapore capture most of cross border assets in the developing world.
Table 2.3 -  Distribution of Cross-Border Assets among Developing World’s Major 
Financial Centres (vis-a-vis all sectors)
Major Banking
Centres
Bahamas
1987
17%
1988
16%
1989
14%
1990
13%
1991
13%
1992
11%
1993
11%
1994
12%
1995
11%
1996
11%
1997
12%
1998
13%
Bahrain 6% 6% 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 5%
Cayman Islands 25% 26% 28% 28% 28% 27% 27% 26% 26% 26% 27% 30%
Hong Kong 28% 29% 28% 32% 34% 34% 35% 37% 37% 34% 31% 27%
Singapore 23% 24% 24% 24% 22% 22% 23% 22% 23% 25% 25% 24%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1%
Share o f the three 
leading banking 
centres
77% 79% 80% 84% 84% 84% 85% 85% 86% 85% 83% 81%
Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Various Issues
Cross Border Deposit Activity
Similar to cross border assets, cross border liabilities (an indicator of cross border 
deposit taking activity) also show a high degree of centralisation. In 1998, around 
70% of the developed world’ cross border liabilities were concentrated in the major 
financial centres of the developed world. The supremacy of the United Kingdom is 
very evident. The United Kingdom alone captures more than 20% of the world’s 
cross- border liabilities. Interesting to note is the declining share of Japan during the 
last decade. In 1987, Japan was the second biggest centre for cross border liabilities 
with a share of almost 15% of the world’s cross border liabilities. In the 1990s, 
Japan’s share of cross border liabilities declined dramatically and by 1998 its share 
stood only at 7.5%. Germany, on the other hand, has increased its share from 4% in
1990 to almost 10% in 1998, making it the third biggest centre for cross border 
liabilities after the United Kingdom and the United States. All in all, the table below 
shows that cross border liabilities in the developed world have become geographically 
more dispersed during the last decade. This is mainly the result of the declining 
importance of Japan. The importance of Hong Kong and Singapore is also evident 
where these two centres capture around 10% of world’s cross border liabilities.
Table 2.4 -  Geographical Distribution of the World’s Cross-Border Liabilities
(vis-a-vis all sectors)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Austria 1.04% 1.09% 1.10% 1.06% 1.03% 1.08% 1.11% 0.99% 1.06%
Belgium 3.36% 3.26% 3.26% 3.17% 3.28% 3.48% 3.29% 2.99% 2.91%
Denmark 0.68% 0.65% 0.55% 0.41% 0.40% 0.41% 0.48% 0.55% 0.62%
Finland 0.66% 0.62% 0.46% 0.35% 0.28% 0.26% 0.20% 0.18% 0.18%
France 7.43% 7.77% 7.89% 7.88% 7.83% 7.83% 7.62% 7.19% 7.09%
Germany 3.47% 3.67% 4.30% 4.81% 5.76% 6.89% 7.04% 7.50% 9.57%
Ireland 0.27% 0.28% 0.31% 0.38% 0.40% 0.58% 0.79% 1.07% 1.38%
Italy 2.21% 3.57% 3.87% 3.44% 3.28% 2.95% 3.06% 2.71% 2.80%
Luxembourg 4.19% 4.37% 4.54% 4.71% 4.85% 4.88% 4.74% 4.15% 4.11%
Netherlands 2.29% 2.34% 2.50% 2.46% 2.35% 2.54% 2.69% 2.79% 3.51%
Norway 0.33% 0.24% 0.17% 0.14% 0.10% 0.10% 0.22% 0.25% 0.27%
Spain 0.99% 1.16% 1.34% 1.42% 1.44% 1.43% 1.58% 1.59% 1.99%
Sweden 1.54% 1.44% 1.00% 0.80% 0.71% 0.70% 0.70% 0.68% 0.92%
Switzerland 4.96% 4.94% 4.83% 4.58% 4.73% 4.68% 4.99% 5.03% 5.21%
United Kingdom 18.59% 17.35% 17.71% 18.04% 17.94% 18.41% 19.21% 20.10% 20.37%
Canada 1.25% 1.22% 1.18% 1.08% 1.15% 1.10% 1.22% 1.40% 1.26%
Japan 14.80% 13.17% 11.26% 10.98% 10.12% 9.43% 8.59% 7.99% 7.51%
United States 10.10% 10.21% 10.93% 11.42% 11.47% 11.11% 10.75% 11.51% 10.75%
Bahamas 3.18% 3.45% 3.01% 2.76% 2.84% 2.47% 2.54% 2.66% 2.47%
Bahrain 0.79% 0.71% 0.97% 0.83% 0.81% 0.71% 0.72% 0.71% 0.91%
Cayman Islands 6.29% 6.27% 6.34% 6.18% 6.01% 5.68% 5.72% 5.63% 5.53%
Hong Kong 6.22% 7.19% 7.37% 7.62% 8,14% 7.92% 7.16% 6.76% 4.74%
Singapore 5.31% 4.93% 4.99% 5.36% 4.99% 5.28% 5.45% 5.39% 4.69%
Other 0.05% 0.08% 0.10% 0.11% 0.08% 0.09% 0.13% 0.18% 0.16%
Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Various Issues
The concentration of cross border liabilities in the major banking centres of the 
developing world is more acute. Around 80% of cross border liabilities concentrate in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Cayman Islands. In this respect, it is important to notice 
the decline of Bahrain and the Bahamas as important centres for deposit taking.
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During the last decade, their shares of cross border liabilities have declined 
considerably, especially the Bahamas where its share has declined from 18% in 1987 
to 13% in 1998.
Table 2.5 -  Distribution of Cross-Border Liabilities among Developing World’s Major 
Financial Centres
Major Banking Centres 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Bahamas 18% 17% 15% 15% 15% 13% 12% 12% 11% 12% 12% 13%
Bahrain 6% 6% 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 5%
Cayman Islands 26% 24% 28% 29% 28% 28% 27% 26% 26% 26% 26% 30%
Hong Kong 26% 28% 26% 28% 32% 32% 33% 36% 36% 33% 32% 26%
Singapore 24% 25% 25% 24% 22% 22% 23% 22% 24% 25% 25% 25%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1%
Share o f the three leading 
financial centres
76% 77% 80% 82% 81% 82% 84% 84% 85% 84% 83% 81%
Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Various Issues
2.3.2 Foreign Exchange Market
The traditional players in the foreign exchange market are commercial banks, 
merchant banks and specialised brokers. These may act on the behalf of their 
customers such as importers, exporters, and MNC headquarters or trade on their own 
account. By minimising the exchange rate risk for their clients through hedging in the 
forward market or through swap contracts, the foreign exchange market can increase 
the scale of international trade and internationalisation of industrial and banking 
capital. During the last decade, the foreign exchange market has grown enormously. 
According to the BIS (1998), the total reported foreign exchange market turnover3 
adjusted for local double counting reached an unprecedented level of a daily average 
of US$ 1572 billion in April 1995. In 1998, this figure increased to US$ 1917 billion. 
These figures exceed by far the volume of international trade or aggregate world 
GDP. Given that the global foreign exchange turnover is much greater than the 
trading needs of banks’ and dealers’ customers such as importers and exporters, this
suggests that the bulk of turnover can be accounted for by banks and dealers trading 
on their own account4 or the account of their customers for speculative or risk 
adjustment unconnected with their underlying real business.
An interesting feature of this market is the declining importance of spot transactions 
relative to outright forwards and foreign exchange swaps. In 1989, the turnover 
volume of spot transactions was larger than the turnover of outright forwards and 
foreign exchange swaps. In 1992, this was no longer the case and the turnovers of 
both categories were almost equal. In 1995 and 1998, forward instruments 
consolidated their leading position, pushing the share of spot turnover down to 44% in 
1995 and 40% in 1998 (BIS 1998). Within the former group, foreign exchange swaps 
continued to be the dominant instrument, overshadowing outright forwards by a large 
margin (BIS 1998).
Another important feature of this market, highly relevant for this discussion, is its 
high degree of geographical concentration. In 1995, the three major international 
financial centres (United Kingdom, United States, and Japan) accounted for about 
56% of total foreign exchange market turnover (Table 2.6). Of these, the UK is the 
most important centre for foreign exchange trading, constituting alone around 30% of 
global turnover. In 1998, these three centres increased their share to 58%. However, 
note that this larger share was mainly due to the higher shares of United Kingdom and 
United States. Japan's share, on the other hand, has declined from 10% in 1995 to 8% 
in 1998. The high degree of geographical centralisation becomes more evident if other 
centres are taken into account. In 1998, 82% of the global foreign exchange market
3 Data include spot, outright forwards, and foreign exchange swaps activity.
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activity was concentrated in 8 countries (United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, Germany, and France).
Table 2.6 -  Geographical Distribution of Global Traditional Foreign Exchange 
Market Activity1 (average daily turnover in billion o f US dollars)
1992 1995 1998
Countiy Amount Share Amount S h are Amount Share
Australia 28.9 4 29.0 3 46.6 2
Austria 4.4 0 13.3 1 10.5 1
Bahrain 3.5 0 3.1 0 2.4 0
Belgium 15.7 1 28.1 2 26.5 1
Canada 21.9 2 29.8 2 36.8 2
Denmark 26.6 2 30.5 2 27.3 1
Finland 6.8 1 5.3 0 4.2 0
France 33.3 3 58.0 4 71.9 4
Germany 55.0 5 76.2 5 94.3 5
Greece 1.1 0 3.3 0 7.2 0
Hong Kong 60.3 6 90.2 6 78.6 4
Ireland 5.9 1 4.9 0 10.1 1
Italy 15.5 1 23.2 1 28.2 1
Japan 120.2 11 161.3 10 148.6 8
Luxembourg 13.2 1 19.1 1 22.2 1
Netherlands 19.6 2 25.5 2 41.0 2
New Zealand 4.2 0 7.1 0 6.9 0
Norway 5.2 0 7.6 0 8.8 0
Portugal 1.3 0 2.4 0 4.4 0
Singapore 73.6 7 105.4 7 139.0 7
South Africa 3.4 0 5.0 0 8.8 0
Spain 12.3 1 18.3 1 19.3 1
Sweden 21.3 2 19.9 1 15.4 1
Switzerland 65.6 6 86.5 6 81.7 4
United Kingdom 290.5 27 463.8 30 637.3 32
United States 166.9 16 244.4 16 350.9 18
Total reported turnover net 1076.2 1571.8 1917.0
o f local double counting 
("net gross")2
Notes:
(1) Data include spot transactions, outright forward, and foreign exchange swaps. The survey was 
performed in April o f each year.
(2) Data are adjusted for local-double counting. Adjustment have in principle been made by halving 
positions vis-a-vis other local reporting local dealers and other reporting dealers abroad 
respectively.
Source: BIS (1998) “ Central Bank Survey o f Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in
April 1998: Preliminary Global Data”, BIS Press Release.
4 It is important to note that interbank activity (as banks lay off their own OTC risks) constitutes a 
siginifcant part of total turnover.
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2.3.3 The Derivatives Markets
The Derivatives markets are an integral part of the modem credit system. In these 
markets, traders and investors are able to hedge against different types of price risk 
such as interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, the risk of movement in prices of raw 
materials, metals or agricultural commodities. The increasing volatility in the world 
financial markets has contributed greatly to the growth of derivatives markets. 
According to the BIS (1998), the average daily turnover of OTC derivative market 
activity amounted to US$ 474 billion in 1998.5 Note that this figure does not include 
data on outright forward and foreign exchange swaps which were included in the 
foreign exchange turnover figures. In particular, data only include OTC derivative 
activity for two main categories: Foreign exchange derivative instruments (currency 
swaps and options) and single-currency interest rate derivative instruments (forward 
rate agreements, swaps, and options such as options on traded securities, interest rate 
options, interest rate cap, interest rate floor, etc). The latter category outweighs the 
former one accounting for almost 70% of total turnover. In the foreign exchange 
derivative category, options are the dominant instrument, while in the interest rate 
derivative activity, swaps consolidated their leading position. In fact, interest rate 
swaps account for almost 43% of the global turnover in OTC derivative instmments, 
followed by currency options (24%) and forward rate agreements (21%).
One important feature of the derivative market is its high degree of concentration in 
very few financial centres. In 1998, 55% of global OTC derivative market activity 
took place in the United Kingdom and the United States, with the United Kingdom 
alone capturing 36% of the total market activity (Table 2.7). The high degree of
5 This figure is adjusted for local double counting.
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centralisation becomes more evident if we take other leading centres into account. In 
1998, more than 80% of total OTC derivative activity was concentrated in the United 
Kingdom, United States, France, Japan, and Germany. It is interesting to note the 
decline of some leading banking centres’ share such as Singapore (from 7% in 1995 
to 2% in 1998) and the rise in other centre’s share such as the UK which increased its 
share from 27% in 1995 to 36% in 1998,
Table 2.7 -  Geographical Distribution of Global over-the-counter Derivative Market 
Activity1 (average daily turnover in billions of US dollars)
1995 1998
Country Amounts Percentage Share Amounts Percentage Share
Australia 3.8 I 4.6 1
Austria 2.3 1 4.6 1
Bahrain 4.1 2 0.4 0
Belgium 6.2 2 5.7 1
Canada 5,3 2 7.5 2
Denmark 3.9 1 4.9 1
Finland 1.8 1 2.4 0
France 22.3 8 45.8 10
Germany 13.8 5 34.4 7
Greece 0.1 0 0 0
Hong Kong 4.3 2 3.8 1
Ireland 1.5 1 2.4 1
Italy 2.4 1 4.4 1
Japan 32.8 12 42.1 9
Luxembourg 2.2 1 2.6 1
Netherlands 5.2 2 5.3 1
New Zealand 0.2 0 0.5 0
Norway 1.5 1 2.9 1
Portugal 0.1 0 1 0
Singapore 18.1 7 11.3 2
South Africa 0.4 0 0.8 0
Spain 3.6 1 3.5 1
Sweden 2.3 1 4.3 1
Switzerland 4.4 2 15.8 3
United Kingdom 73.8 27 170.8 36
United States 
Total "net-gross" 
turnover2
53.2
269.5
20 90.9
474
19
(1) Data include Foreign Exchange Contracts (Currency swaps, Options, Other) and Interest Rate 
Derivative instruments (FRAs, Swaps, Options, Other). The Figures exclude outright forwards and 
foreign exchange swaps. Turnover is defined as the absolute gross value of all deals concluded 
(but not closed) during the month and was measured in terms of the notional amounts of contracts.
(2) Data are adjusted for local double counting.
Source: BIS (1998) “ Central Bank Survey o f Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 
April 1998: Preliminary Global Data”, BIS Press Release
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Futures and options on traded exchanges
As in the case of OTC derivative activity, futures and options traded on organised 
exchanges show a high degree of centralisation. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 provide figures on 
the turnover in notional amounts of equity index, currency and interest rate futures 
and options and the shares of North America, Europe and Asia out of total activity. 
Table 2.8 below shows that interest rate futures and interest rate options are by far the 
most dominant instruments constituting the bulk of trade activity. Also interesting to 
note is the geographical concentration of trading activity in Europe and North 
America. More than 80% of futures are traded in these two regions. In the case of 
options, the degree of concentration is much higher with 94% of the activity taking 
place in these two parts of the world.
Table 2.8 -  Turnover of Futures Traded on Organised Exchanges by Instrument 
and Location (notional principal in billion o f  US dollars)
19 96 1997 1998
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
FUTURES (All markets) 269474.8 100% 294423.4 100% 318611.1 100%
Interest rate 253526.5 94% 274594.2 93% 294792.6 93%
Currency 2999.4 1% 3466.1 1% 3068.4 1%
Equity index 12948.9 5% 16363.1 6% 20750.1 7%
LOCATION
North America 119946.9 45% 139115.3 47% 151928 48%
Interest rate 110311 127188 139326
Currency 2504.5 3029.3 2868.7
Equity index 7131.4 8897.9 9733.3
Europe 86395.9 32% 100225.8 34% 117396.1 37%
Interest rate 83678.8 95845.7 109134.5
Currency 5.8 6 10.2
Equity index 2711.4 4374 8251.5
Asia 59867.1 22% 52429.1 18% 47285.6 15%
Interest rate 57056.4 49840.2 44797.1
Currency 37.3 26.8 3.8
Equity index 2773.3 2562.1 2484.7
Other markets 3264.9 1% 2653.2 1% 2001.2 1%
Interest rate 2480.3 1720.2 1534.9
Currency 451.7 403.9 185.7
Equity index 332.8 529 280.5
Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, (Various Issues).
58
Table 2.9 -  Turnover of Options Traded on Organised Exchanges by Instrument 
and Location (notional principal in billion o f  US dollars)
1996 1997 1998
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
OPTIONS (All markets) 52053.5 100% 62326.3 100% 69088.1 100%
Interest rate 41016.5 79% 48601.3 78% 55480.4 80%
Currency 905.5 2% 685.3 1% 397.8 1%
Equity index 10131.5 19% 13039.7 21% 13209.9 19%
North America 34254.4 66% 43579.9 70% 47605.5 69%
Interest rate 26012.1 33763.3 38599.1
Currency 843.5 636.8 379.5
Equity index 7398.9 9179.8 8626.9
Europe 13731.5 26% 14706 24% 17225.5 25%
Interest rate 11998.3 11855.7 14152.4
Currency 17.3 6.3 0.9
Equity index 1716 2843.9 3072.2
Asia 3901.9 7% 3840.3 6% 3998.5 6%
Interest rate 2968.5 2932.7 2590.9
Currency 0 0 0
Equity index 933.5 907.7 1407.7
Other markets 165.6 0% 200.2 0% 258.5 1%
Interest rate 37.6 49.7 138
Currency 44.8 42.2 17.4
Equity index 83.2 108.2 103.1
Source: BIS (1998), Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market
Developments, August.
k
Data on market activity within regions are not available for all instruments. In order to 
get an idea of the extent of centralisation within regions, Table 2.10 below provides 
evidence on the location of equity index futures and options in 1998. As the table 
below shows, in North America, almost all equity index options are traded on the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME). In the case of equity index futures, almost all of the trading activity takes 
place in the CME.6
ft
6 It is noteworthy that the CME and CBOT dominate organised derivative markets accounting for 
almost 50% of turnover.
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Table 2.10- Geographical Distribution of Equity Index Options and Futures
Exchanges Equity Index Options Equity Index Options Equity Index Futures Equity Index
Futures
Volume Notional Value Volume Notional Value
(n° o f contracts) (million USD) (n° o f  contracts) (million USD)
AMEX (USA) 779,281 44,057.3 Not Traded Not Traded
AMEX (USA) Hong Kong 114,785 2,122.0 Not Traded Not Traded
AMEX (USA) Japan 440,427 6,972.0 Not Traded Not Traded
AMEX (USA) Pan-European 51,503 1,357.5 Not Traded Not Traded
CBOE(USA) 67,209,060 4,847,366.9 Not Traded Not Traded
CBOE (USA) Japan 4,569 106.4 Not Traded Not Traded
CBOE (USA) Mexico 16,150 156.9 Not Traded Not Traded
CBOT(USA) 245,398 21,179.8 3,567,512 307,904.8
CME (USA) 5,139,403 1,371,883,7 37,546,557 9,022,487.8
CME (USA) Japan 7,725 593.1 479,248 36,796.7
KCBT(USA) 1,662 149.1 80,830 7,852.8
NYCE/NYFE (USA) 93,343 25,699.7 590,327 162,531.8
Toronto SE (Canada) 388,273 9,707.9 457,751 57,477.4
Europe
AEX (Netherlands) 7,951,338 445,319.5 3,498,970 390,415.4
AEX (Netherlands) Pan- 36,106 1,068.7 2,026 119.9
European
BELFOX (Belgium) 978,341 6,834.8 664,360 46,410.1
EUREX Deutschland 29,948,503 844,309.9 6,995,152 978,187.2
(Germany)
EUREX Deutschland 196,730 6,812.6 461,206 15,937.3
(Germany) Pan European
EUREX Zurich 3,394,098 166,099.1 4,445,396 217,547.2(Switzerland)
HEX (Finland) 267,959 4,246.6 236,220 3,743.6
FUTOP (Denmark) 4,073 134.3 289,424 9,545.1
IDEM (Italy) 1,616,635 299,041.6 5,926,310 1,092,529.3
LIFFE (UK) 4,541,456 423,675.7 7,020,315 1,627,689.9
LIFFE (UK) Pan-European Not Traded Not Traded 42,058 2,489.7
MATIF (France) Not Traded Not Traded 16,908,364 1,059,654.0
MEFF Variable (Spain) 1,681,205 174,570.0 1,681,205 174,570.0
MONEP (France) 7,981,570 445,553.7 Not Traded Not Traded
OM (Sweden) 4,947,486 68,990.9 9,265,510 80,716.6
Oslo (Norway) 828,445 6,803.4 354,602 2,912.1
Asia
HKFE (Hong Kong) 805,357 48,665.2 7,155,543 425,477.3
HKFE (Hong Kong) Taiwan 56 8.2 71 2.1
Osaka (Japan) 5,232,623 614,291.3 9,722,134 80,715.2
SFE (Australia) 847,375 34,986.7 3,678,151 151,864.9
SIMEX (Singapore) NT NT 27,727 606.3
SIMEX (Singapore) Hong NT NT 6,124 221.9Kong
SIMEX (Singapore) Japan 838,891 49,262.0 5,632,813 326,878.9
SIMEX (Singapore) Taiwan 20,521 629.2 1,842,977 56,507.5
SIMEX (Singapore) NT NT 721 10.9Thailand
Tokyo (Japan) 330 29.7 2,731,212 246,091.1
Source: FBIV --------------------------------------------------------- ----- "------------------ ------------
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In Europe, the dominance of Germany is quite evident, especially in equity index 
futures. More than a third of total trading in equity index futures in Europe takes place 
in Germany. United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and Netherlands also have active 
exchanges. In case of Asia and the Pacific, Japan’s supremacy is dominant, followed 
by Hong Kong and Singapore.
The data also show a high degree of geographical concentration of activity in a few 
established centres. For instance, if we consider the case of equity index options we 
find that in 1998, more than 80% of equity index option turnover was concentrated in 
the CBOE and CME. The shares of Japan (6%), France (6%), Germany (6%) and the 
UK (5%) remain modest compared to the share of the American exchanges. A similar 
pattern can be observed in the case of equity index futures. All in all, the evidence 
suggests that almost 90% of total trading in equity index futures and options is 
concentrated in the major financial centres of the developed world.7
2.3.4 The Stock Market
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 reveal some interesting observations regarding the world’s 
major stock markets. First, as table 2.11 shows, despite the growing importance of 
emerging markets in recent years, the bulk of equity turnover is concentrated in the 
major financial centres of the developed world. In 1998, only 8.55% percent of world’ 
market value of shares traded was concentrated in emerging markets. While the crisis 
in East Asia has played a role, the steady decline in recent years may suggest that 
other factors have been at work. Second, as Table 2.12 shows, the value of shares 
traded on the American exchanges is enormous in comparison with any other country.
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During the 1990s, the US has consolidated its leading position in terms of market 
value of shared traded which increased from US$1.75 billion in 1990 to more than 
US$13 billion in 1998. While in 1990, the US accounted only for 38% of the market 
value of shared traded in the developed markets, by 1998, this share increased to 63% 
(Table 2.12). On the other hand, during the same period, the turnover on the Japanese 
stock exchanges declined dramatically. While in 1990, the US and Japan had equal 
market value of shares traded, in 1998 the market value of equity turnover in the US 
was 13 times higher than that of Japan. The European stock exchanges also lag well 
behind the US in terms of market value of shares traded. In 1998, the leading 
financial centres of Europe (Germany, UK and France) accounted only for 15% of the 
market value of shares traded in developed markets. As to Hong Kong and Singapore, 
their shares of equity turnover are negligible. Third, as in the case of other financial 
activities, stock market turnover shows a high degree of centralisation in a few 
financial centres. The data show that more than 75% of equity turnover is 
concentrated in the leading financial centres of the developed world (US, Germany, 
UK, Japan and France).
Table 2.11 -  Stock Value Traded in Developed and Emerging Markets
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
World Value Traded 5514706 5019596 4782850 7194675 8821845 10218748 13616070 19484814 22874320
Developed Market 4614786 4403631 4151662 6090929 7156704 9176451 12105541 16818167 20917462
Emerging Markets 899920 615965 631188 1103746 1665141 1042297 1510529 2666647 1956858
Share o f emerging 
market's value traded 
out o f world value 
traded
16.319% 12.271% 13.197% 15.341% 18.875% 10.200% 11.094% 13.686% 8.555%
7 It is important to note that this evidence refers only to one type of futures and options trading and 
hence it can only give us a good indication o f the extent of centralisation of derivatives traded on
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Table 2.12 -  Concentration of Value of Shares Traded in Developed Markets
Developed Markets 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Australia 0.87% 1.06% 1.10% 1.11% 1.32% 1.08% 1.96% 1.85% 1.95%
Austria 0.40% 0.16% 0.12% 0.11% 0.23% 0.28% 0.17% 0.15% 0.08%
Belgium 0,14% 0.14% 0.19% 0.18% 0.18% 0.17% 0.22% 0.18% 0.26%
Canada 1.54% 1.77% 2.01% 2.33% 2.25% 2.00% 2.19% 2.11% 1.78%
Denmark 0.24% 0.21% 0.38% 0.34% 0.38% 0.28% 0.29% 0.28% 0.00%
Finland 0.09% 0.04% 0.06% 0.13% 0.18% 0.21% 0.19% 0.22% 0.29%
France 2.53% 2.58% 2.93% 2.86% 4.30% 3.97% 2.29% 2.41% 2.74%
Germany 10.87% 8.62% 10.74% 4.97% 6.44% 6.25% 6.35% 6.12% 6.65%
Italy 0.92% 0.57% 0.68% 1.08% 1.65% 0.95% 0.85% 1.18% 2.27%
Japan 34.72% 22.62% 15.30% 15.67% 15.67% 13.42% 10.34% 7.44% 4.53%
Luxembourg 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
Netherlands 0.87% 0.88% 1.10% 1.10% 2.38% 2.71% 2.80% 1.69% 1.81%
New Zealand 0.04% 0.07% 0.08% 0.11% 0.10% 0.09% 0.07% 0.15% 0.24%
Norway 0.30% 0.26% 0.24% 0.14% 0.12% 0.27% 0.30% 0.28% 0.20%
Spain 0.89% 0.92% 0.96% 0.77% 0.86% 0.65% 2.07% 2.69% 3.34%
Sweden 0.38% 0.49% 0.68% 0.72% 1.19% 1.02% 1.13% 1.05% 0.97%
UK 6.04% 7.16% 9.23% 6.95% 6.48% 5.56% 4.78% 4.93% 5.58%
US 37.95% 49.59% 50.14% 55.08% 49.80% 55.67% 58.83% 60.74% 62.86%
Hong Kong 0.75% 0.88% 1.82% 2.16% 2.06% 1.16% 1.37% 2.91% 0.98%
Singapore 0.44% 0.41% 0.34% 1.34% 1.13% 0.66% 0.35% 0.38% 0.24%
Other 0.00% 1.56% 1.90% 2.80% 3.26% 3.61% 3.45% 3.24% 3.20%
Source: IFC, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1999
In order to provide an indication of the international dimension of different centres, 
Table 2.13 examines the relevance of foreign companies and securities for the stock 
exchange in various cities.8 As can be seen, Luxembourg, Frankfurt, Switzerland and 
Brussels exchanges have very high ratios of listed foreign companies to total listings. 
A more accurate indicator of the relevance of foreign activity however is the value of 
share trading in foreign companies to total value of share trading which is presented in 
column 2. Based on this measure, it is clear that London is the most international 
among centres with turnover in foreign shares constituting almost 60% of total 
turnover, followed at a distance by Brussels (13.5%) and Stockholm (10%).
organised exchanges.
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Table 2.13 -Importance of Foreign Companies on the Stock Exchange
________________________ (end o f 1997)
Exchange Foreign companies 
listed
Value of share trading in foreign 
companies
North America % o f total listing % o f total value share trading
Montreal 2% 0.33%
NASDAQ 8% 13.73%
NYSE 14% 8.39%
Europe
Amsterdam 43% 0.35%
Athens 0% 0.00%
Barcelona 1% 0.03%
Bilbao 0% 0.00%
Brussels 48% 13.44%
Copenhagen 5% 2.71%
Germany 74% 4.49%
Helsinki 2% 0.21%
Irish 19% 0.00%
Istanbul 0% 0.06%
Italy * 2% 0.07%
Lisbon 0% 0.00%
London 19% 58.12%
Luxembourg 80% 1.79%
Madrid 1% 0.03%
Oslo 10% 3.52%
Paris 20% 2.47%
Stockholm 6% 9.91%
Switzerland 50% 4.98%
Vienna 27% 2.44%
Warsaw 0% 0.00%
Asia and Pacific
Australian 5% 0.73%
Hong Kong 3% 0.07%
Kuala Lumpur 0% 0.25%
New Zealand 29% 4.54%
Osaka 0% 0.05%
Philippine 0% 0.00%
Singapore 12% 0.00%
Taiwan 0% 0.00%
Thailand 0% 0.00%
Tokyo 3% 0.16%
Source: FIBV
8 Data at the country level are not available.
Table 2.14 shows individual stock markets’ capitalisation as a proportion of 
developed markets’ total stock market capitalisation.9 In 1998, the US consolidated 
itself as the biggest stock exchange in the world, followed by a wide margin by Japan 
and the UK. Notice the rapid decline in the importance of Japan. As recently as 1989, 
Japan was the biggest centre in the world with a share of 37.5% of world’s stock 
market capitalisation. In 1998, this share stood only at 9%. In Europe, the UK has the 
biggest stock exchange followed by Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy. All 
in all, the leading financial centres of the developed world account for around 80% of 
world total market capitalisation in 1998.
Table 2.14 -  Major Stock Markets’ Capitalisation as a Proportion of Developed 
Markets’ Stock Market Capitalisation
Developed Markets 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Australia 1.22% 1.39% 1,37% 1.65% 1.66% 1.55% 2.73% 3.27% 3.42%
Austria 0.13% 0.07% 0.22% 0.23% 0.23% 0.21% 0.19% 0.17% 0.13%
Belgium 0.75% 0.68% 0.65% 0.63% 0.64% 0.66% 0.66% 0.64% 0.96%
Canada 2.75% 2.56% 2.45% 2.65% 2.38% 2.31% 2.68% 2.66% 2.13%
Denmark 0.44% 0.43% 0.33% 0.34% 0.41% 0.35% 0.40% 0.44% 0.39%
Finland 0.26% 0.14% 0.12% 0.19% 0.29% 0.28% 0.35% 0.34% 0.60%
France 3.58% 3.34% 3.54% 3.70% 3,42% 3.29% 3.26% 3.16% 3.88%
Germany 4.04% 3.77% 3.51% 3.76% 3.56% 3.64% 3.70% 3.87% 4.28%
Italy 1.69% 1.52% 1.22% 1.10% 1.36% 1.32% 1.42% 1.62% 2.23%
Japan 33.21% 30.01% 23.57% 24.33% 28.16% 23.12% 17.03% 10.40% 9.77%
Luxembourg 0.12% 0.11% 0.12% 0.16% 0.22% 0.19% 0.18% 0.16% 0.14%
Netherlands 1.36% 1.30% 1.36% 1.48% 2.14% 2.25% 2.09% 2.20% 2.36%
New Zealand 0.10% 0.14% 0.15% 0.21% 0.21% 0.20% 0.21% 0.42% 0.35%
Norway 0.30% 0.21% 0.18% 0.22% 0.28% 0.28% 0.32% 0.31% 0.22%
Spain 1.27% 1.42% 1.00% 0.97% 1.17% 1.25% 1.34% 1.36% 1.57%
Sweden 1.11% 0.97% 0.79% 0.87% 0.99% 1.12% 1.36% 1.28% 1.09%
UK 9.66% 9.47% 9.34% 9.34% 9.16% 8.88% 9.59% 9.36% 9.29%
US 34.83% 39.18% 45.20% 41.67% 38.36% 43.24% 46.77% 53.05% 52.64%
Hong Kong 0.95% 1.17% 1.73% 3.13% 2.04% 1.92% 2.48% 1.94% 1.34%
Singapore 0.39% 0.46% 0.49% 1.08% 1.02% 0.93% 0.83% 0.50% 0.37%
Other 1.82% 1.68% 2.66% 2.29% 2.31% 3.01% 2.42% 2.84% 2.83%
Source: IFC, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1999
9 We focus here on developed markets only which represent the bulk o f world’s market capitalisation. 
For instance, in 1998 the market capitalisation of emerging markets represented only 7% of world
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2 .3 .5  The B on d  M arket
Many problems arise when it comes to providing data on bond market activity. The 
FIBV provides data on bond turnover data, but such data do not include over-the- 
counter trade in these bonds. This limits the usefulness of comparisons across centres, 
especially since the bulk of this trade occurs over-the-counter. This can explain the 
low value of trade in bonds in Table 2.15, However, it is possible to make some 
comparisons in terms of the market value of bonds listed and the total number of bond 
issuers. As the table below shows, the market value of bonds listed is highest in New 
York in 1997.10 In Europe, Frankfurt has the highest market value of bonds listed, 
followed by Luxembourg, Italy, London and Paris. In Asia and the Pacific, the 
supremacy of the Japanese exchanges is evident. In terms of foreign bonds listed, 
Luxembourg is the most important centre followed by a wide margin by London, 
Germany, Paris and Switzerland.
market capitalisation decreasing from 13% in 1994.
10 In terms of corporate bonds, the American exchanges are the most important in the world.
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Table 2.15 -  Turnover, market capitalisation, and number of bonds listed in Bond 
markets (end o f 1997)
Exchange Market value of 
bond listed (at year 
end, 1997)
Value of bond 
trading
Total number of 
bond issuers
Foreign 
bonds listed
North America
Montreal (TSV) * 185,472.7 35.0 26 3
NYSE (TSV) * 2,625,357.0 5,063.3 1,965 211
Europe
Amsterdam (REV) 334,786.4 281,242.3 866 191
Barcelona (REV) 13,051.2 33,505.3 266 13
Brussels (TSV) 210,811.2 557.0 130 2
Copenhagen (REV) 291,643.5 1,073,363.6 2,464 8
Germany (REV) 2,021,783.0 1,509,913.2 24,129 1,075
Helsinki (TSV) 47,235.2 93.6 308 0
Italy (REV) * 1,069,368.0 6,144,138.3 761 13
London (REV) 978,000.2 NA 9,075 4,074
Luxembourg (TSV) 1,787,454.2 7,375.4 9,574 9,294
Madrid (TSV) 22,092.7 27,427.9 967 202
Paris (REV) 777,524.4 12,141,595.0 3,469 1,349
Stockholm (REV) 201,018.3 1,792,075.3 987 15
Switzerland (REV) 243,411.5 132,168.9 1,906 761
Asia and the Pacific
Australian (TSV) * 76,107.6 106.0 1,244 -
Hong Kong (TSV) NA 23.2 286 251
Korea (TSV) 132,222.2 4,102.6 15,887 3
Osaka (TSV) 1,785,308.4 17,592.2 888 7
Singapore (TSV) 171,625.9 3,883.4 89 NA
Taiwan (TSV) 32,919.1 683.00 93 7
Thailand (TSV) 351.0 0.03 16 0
Tokyo (TSV) * 1,814,982.4 138,031.2 1,136 52
Source: FIBV
2.3.6 International Payment Clearing Activity
At the heart of a financial centre's network is the international payment clearing 
system. One of the main functions of international financial centres is the clearing of 
international payments (Reed, 1989) . This activity is a condition for the expansion of 
foreign trade since it facilitates payment settlements and minimises transaction costs 
and different types of risk (such as settlement risk and credit risk) among receiving 
and paying banks. In the international context the importance of clearing system is 
very clear (Kingman-Brundage et al, 1986). Banks usually take the responsibility for 
the settlement of payments between traders for a fee. This settlement process involves
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a number of complex steps as well as heavy investment in technology which few 
cities are likely to afford. Moreover, payments settlement requires an efficient 
financial structure and prudent monetary management. Because of the existence of 
economies of scale and the ability to minimise transaction costs (Kindleberger, 1974), 
these clearing activities are likely to be concentrated in very few financial centres. 
These financial centres are the hosts of large banks and clearing houses which take the 
responsibility for international payments clearing. Moreover, the existence of a large 
number of banks of different nationalities in a financial centre makes the settlement of 
international payments much easier. In fact, most of the international clearing activity 
occurs in New York through CHIPS (BIS, 1996). Available data indicate that in 1991, 
37.6 million transactions were handled through CHIPS. In 1995, these transactions 
increased to 52 millions the value of which amounted to more than US$ 310 billion 
(BIS, 1996).
2 .3 .7  C en tra lisa tion  o f  In ternation al F inancia l A ctivity: A S ty lised  F act 
It has not been possible to provide evidence on the extent of centralisation of each 
type of financial activity. However, the above evidence clearly suggests that financial 
activity is highly centralised in a few geographical locations. In order to establish this 
stylised fact, I focus on the share of the five international financial centres of the 
developed world (United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Germany and France) and 
the two leading financial centres of the developing world (Hong Kong and 
Singapore). In terms of cross border assets and cross border liabilities, around 66% of 
these assets and liabilities were concentrated in these centres in the end of 1998. The 
geographical concentration of foreign exchange activity is much higher with around 
80% of global market turnover being concentrated in these centres in 1998. In terms
of over the counter derivative activity, the geographical concentration is even higher 
with 84% of total trading activity taking place in these centres in 1998. Although 
comprehensive data on futures and options traded are not available for each country, 
the data on equity index futures and options suggest that the bulk (around 90%) of this 
activity is concentrated in the major international financial centres. In terms of stock 
market turnover, the data show that more than 75% of equity turnover is concentrated 
in the leading financial centres of the developed world (US, Germany, UK, Japan and 
France), Furthermore, the leading financial centres of the developed world account for 
around 80% of world stock market capitalisation in 1998. Due to data unavailability, 
it is not possible to provide a comprehensive measure of concentration of bond market 
turnover. But the existing evidence shows that this activity also tend to be centralised 
in the leading centres of the world. Based on the empirical evidence, we can safely 
conclude that the high degree of geographical centralisation of international financial 
activity should be considered as a stylised fact.
2.4 World’s Major Financial Centres
2.4.1 D ifferen tia tion  B etw een  In ternational F inan cia l C entres a n d  B anking Centres  
It is clear from the empirical evidence that financial activities performed in financial 
centres and the complexity of their financial structure differ substantially. In this 
thesis, we make a distinction between international financial centres (IFCs) and 
banking centres (BCs) based on the variety of functions performed in each of these 
centres, the complexity of their financial structure and the size of their markets. While 
banking centres perform a narrow range of functions mainly related to lending 
activity, international financial centres engage in the provision of a wide variety of 
financial services (international payment clearing, management of a global portfolio,
69
advisory services, liquidity and risk management, etc) and financial instruments 
(options, futures, swaps, bonds, stock etc). The provision of such a wide variety of 
services requires a complex network of financial markets. Hence, in order for a centre 
to qualify as an international financial centre, it must posses a very well developed 
financial structure. By a " well developed financial structure", it is meant that a centre 
must not only have an active banking system, but should also comprise a diversified 
set of active and liquid financial markets and provide a wide variety of financial 
instruments.
The level of complexity of financial markets differentiates international financial 
centres from banking centres which usually engage in the provision of a couple of 
financial services, mainly lending in the interbank market and trading in foreign 
exchange. 11 Because they provide fewer services, these banking centres do not 
require a complex financial structure and as such their financial systems are not 
characterised usually by well developed capital markets, but rather by an active 
banking system. In fact, a well-developed banking system with international banking 
expertise and a well-established communication infrastructure are sufficient for a 
banking centre to perform its functions efficiently.
The difference in the financial structure of financial centres also reflects their different 
roles and importance in the world economy allowing for another useful distinction 
based on the role played by each type of financial centre in the world economy. 
Banking centres’ relatively simple financial structure reflects the role they assume in
11 One very serious limitation to the theoretical classification above is that during the last two decades 
many banking centres have successfully managed to diversify their financial activities, activate their 
capital markets and establish new markets and financial products. In such cases, the distinction 
bewteen banking centres and international financial centres is unclear.
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the world economy. This role is mainly to provide links between the centre’s regional 
economies and the major international financial centres (Hodjera, 1978). Banking 
centres played an important role in transferring funds from regional economies 
endowed with a surplus to international financial centres which recycled these funds 
to economies in deficit and/or are more able to use these surplus funds. The outward 
intermediation function of these centres evolved rapidly and from the early seventies 
onward, some of these centres played an important role in the development of their 
regional economies by channelling funds from outside the region, mainly from the 
major international financial centres. These funds were used to finance regional trade 
as well as few public and private projects in the host and neighbouring economies 
(Bhattacharya, 1988). The interconnectedness between banking centres and the 
international financial centres may suggest that these centres form some type of a 
network which is responsible for extending the flow of capital to almost every region 
in the world with the major international financial centres acting as the fuel (being net 
suppliers of capital), engine, and organisers of this network. Through this network, 
flows of financial capital are directed from regions with low rates of return towards 
those regions with the highest rate of return and hence improving the efficiency of 
investment at a global level and at the same reinforcing the uneven geographical 
flows of financial capital.12 13
12 Furthermore, this network enables banks to achieve higher rates of return on their capital by avoiding
taxes and restrictive regulatory environments.
13 Because of the high interconnectedness between these centres, some economists suggest that 
banking centres should be treated as extensions to the international financial centres in the developed 
world (Gorostiaga, 1984) or as McCarthy (1979) puts it "offshore centres (i.e. banking centres) should 
be seen as adjuncts to these traditional centres rather than as solely competitors". However, the 
differentiation between financial centres on the basis o f their role or importance in the world economy 
is highly abstract. Hence, in this paper, the criterion adopted to differentiate between different types of 
financial centres is the level of complexity of the financial structure of financial centres which is 
supposed to reflect indirectly their role and importance in the world economy.
The focus so far has been on “functional centres”. But another type of financial 
centre, the “paper" centre also coexists with functional centres. Paper centres do not 
engage in providing funds for borrowers or any trading activity, but are rather used by 
banks as a location to record financial transactions that are undertaken somewhere 
else (McCarthy, 1979). In such centres, the sources and uses of funds are usually from 
outside the region and the value added from the booking of financial services is 
almost negligible (Park, 1982, 1989). These paper centres are sometimes also 
referred to in the literature as offshore banking centres. This term is used in the 
literature to indicate those cities or microstates that have engaged in deliberate actions 
to attract foreign businesses (McCarthy 1979). This definition is based on the 
observation that most of these centres offer monetary and fiscal incentives to 
encourage multinational banks (MNBs) to establish branches or subsidiaries on their 
jurisdiction. These incentives come in the form of low taxes, free movement of capital 
in and outside the country, easy entry for international banks, absence of reserve 
requirements on offshore deposits and very little regulation by domestic 
governments.14 However, the classification of centres based only on their regulatory 
and tax incentive structure is difficult since all types of financial centres (from 
London to the Bahamas) have engaged in deliberate policies to attract financial 
activity to their jurisdiction. Our criterion of financial complexity can incorporate 
these centres better. Since these centres do not engage in the actual provision of 
financial activity, they do not require developed financial markets or even a 
developed banking system. Hence, centres are considered “paper” or offshore if they
14 For instance, Cassard (1994) argues that offshore centres emerged as a result o f regulations and taxes 
imposed on the banking activities o f the developed world in particular as a consequence of the 
regulatory measures taken by the USA government that restricted capital export and imposed ceilings 
on the interest rate. In such a restrictive environment, banks started looking for alternative sites with 
less regulation and low costs to perform their financial activities.
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hold a large volume of cross border assets by value, but without having the proper 
financial infrastructure to support such large holdings of financial assets.15
2 .4 .2  F inan cia l C entres in the D eve lo p ed  W orld
Based on this criterion, the United Kingdom, United States and to a lesser extent 
Japan, Germany, France and Hong Kong qualify as international financial centres. 
These centres have very active financial markets and offer a wide range of financial 
services. Among these centres, the United Kingdom is the leading international 
financial centre in many activities. The empirical evidence shows that the United 
Kingdom is the leading centre in foreign exchange turnover, OTC derivative activity, 
international bank lending and international deposit taking activity. Furthermore, the 
United Kingdom is the world’s biggest centre for advice on cross border mergers and 
acquisition and for international bonds (Edwards, 1998). In terms of stock and futures 
market activity, the US is the leading centre by a wide margin. But what is interesting 
to note is that unlike the US, the UK is more international as reflected by the 
dominance of foreign activity in the stock and bond exchanges.
In Europe, the growing importance of Germany and France is noticeable. These two 
centres have managed to increase their shares in many financial activities. During the 
90’s, Germany has increased its share of international bank lending, deposit taking 
activity and OTC derivative activity. France has increased its share of the global 
foreign exchange and OTC derivative activity. Furthermore, the stock, bond, and
15 This chapter discusses briefly the importance of these "paper" centres. The main focus is on financial 
centres which are fully functional. These centres channel funds from lenders to borrowers, manage 
funds and liabilities on a world scale, act as brokers and advisers to various types o f customers, clear 
payment across regions, and engage in dealing and trading in financial instruments.
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futures markets in both these countries are highly developed as reflected in their high 
market capitalisation and high turnover volume.
In the 1980s, Japan was able to consolidate itself as one of the leading centres of the 
world. In the 1990s, Japan’s position as international financial centre is much in 
doubt. During the last decade, Japan’s share in all types of financial activity has been 
declining. For instance, Japan’s share of cross border liabilities declined from 18% in 
1987 to 7.5% in 1998. In terms of foreign exchange activity, its share of global 
foreign exchange turnover has declined from 11% in 1992 to 8% in 1998. The same 
pattern is observed in the case of OTC derivative activity where Japan’s share 
declined from 12% in 1995 to 9% in 1998. The most astonishing development 
however is the rapid decline of Japan’s stock turnover both in absolute and relative 
terms which did not only affect Japan’s global position, but also its position relative to 
the region. Equally, important is the rapid decline in the size of the Japanese stock 
markets.16
In addition to major international financial centres, a number of banking centres have 
created a niche in a few activities. Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands have become important centres for international bank lending and deposit 
taking activity. The importance of Netherlands and Luxembourg as centres for 
international bond trading has also been growing from the early 1990s,
16 Although the East Asian crisis affected financial activity in Japanese financial markets, time series 
data on cross border banking and stock market activity suggest that this decline has been taking place 
for many years and hence this decline is not temporary.
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2.4 .3  F inan cia l C entres in the D eve lo p in g  W orld
In the developing world, Hong Kong and Singapore stand out as the most important 
functional centres. Since the thesis’s main focus is on regional centres in the 
developing world, this section describes in greater details the financial structure of 
these two centres.
H ong K o n g
During the last decade, Hong Kong has established itself as one of the leading 
financial centres of the world. Hong Kong’s financial structure is highly developed 
and well diversified. It provides a wide variety of financial services and its financial 
structure is made up of a highly developed banking system and a set of active 
financial markets. Furthermore, Hong Kong has also become an active centre for fund 
management with more than 1,800 unit trusts and funds registered. In fact, most 
international fund managers run their Asian business from Hong Kong . Furthermore, 
the Asian corporate-fmance teams of international investment banks are based in 
Hong Kong. This can be attributed to the large number of multinational firms' offices 
located in Hong Kong. More than 2000 multinational firms as well as the largest 
accounting companies and legal advisers maintain regional offices in Hong Kong 
(Edwards, 1998).
Despite its outstanding performance, Hong Kong’s share in most activities has been 
declining in the last few years. In 1995, Hong Kong was the third largest centre in the 
world in terms of cross border assets with a share of 8.12% of world’s total cross 
border assets. In 1998, this share stood only at 5.18% placing Hong Kong in the sixth 
position. The same pattern can be observed in case of cross border liabilities where
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Hong Kong’s share has declined from 8.14% in 1994 to 4.74% in 1998. In fact, since 
the transfer of sovereignty to the Chinese rule, Hong Kong’s international assets have 
shrunk by 22%. While the East Asian crisis has a played a role in the contraction of 
international banking, the huge decline of Hong Kong’s external assets relative to 
Singapore (only 10%), suggests that other factors have been at work (BIS, 1999). 
Specifically, Hong Kong has suffered more than any other financial centre from the 
recession in Japan. Hong Kong has played an important role in the extension of the 
domestic intermediation of the Japanese domestic banking system by attracting funds 
from Japan through the interbank market and then re-lending these funds to Japanese 
non-bank customers. The weakness of loan demand by Japanese corporations is 
probably the main cause for the decline in Hong Kong’s external assets. In fact, this is 
reflected in the data where from mid-1997 to end-1998, Hong Kong claims on non­
bank Japanese fell by $115 billion. Although there has been withdrawal of bank credit 
from the crisis affected countries (Korea, Indonesia, Thailand), the fall of claims on 
corporations in these countries and China have been only $20 billion and $8 billion 
respectively (BIS 1999).
Hong Kong has also established itself as an important centre for foreign exchange. In 
1992, Hong Kong ranked sixth after Switzerland in terms of daily turnover. By year 
1995, Hong Kong overtook Switzerland and ranked fifth in the world with an average 
daily turnover of 90.2 billion dollars . However, in 1998, Hong Kong’s share declined 
to 4% from 6% in 1995, placing it in sixth position and with equal footing with 
France. During the last few years, Hong Kong also emerged as an important centre for 
derivative instruments trading. However, as in the case of other types of activity, its 
share in this activity has declined from 2% in 1995 to 1% in 1998.
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Hong Kong also has a very well developed stock market. With a market capitalisation 
of around $343 billion at end of 1998, the Hong Kong stock exchange is the third 
biggest in the Asia and Pacific region after Japan and Australia. The flexible 
regulatory environment where there are no restrictions on foreign ownership, no taxes 
on capital gains, and low brokerage fees have contributed to the growth of the equity 
market. Most importantly, the Hong Kong stock exchange is an important centre for 
raising capital for China which contributed further to the development of the equity 
market. In terms of turnover, Hong Kong’s position in the region is less prominent. In 
1998, Japan, Taiwan, Australia and China all had higher values of shares traded. 
Although growing fast, the debt market remains relatively thin with low volumes of 
trading. The small size of the economy and the Hong Kong authorities’ persistent 
budget surpluses are cited as major factors responsible for the underdevelopment of 
the debt market.
It is important to note that despite Hong Kong’s complex, diversified and developed 
financial structure, the size of its financial markets remains modest compared to the 
international financial centres. Although it is the third largest in the region, the 
capitalisation of the Hong Kong stock exchange market remains modest compared to 
the major international financial centres. Moreover, its turnover is modest not only 
compared to stock exchanges in the developed world, but also to those in the region. 
Despite the complexity of Hong Kong’s financial structure, its derivative market 
remains small and its share of total turnover has been declining in recent years. 
Equally important, Hong Kong’s debt market is very thin and underdeveloped. The 
underdevelopment of the debt market is due to a number of factors most notably the
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lack of government securities, which in turn is caused by a highly conservative fiscal 
policy. It is often argued that the small size of Hong Kong firms is also another 
contributing factor for the underdevelopment of the bond market (Luk, 1994). This 
makes it very difficult and costly to raise funds in the debt market because the 
amounts of funds required by these firms does not justify the costs incurred in 
screening and information collection. Although such arguments may be valid in 
reference to national financial markets, they are less valid when dealing with regional 
or international financial centres. These centres are not expected to provide their 
services to local firms, but to world-wide companies and hence the small size of their 
economies and firms should not be a deterring factor for the development of the debt 
market. However, it seems that large local and regional corporations prefer to use the 
overseas debt markets mainly London and Luxembourg, for raising funds (Cassard, 
1994). There are two main reasons for this preference. First, the requirements in Hong 
Kong are more stringent and fees are higher than in the Eurodollar market. Second, 
the information required for the issue of such bonds has become highly standardised 
and is usually collected by credit rating agencies. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
problems related to information asymmetry would affect the cost structure of banks. 
Therefore, borrowers can benefit from London’s and Luxembourg’s highly liquid 
Eurodollar markets and their low costs. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Hong 
Kong’s position has been deteriorating in many traditional activities such as cross 
border banking, deposit taking activity and foreign exchange activity which raises 
doubts about Hong Kong’s position as one of the leading centres of the world.
78
S in gapore
The creation of the Asian dollar market in Singapore in the late sixties was mainly 
responsible for the emergence of Singapore as an important financial centre. Initially, 
this market provided an intermediation function between several Asian countries and 
Eurocurrency markets. However, this function rapidly evolved and from the early 70s 
Asian currency units (ACUs)17 in Singapore played an important role in attracting 
funds from outside the region and lending them to the Asian region mainly Hong 
Kong, making Singapore an important centre for international bank lending and 
deposit taking activity. What is interesting to note is that Singapore has been able to 
maintain its share of these activities, unlike Hong Kong and Japan whose shares have 
declined fast over the last few years.
There are no doubts that Singapore’s financial structure has become more complex. 
Singapore has also succeeded in becoming a regional centre for foreign exchange 
trading. According to BIS statistics, in 1995 Singapore ranked fourth in the world in 
terms of foreign exchange market turnover with an average daily turnover of 105.4 
billions dollars in 1995. In 1998, Singapore maintained its position capturing 7% of 
global turnover.18 What is interesting to note though is the declining share of 
Singapore in the global OTC derivative market activity from 7% in 1995 to 2% in
17 Financial institutions with offshore license must keep a separate book keeping unit known as Asian 
Currency Units (ACUs) for dollar transactions. These ACUs are exempt from reserve requirements and 
their income derived from offshore operations is taxed only at 10%. Furthermore, the interest received 
by non -residents on their deposits in ACUs are exempt completely from any tax. Such regulatory 
measures and the tax concessions played an important role in the creation of the Asian dollar market in 
Singapore.
18 The currency composition o f foreign exchange turnover reflects the international dimension of this 
market. In April 1995, domestic currency business was negligible. The net foreign exchange turnover 
in local currency against international currencies amounted only to 5.8 billion dollars. This indicates 
that foreign business accounts for the bulk o f the turnover which reflects the importance o f Singapore 
as an international centre for foreign exchange trading.
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1998 which suggests that Singapore has failed to consolidate its position as the 
regional centre for derivative activity.
Although Singapore's financial structure has become more complex, its success in 
diversifying its financial structure remains limited. Singapore's share of total financial 
activity is relatively small compared to the major international financial centres 
(London, New York, and Tokyo). More importantly, capital markets in Singapore 
remain underdeveloped. With 321 companies listed in the stock market, a total market 
capitalisation rate of around US$ 94.5 billion, and turnover of $50 billion at end of 
1998, Singapore’s stock market remains small not only relative to international 
financial centres, but also to regional stock markets. Furthermore, the bond market in 
Singapore is very thin and illiquid. In this respect, it should be mentioned that the 
bulk of the Asian bond issues are placed in the London Eurobond market and with the 
support of European banks (Cassard, 1994 ; Park, 1982). This reflects the limited role 
Singapore plays in raising funds for Asian coiporations through this market. Finally, 
it is important to note that Singapore has not been successful in developing as an 
important centre for Euroloan and syndicate lending. However, Singapore still 
contributed indirectly to the growth of these markets by supplying Hong Kong with 
huge amounts of funds raised through the Asian dollar market.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have provided empirical evidence on the degree of centralisation of 
different types of financial activity. The existing evidence suggests that international 
financial activity shows a strong tendency to centralise in very few financial centres. 
This is true for all types of financial activity, although the degree of centralisation can
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vary across different financial services. In fact, Kindleberger (1983) and Daly (1991) 
argue that finance is more centralised than other lines of activity such as commerce or 
industry. This is quite a puzzling observation since the opposite is expected. Banks 
offer services to customers who are distributed all over the world and hence it is 
expected that banks will also have such a scattered distribution (Bertrand and Noyelle, 
1988). Furthermore, information is an important input for the provision of financial 
services and hence it is expected that banks will expand all over the world to remain 
close to the sources of information. However, it seems that factors responsible for 
centralisation of financial activity in one location are stronger and offset 
decentralising factors. Hence, the central questions are: what are the major 
agglomeration forces in the financial industry? Why do financial institutions and 
financial activity show a high tendency to centralise? In the next three chapters, we 
address these questions in detail. In chapter 3, we examine the impact of information 
asymmetry on the degree of centralisation of cross-border lending activity. In chapter 
4, we abstract from the lender-borrower relationship and examine the major processes 
that push banks to locate near each other. In chapter 5, we identify a major 
agglomeration force in financial activity, that of path dependence which suggests that 
once a centre is established, it will continue to attract financial activity and hence 
enhance the centralisation of financial activity.
81
Chapter 3 - Dispersion and Agglomeration Forces in Credit Activity
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter stressed the importance of treating financial services as a 
heterogeneous category. One major benefit from such a treatment, which is relevant 
for this chapter, is that it allows us to specify which types of financial activity are 
likely to show the highest degree of centralisation. Equally important, it provides us 
with a framework to specify the type of international banking activity which is mostly 
associated with the emergence of financial centres.
Theoretically, it is possible to distinguish between financial services according to their 
informational content. In particular, it is possible to distinguish between non­
standardised financial products (mainly bank loans) which utilise local information to 
a high degree, and highly standardised financial products which require low 
investment in local information. Assuming that the former type of financial activity is 
less standardised due to information asymmetries, it can be shown that the location of 
the bank relative to the source of information (i.e. the borrower) matters for the 
delivery of the financial product.1 Given that certain types of borrowers follow a 
scattered distribution, non-standardisation is likely to act as a powerful dispersion 
force in certain types of financial activity. On the other hand, "transparent" or 
standardised financial services can be delivered to customers all around the world. 
Because the location of suppliers relative to borrowers or depositors is not important 
for standardised “transparent” financial services, banks may decide to provide them
1 Although the main focus of this chapter is on bank lending activity, it is important to note that other 
types of financial activity such as OTC derivative market activities (including FX forwards and swaps) 
are also highly non-standardised and utilise information to a large extent. Hence, the main arguments 
presented in this chapter also apply to such types of financial activities. For instance, in case o f OTC 
derivative market activities, the bank still need proximity for liquidty and offsetting risk purposes.
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from a central place in order to benefit from various externalities that arise from 
centralisation.2
This chapter studies the impact of information asymmetries on the degree of 
centralisation of lending activity. In particular, under certain assumptions related to 
the structure of monitoring costs, this chapter shows that the decision of banks to 
establish near the source of information can act as a powerful dispersion force. This is 
particularly true in the case of retail borrowers who have a scattered distribution. The 
fact that banks want to locate near their main borrowers has been long recognised. 
This relationship has been analysed in the context of the theory of bank 
multinationality. In its crudest form, this theory simply applies the elements of the 
eclectic approach, established in the study of multinational corporations, to the 
banking firm (Gray and Gray, 1981). Few modifications have been made to take into 
account the importance of information and trust in the business of banking (Dunning, 
1993). In this respect, many studies have emphasised a “follow the clientele” 
hypothesis in which the bank follows its main borrowers abroad in order to maintain 
an existing relationship with them, hence not losing out to local or other foreign 
banks. This chapter discusses the major limitations of this approach and suggests an 
alternative framework, based on the theory of financial intermediation, which can also 
explain the decision of banks to establish near borrowers. In particular, under certain 
assumptions related to the structure of monitoring costs, this chapter shows that there 
is a certain distance beyond which the bank may decide to exclude a group of 
borrowers from the credit market. The bank’s decision to exclude borrowers is based 
solely on their location relative to the bank. In order for the bank to have access to
2 The sources of these externalities are discussed in details in Chapter 4.
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such customers, the bank has to locate near them.3 For some types of lending, the 
value d* defines a region such that by locating in a certain geographical location (i.e. 
an international financial centre), a bank can service its clients anywhere in this region 
at equal cost, for by assumption within that region the cost of obtaining information 
and monitoring costs are zero and there is no deterioration in the quality of 
information.
This chapter is divided into six main sections. Section 2 discusses the bank 
multinationality approach and its major limitations. This approach consists of various 
elements, many of which are not directly relevant for the discussion in this chapter. 
Hence, this section focuses only on the bank-borrower relationship and how 
maintaining such a relationship creates a motive for bank multinationalisation. 
Section 3 provides an alternative framework based on the theory of financial 
intermediation. This section provides a model in which a bank’s geographical 
proximity to borrowers matters in the provision of certain types of financial services. 
One such type is banks’ lending activity which requires a high degree of monitoring 
and information processing. Section 4 uses the main implication of the specified 
model to study the impact of infoimation utilisation on different types of lending 
activities. Section 5 discusses the relationship between wholesale banking and 
financial centres. In particular, it is argued in this section that the emergence of 
financial centres is mainly associated with the internationalisation of wholesale 
banking. Section 6 discusses the impact of information technology on the 
agglomeration of the financial industry. The last section contains my conclusions.
3 In this context, it is important to note that in principle, features such as language and culture, 
consistency of accounting standards, and similar locally specific aspects o f the business environment 
are usually correlated with distance.
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3.2 Multinationalisation of Banks
In the early 60s, wholesale banks did not go multinational and most of their 
international operations were settled through correspondent banks. However, during 
the late 60's and early 70's, many banks preferred to deal directly with their 
multinational borrowers rather than depending on correspondent relationships (Hine 
et al, 1997; Coulbeck, 1984). The “eclectic approach” developed by Dunning (1988) 
is useful in explaining some possible factors behind the multinationalisation of banks. 
This theory, which has been primarily applied to the manufacturing MNC, synthesises 
three hypotheses: the organisation theory, the internalisation theory, and the location 
theory. Within these hypotheses, it is possible to identify three important sources of 
comparative advantage that may give incentives for non-fmancial firms to undertake 
foreign direct investment in foreign locations. These three sources are “firm-specific” 
or “ownership” advantages, such as product differentiation, managerial skills, superior 
marketing techniques; “internalisation-specific” advantages such as quality control 
and “location-specific” advantages such as low labour costs and preferential tax 
treatment (Dunning, 1988).
Many studies have emphasised ownership-specific advantages as the main motive for 
bank multinationalisation (Grubel, 1985; Aliber 1984). This view focuses on 
technology and knowledge transfer as the most important factors responsible for the 
multinationalisation of banks. Grubel (1985), for instance, argues that financial 
knowledge is very difficult to patent or transfer to other establishments. Furthermore, 
since buyers and sellers have different information about this "knowledge", it is very 
difficult to assign a price that satisfies both sides. Such factors may prevent the
85
formation of markets for intangible assets such as knowledge of marketing strategies 
and managerial skills. Aliber (1984) stresses the importance of technical know-how. 
He argues that banks that have developed low cost technologies are likely to go 
multinational. Regardless of the source of ownership advantage, the bank must 
operate abroad in order to exploit the value of such assets. Through foreign 
operations, the bank can “ increase the return to its domestic capital above what it 
would have been without this move abroad" (Grubel, 1985, p. 2).
The major problem with this type of argument is that it neglects the nature of financial 
knowledge which is not only difficult to patent, but is also very easy to duplicate. It 
takes only a short period of time for competitors to acquire such knowledge which 
suggests that the “monopoly element is usually missing" (Casson, 1990, p. 16). As 
such, technical know-how by itself is unlikely to be the critical element responsible 
y for multinationalisation of banks. Instead, many studies have focused on information
about borrowers as the main ownership advantage for banks.4 Information about 
customers provides banks with a monopolistic advantage which it can exploit by 
operating abroad.5
Many studies have argued that the advantageous position banks have for serving 
existing multinational borrowers (mainly MNCs) in other unfamiliar regions is the 
major determinant of bank multinationalisation (Gray and Gray, 1981; Casson, 1990). 
The argument is that these banks are able to compete with local financial institutions
4 In the MNC theory, this is similar to cognitive imperfection which arises when information about the 
service or the product is not readily available which entails costs in obtaining such information.
5 For instance, Casson (1990) argues that “ the advantage is goodwill derived from specific knowledge 
of the customer requirements and it is a monopolistic advantage which is not patentable and which can 
be transferred abroad. The internalisation o f this advantage transforms domestic banks into a MNB” 
(p.17).
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which are usually unfamiliar with MNCs' financial needs. As a result, “host” 
countries’ banks’ costs of servicing these MNCs are likely to be quite high.6 On the 
other hand, “home” countries’ banks can provide financial services to these 
multinational clients at a much cheaper cost. This ownership advantage is derived 
from the fact that “home” countries’ banks have more information and better quality 
information about their multinational borrowers. According to this argument, this 
advantageous position in terms of information stock is acquired as a result of the past 
relationship and a history of continuous and regular contact between the bank and the 
boiTOwer (Gray and Gray, 1981), In fact, such an ownership advantage is the basis of 
the "follow the clientele" hypothesis (Erramilli and Rao, 1990) which claims that 
following the MNCs is the first stage in the process of multinationalisation of banks. 
In particular, this hypothesis is usually used to explain the rapid expansion of US 
banks in Europe during the late sixties and early seventies. During that period, US 
MNCs witnessed a rapid expansion of their activities across borders. This expansion 
provided US banks with incentives to locate near these MNCs and provided them 
with substantial profitable opportunities.7
The fact that banks can finance MNCs’ operations from their home bases as well as 
obtain all the relevant information through arm's length correspondence is well 
recognised. However, there are some reasons why banks may prefer to provide 
financial services themselves in the MNCs’ host country. First, multinationality can
6 This argument has been made in the context o f MNBs operating in developing countries where it is 
argued that domestic banks are poorly equipped to meet the MNCs’ requirements. However, the fact 
the many banks have developed offices in countries with highly complex financial structures and 
developed banks which can easily meet the MNCs’ requirements invalidate the above argument 
(Aliber, 1984).
7 An examination of the business o f US banks in London in that period lends support to the above 
point. According to Yannopoulos (1983), "Four fifths of their (i.e. US banks in London) sterling 
advances and two fifths of their sterling deposits were with UK branches or UK subsidiaries of US 
multinational corporations " (p. 245).
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reduce the costs of "external" transactions which arise when dealing with 
correspondents. Furthermore, transactions with correspondents may not run smoothly 
and as a result, some problems of principal-agents costs may arise. Multinational 
banks can economise on these costs by carrying such external transactions within the 
firm. Second, as Casson (1990) notes, "although the information can, in principle, be 
acquired entirely at arm's length, the establishment of wholly owned outposts may 
increase both the quantity and the quality of information gathered" (p. 17). In this 
context, Casson (1990) is referring to the internal organisation of the firm. In 
particular, transactions within the same organisation are likely to achieve better results 
in terms of information gathering due to higher quality control, more efficient 
communication network and higher interaction between bank employees of the same 
firm.
Despite its usefulness, it is important to note that the above approach to bank 
multinationalisation is based on a few implicit rigid assumptions.8 One such 
assumption is that banks, by locating near their borrowers, are able to maintain their 
monopoly power over the information stock. In fact, this is quite a strong assumption. 
It is usually the case that local and other foreign banks compete with “home” banks 
for a greater share of the credit market, which requires that they develop their own 
information about multinational borrowers. There is no reason to think that other 
banks are not able to develop their own information stock about certain borrowers. 
Equally important, this explanation does not allow for the possibility that by locating 
abroad, banks can develop new customers who would become their main borrowers.
8 The main focus of this section is on the “follow the clientele” hypothesis. There are other elements in 
the theory of the bank multinationality that could explain the decision o f banks to locate abroad. For 
instance, location-specific advantages provide banks with incentive to locate abroad. Such advantages
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In other words, this explanation focuses only on pre-existing main customers which is 
quite restrictive. Furthermore, in this paradigm, the decision of banks to locate near 
their existing borrowers is not necessarily optimal. As in the case of manufacturing 
firms, the decision of banks to go multinational is mainly to protect their market 
shares against competitors. According to this paradigm, banks that do not locate near 
their main borrowers would lose the “knowledge” or “information” advantage, not 
only abroad, but also at home (Gray and Gray, 1981). Hence, the need to preserve 
information about borrowers, which also means the preservation of the bank’s market 
share, is the main motive for bank multinationlisation. Finally, this approach neglects 
many of the special features of financial intermediaries. For instance, it does not 
specify the various functions performed by banks, of which monitoring and 
information processing are very important. This has resulted in the neglect of many 
interesting issues related to the lender-borrower relationship and the manner in which 
the distance between the bank and the borrower could affect such a relationship. 
Equally important, it neglects many important features of financial services. For 
instance, in this approach, it is not clear why the financial product is different from 
any other commodity.
3.3 Financial Intermediation Paradigm
It is possible to provide an alternative framework to explain why banks decide to 
locate near borrowers, based on the recent theory of financial intermediation and 
equilibrium credit rationing. This paradigm is useful in many respects, the most 
important of which is that it does not treat a bank like a manufacturing firm. Instead, 
this approach analyses the special functions of banks as monitors and information
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. For the purpose of this section, only the bank-borrower
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providers and users. In particular, it focuses on the various functions of financial 
intermediaries and how these functions can be affected by the location of the 
borrower relative to the bank. This paradigm also analyses the special features of the 
credit market and in particular, the relationship between the lender and the borrower 
which may be subject to problems of asymmetric information. As a consequence, the 
bank may decide to invest in information technology to screen borrowers or monitor 
the borrower in order to limit the risk that the borrower might implement a different 
project.
3.3.1 Banks as Delegated Monitors
Various models have been developed to explain the different features of financial 
intermediaries. Some of these models emphasise the role of banks as liquidity 
providers (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983); others interpret financial intermediaries as 
information sharing coalitions (Leland and Pyle, 1977); while some models 
emphasise the monitoring aspect of financial intermediaries (Diamond, 1984). This 
section is not intended for the review of this wide literature. Instead, the analysis here 
is limited to very specific models which are used to address the problem set in the 
introduction. Since we will be focusing on the monitoring function of banks, it is 
useful to discuss Diamond’s (1984) model in detail which explains the emergence of 
banks based on economies of scale in monitoring.
Diamond (1984) develops a model in which the intermediary serves as a delegated 
monitor who is able to economise heavily on monitoring costs. In order for this theory 
to work, certain ingredients are required. First, there must be economies of scale in
relationship is discussed.
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monitoring which implies that one bank finances many projects. Second, investors are 
only endowed with a fraction of the total amount of the project which implies that 
each project requires the finance of many investors. Third, the cost of monitoring the 
financial intermediary should be less than the surplus gained by exploiting the 
economies of scale in monitoring. This last ingredient is essential for the delegated 
monitoring theory to work (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Finally, we require the 
assumption that borrowers have more information than lenders which gives rise to a 
moral hazard type problem which can be solved either by monitoring or designing a 
debt contract which imposes a non pecuniary cost. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
monitoring is less costly, hence the financial intermediary decides to monitor the 
borrower at a cost K.
Given the above ingredients, it can be shown that the indirect lending solution 
dominates the direct lending since the former economises heavily on monitoring 
costs. To establish this, assume that each investor is endowed only with 1/m of the 
capital good so that m investors are required to finance one project. Also assume that 
there are nm investors such that all n projects in the economy are financed. Since 
each investor incurs a monitoring cost (K)t the total monitoring costs involved in 
direct lending is nmK. On the other hand, if investors delegate this function to a 
financial intermediary, the total cost of monitoring would be nK which is less than 
nmK since by assumption m is greater than 1. Hence, lenders would prefer to delegate 
the monitoring function to the financial intermediary, given that the costs involved in 
the direct monitoring of the financial intermediary itself do not offset the gains 
achieved through economies of scale in monitoring. In fact, using the strong law of 
large numbers, Diamond (1984) shows that the bank can offer investors deposit
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contracts which are risk-less, hence solving the problem of monitoring the monitor. 
The financial intermediary’s ability to offer risk-less deposits is a direct consequence 
of its own diversification means. To put it differently, it is assumed that 
intermediaries are able to hold very large portfolios which diversify away the risk of 
default.
More recently, Krasa and Villamil (1992) have addressed the problem of monitoring 
the monitor in non-limit economies, so that the assumption of an infinite number of 
loans required in order to derive the large numbers result can be relaxed. In fact, 
Krasa and Villamil (op.cit.) show that even with a finite number of independent 
projects the probability of bank’s insolvency goes to zero and hence the costs 
involved in monitoring the monitor goes to zero. Hence, even with a small size 
portfolio, the bank can reduce significantly the probability of default.
It is important to stress two main features of this model; (1) Monitoring decisions are 
made ex-ante i.e. before the loan is given and (2) there is no credit rationing in 
equilibrium. In this model, all projects are financed. For the purpose of this chapter, it 
is important that we explore the phenomenon of equilibrium credit rationing. Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and Williamson (1986, 1987), respectively, develop two models in 
which equilibrium credit rationing may occur,9 Although these two models are based
9 Santomero (1984) defines credit rationing as a situation where “ a subset o f firms seeking credit at the 
going rate are not granted such loans in spite of the fact that their objective characteristics are identical, 
or nearly so, to those firms receiving credit” (p.599). This definition is specific about which cases 
satisfy the equilibrium credit-rationing criterion. For instance, cases where restrictions on interest rates 
result in credit rationing are not characterised by equilibrium credit rationing since such restrictions 
involve “disequilibrum” in the credit market. Another case is where the bank grants a loan to a 
borrower with collateral, but refuses to extend credit to a similar borrower with no collateral. The later 
is not considered as credit rationed because its “ objective characteristics” is not identical to the former. 
Finally, when a bank excludes an entire group of borrowers from the credit market, this is not 
considered as equilibrium credit rationing, but as the “redlining” phenomenon (Frexias and Rochet, 
1997).
92
on information asymmetry, there are some basic differences among them. This 
chapter uses the model developed by Williamson (1986,1987) in which ex-post 
monitoring is endogenously determined. This allows for equilibrium credit rationing 
to occur.
3.3.2 Different Stages in Making a Loan
Following Porteous (1995), it is possible to decompose the loan making process into 
the following five stages:
(a) Screening: This stage involves choosing borrowers from a pool of potential 
applicants. Based on some pre-determined criteria, the bank may decide not to 
extend credit to few borrowers.
(b) Processing: This stage deals with borrowers who have passed the screening stage. 
At this stage, the loan officer collects specific details about borrowers. This stage 
is very information intensive and involves the collection of various documents.
(c) Verification: The loan officer passes the information collected to the head office 
for verification and further analysis. At this stage, the decision is made whether to 
grant the loan or not. This stage may require the collection of additional 
information about the borrower.
(d) Administration: This stage involves book keeping and checking that the 
conditions of the contract are met.
(e) Monitoring: This stage is required in case of a borrower’s default.10 This phase 
requires a large flow of non-standardised information about the project.
10 Note that this gives monitoring a different meaning from Diamond where in Diamond’s model 
monitoring is ex-ante i.e. monitoring is made before the loan is made.
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The degree of standardisation differs considerably across the various stages and 
depends on the type of the financial service being provided. For certain types of 
financial contracts, the screening process is highly standardised (for instance credit 
card applications), hence it is not location-dependent. However, in non-standardised 
types of contracts such as loans, the screening stage can be location-dependent. In 
fact, the pre-determined criteria adopted in the screening stage are location-specific 
and it is usually the case that the same criteria can not be applied to borrowers from 
different countries.
The processing and verification phases are less standardised, hence they can still be 
highly dependent on the location of the bank and the ultimate source of information 
i.e. the borrower. This is especially true in cases where the information produced is 
highly unreliable due to lack of transparency in accounting and auditing procedures 
and/or lack of enforcement by the legal system. In such cases, banks may need to 
collect additional information and/or verify the information obtained from the 
processing stage. This may involve face to face contact with borrowers and site visits. 
This problem is more serious in cross-border lending activity. Even if the required 
information can be obtained cheaply from a distance as a result of recent advances in 
information technology, its quality or usefulness may deteriorate significantly with 
distance. This may arise due to differences in accounting and auditing procedures 
between countries which limit the usefulness of the obtained information or due to the 
fact that information is produced within a certain context which can not be transmitted 
with the piece of information (Porteous,1995). Such factors affect the ability of the 
bank to evaluate the piece of information in an efficient or even in a correct manner.
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Administration functions are highly standardised and they can easily be centralised in 
order to capture economies of scale. Hence, administration functions are not location 
dependent, especially since information technology has significantly reduced the cost 
of transmitting information within the bank.
The costs involved in the monitoring stage, which occurs in case of a borrower’s 
default, can be highly location-dependent (Porteous, 1995). The nature of information 
required at that stage is highly non-standardised. Obtaining such information may 
require frequent visits to the borrower which is costly in terms of time and 
transportation. In cases when the bank decides to seize the borrower’s physical assets, 
these costs may increase substantially, especially if these assets represent specific, 
ongoing projects. For instance, taking over the project involves hiring lawyers, 
managers, analysts and auditors. The costs of transporting such skilled labour to the 
site are likely to be higher the further the bank is from the borrower. In case of cross- 
border banking i.e. when the bank deals with a borrower located in a different 
jurisdiction, the bank may face additional costs arising from dealing with a different 
legal system and an unfamiliar business environment. For instance, the bank may not 
be familiar with the bankruptcy laws of the borrower’s country. In more extreme 
cases, law enforcement in some countries may be weak affecting the degree of the 
bank’s control over the project.
Given that the friction of distance is likely to be greatest in the monitoring stage, this 
chapter uses a credit rationing model with ex-post monitoring to explain the decision 
of banks to locate near borrowers.11 This requires incorporating into the model the
11 See Porteous (1995) for a similar analysis.
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assumption that monitoring costs are increasing and convex with distance. This 
assumption usually captures the specialisation effect: the closer is the bank relative to 
the borrower, the lower is the bank’s monitoring costs (Sussman, 1993). The 
Williamson model is robust to such an extension.
3.3.3 A Model o f Financial Intermediation with Ex-Monitoring Costs 
Williamson (1986, 1987) develops a model with ex-post monitoring which is 
endogenously determined, hence allowing for equilibrium credit rationing. 
Williamson’s model is based on the costly state verification paradigm (Townsend, 
1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985) which justifies the use of the standard debt contract. It 
is assumed that the outcome of the project is not observable to the lender, unless a 
costly audit is performed. In this context, the debt contract is optimal. In a standard 
debt contract, the lender and the borrower agree on a certain payment (R) where R 
denotes the nominal unit repayment to the bank. If the return of the project equals or 
exceeds the agreed payment, auditing will not take place. However, when the cash 
flow is less than the agreed repayment, audit will occur at a cost c. This last situation 
is interpreted as default or failure in which the bank seizes the entire return of the 
project. Based on the discussion of the previous section, I assume that monitoring 
costs c are increasing and convex with distance (c = c{d) and c' (d) >0 and c" (d) >0). 
Notice that this assumption applies to non-standardised financial products and that 
non-standardisation is associated with information asymmetries.
The Williamson model does not require any assumption about the distribution of the 
projects’ return. Let x denote the random return of the borrower’s project, x has a
density function/fx) which is continuous and positive in its support £ * .* ] •
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It is important to emphasise that the dominance of indirect lending over direct lending 
is based on the assumption that the intermediary can achieve a large portfolio of
loans. This solves the problem of monitoring the monitor, since under this
12 * *assumption, the bank can offer risk-less contracts to depositors. This assumption 
must hold in order for the above theory to work.
The return to the intermediary can then be written as:
R  x
p  (R) = j ( x - c ) f ( x ) d x + j R f ( x ) d x >  Kr (1)
*  R
The first term expresses the expected reclaim value of the project in case of 
borrower’s default minus the monitoring costs incurred, weighted by the probability 
of default, while the second term expresses the agreed return received by the bank, 
weighted by the probability of the project’s success. The last term requires that the 
intermediary earns expected profit per unit invested, K, equal at least to the alternative 
rate,13 If this condition does not hold, intermediation will not take place.
Since/and c are continuos, p  is continuously differentiable:
Jt
p ( R )  = ( R -  c ) f (R)  -  Rf(R)  + \ f ( x ) d x
R
12 See the discussion at the beginning o f this section.
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Or
X
p  (R) = -c f (R)  + \ f (x ) dx  (2)
R
As R tends to x, the last expression is negative which implies that the profit function is 
strictly concave in R. As such, there exists an 7?* that maximises p*(R)}4 This implies 
that an equilibrium credit rationing may arise since the expected return is not a 
monotonic function of the nominal interest rate on loans. Intuitively, an increase in 
the nominal interest has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it increases the 
expected return for the bank. On the other hand, it increases the probability of default 
or failure. Since default is costly to the bank, this will decrease the bank’s expected 
return. As a consequence, an increase in the interest rate does not necessarily increase 
the bank’s expected profits which depends on which of the two effects dominates.
It follows from equation (2), that dp*(R*)/ dc < 0. If we assume that the bank is 
required to earn expected profit per unit invested, K, at least equal to the alternative 
rate r, then no entrepreneur with c greater than c* would receive a loan, where c* for 
simplicity is determined by the condition p*(c*) = Kr. Hence, for a borrower with 
c>c*, the expected return of the bank falls below the required rate and the bank would 
not to extend credit to that borrower.
13 r can be thought of as the return obtained from investment in risk free technology.
14 Credit rationing would occur when the expected return of the bank is not a monotonic function o f the 
nominal interest rate o f the loan. In this case, it is possible that the demand and supply of credit curves 
do not intersect resulting in equilibrium credit rationing. Hence, in order to explain the phenomenon of 
credit rationing, it is required to explain why the supply of loans can be not a monotonic function o f the 
interest rate on loans.
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Since we are assuming that monitoring costs are increasing in distance between the 
bank and the borrower, there is a distance d* , associated with c*, such that the 
optimum profits of the bank would fall below the required return. As a consequence, 
the bank would not extend credit to borrowers beyond d*. As such, all borrowers 
located beyond d* are excluded from the credit market. If the intermediary decides to 
provide loans to borrowers beyond (d*) in an attempt to increase its market share, it 
must locate near her or him.
In order to carry the analysis one step further, it would be useful to classify borrower 
categories according to their relative location to the bank. In particular, at each 
location, borrowers can be ranked according to R *, the level of contractual interest 
rate that maximises the bank’s expected return when dealing with that group of 
borrowers. In order to do this, we first need to derive dR*/dc which examines the 
impact of a change in monitoring costs (which is a function of bank’s location relative 
to the borrower) on the level of interest rate that maximises the bank’s expected 
return.
*
In order for R * to be optimal, J/ (x)dx -  cf  (R*) = 0 has to hold for every c and R *.
R
Total differentiation of the above function yields the following:
- f(R*) d R - c f  ‘ (R*) d R - f ( R *) dc = 0 
Therefore,
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- dR* [f(R*) + c f ’ (R*)] = dcf(R*)
Hence,
dRVdc = - f (R*)  / [ / (R*) + c f  (R*) ]
This can be negative or positive depending on / '  (R*) which in turn depends on 
assumed distribution of return. Assuming that project’s returns follow a particular 
distribution such that f  (R*) + c f  (R*) is positive, dRVdc is decreasing in c. Hence, 
an increase in monitoring costs causes a decrease in i?*.
It follows that a group of borrowers are credit rationed out of the market because of 
their relative location to the bank. This follows directly from the structure of the 
monitoring cost which is assumed to be increasing in distance. This is made very clear 
in the figure below. Borrower categories are ranked according to their expected return 
which is not a monotonic function of the nominal interest rate of loans. The closer is a 
group of borrowers from the bank, the higher is R*. This follows directly from 
(dRVdc)/ (dc/dd) which under certain assumption related to distribution of projects’ 
return is less than zero. Since the bank has to earn a required return at least equal to 
Kr, the equilibrium would occur at the tangency of the line Kr to the “marginal” 
borrowers (group d* in the figure below). Notice that refers to the location of these 
marginal borrowers. Borrower groups above d* would obtain credit, while borrower 
groups below d* are credit rationed out of the market (group dr in the figure below).
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One main implication of this analysis is that in order to gain access to borrowers 
beyond d * the bank may decide to locate near such borrowers. This would enable the 
bank to have access to previously “credit-rationed” borrowers. For instance, in an 
attempt to increase its share of the credit market, the bank may find it necessary to 
locate near borrowers. If not, the bank would not be in a position to penetrate the 
“foreign” market and hence its optimal portfolio would not include any loans in that 
region (Greenwald et al, 1993).
This framework can also be used to explain the decision of banks to follow their main 
borrowers abroad. If one of the bank’s main customers starts operating in a region 
beyond d*, the bank may not be willing to finance the foreign operations of that 
borrower unless the bank locates abroad near that borrower.
The monitoring cost function does not specify the shape of c(d). This allows us to 
construct a few possible cases of how costs are likely to vary with distance. For some 
types of lending, mainly wholesale lending, I shall assume discontinuity such that
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within a certain area, the optimum profits of the firm are not affected by distance. In 
other words, within a specific area (summarised by do), the costs involved in 
monitoring are constant. However, when distance exceeds do, the cost structure of the 
bank starts to increase. Monitoring costs may remain constant due to the fact that 
within that distance, the bank is able to obtain all the relevant non-standardised 
 ^ information through telecommunication, without its quality being affected. This could
also be the case because within a certain region the bank is familiar with the legal 
procedures and with the business environment or because bankruptcy laws are known 
to be properly enforced in that region. Notice that the bank may still decide to extend 
credit to borrowers located beyond do depending on whether the bank can achieve a 
risk-adjusted rate of return on banking capital higher than rate of return obtained from 
investing in the risk-free technology,
} This structure of monitoring costs can be written as:
c(d) = c0 i f d < d 0
c(d), c'(d) >0 and c"(d) >0 ifd  >d0
Figure 2
co
do
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In the figure above, the costs facing the firm remain fixed until dQ, but beyond d0 
monitoring costs start increasing. Whether these costs will rise fast or not depends on 
the region the borrower is located in. It is possible to construct a case where the costs 
facing the bank explodes beyond dQ. For instance, if a bank deals with borrowers in a 
region where the bank is not familial* with the nature of customers and business, 
where information produced can not be trusted, where bankruptcy laws are not 
enforced, or in a politically and economically unstable environment, then monitoring 
costs facing the firm may rise very fast. The monitoring cost function can be written 
as15:
c(d) -  c0 if  d<d0
c0 + e a(d-d°) i f  d>d„
The main implications of the model is that borrowers can be rationed out of the credit 
market because of their relative location to the bank. This feature is likely to be 
prevelant in cross-border banking activity since banks are likely to incur substantial 
costs arising from dealing with a different legal system and an unfamiliar business 
environment. Hence, in order for borrowers to have access to credit, they may have to 
locate near banks. Banks may also decide to establish offices or branches near such 
borrowers to in order economise on their monitoring costs and increase their market 
share by gaining acess to borrowers.
15 It is important to check whether the cost function is continuous so it is consistent with differentiation 
and integration. Consider the function q =g(s) in N ( where N is a point). The function q=g(s) has to 
have a limit and this limit has to be equal to g(N) for s=N (i.e. the value of the function for s-N ), Three 
requirements must be satisfied in order for the function to be continuous: (1) g(N) has to be defined (2) 
the limit of g(.) for v which tends to N has to exist (3) this limit has to be equal to g(N). The above 
function satisfies all three conditions, hence it is continuous.
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3.4 Centralisation and Dispersion in Credit Activity
The above framework can be used to examine the impact of information asymmetry 
on the degree of centralisation of credit activity. In order to arrive at more accurate 
conclusions, it is useful to make the distinction between retail and wholesale banking 
activity. This distinction also allows us to determine more accurately which type of 
financial activity is more associated with the emergence of financial centres.
Retail banking involves dealing with households and small and medium firms which 
are numerous and distributed all over the world. Given that the sources of information 
(i.e. borrowers) are scattered all over the globe, this can act as a dispersion force in 
the credit market. In particular, the above model shows that the location of the bank 
with respect to the borrower can affect the latter’s access to credit. Since the 
distribution of borrowers is scattered, the decision of the bank to locate near 
borrowers can act as a powerful dispersion force in the banking industry.16
Despite the revolution in information technology, most of retail financial products 
remain non-tradable. This may be due to economic, cultural and regulatory factors 
(UN, 1994). The table below summarises the main tasks performed in retail-branch 
offices of banks. As table 3.1 shows, many retail financial services can be "technically 
produced" without the necessity of face to face contacts with customers. For instance, 
communication between customers and banks can occur through phone, post, or 
electronic data transfer; the withdrawal of money can occur through ATM machines, 
etc. However, despite the fact that many of these banking products are technically
16 Furthermore, retail banking depends mainly on retail deposits as a main source for funds. Since 
retail depositors are highly scattered, this may produce a dispersed distribution of banks.
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tradable, "international trade in retail services is still limited to very few specialised 
areas" (UN, 1994, p. 54) and that “international trade on a larger scale has not yet 
emerged due largely to non-technical factors” (UN, 1994, p.55) This is shown in table
3.1 below where actual trade in most of retail products is negligible, with credit 
activity being the least tradable. The above framework suggests an explanation for 
why this might be the case. Due to information asymmetries, the bank may find it 
necessary to establish near borrowers to increase its share of the market. In this way, 
the bank can gain access to previously excluded borrowers. In fact, this analysis is 
consistent with one of the UN report’s (1994) findings when it points out that “ it has 
not been possible to find examples of foreign banks that have been able to penetrate 
significantly the retail market without establishing their own branch network " (p. 54).
Table 3.1 - The Tradability of Intermediate and Final Retail-Banking Products
Product Tradability of intermediate 
P roduct1
Tradability o f Final 
Product2
Actual Trade in 
Product3
Cash handling None None _
Cheque Book Keeping (ME) and 
Clearing (ME)
Poor -
Debit Cards Credit Rating (S) Clearing (E) Good +
Credit Card Credit Rating (S) Clearing (E) Very good 4"
Bank Transfer None Very good +
Home banking None Very good +
Prepayment card None Fair _
Current account Interest calculation (E) Good
Saving account Interest calculation (E) Good _
Pension-scheme saving Custodial Service (S) Poor
Bills Credit Rating (S) Poor _
Mortgage deed Issuing and Recording (M) Poor _
Housing Loan Credit Rating (S) Fair
Consumer Loan Credit Rating (S) Fair
Overdraft Facility Interest calculation (E) Poor
-
Key:
(1) Refers to work processes that could be separated from the rest o f production and produced at a 
Distance from the bank.
(2) This column assesses the transportability of each final product.
(3) This column indicates whether actual credit in the final product takes place
M = Manual Process; E = Electronic Process; S = Process involving skilled labour 
- = Trade in financial service is negligible ; + = Significant amount of trade is taking place 
Source: UN(1994)
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On the other hand, wholesale banking deals with a small number of borrowers mainly 
MNC headquarters, other banks, and wealthy individuals. Since these borrowers show 
a high degree of centralisation, this may produce centralisation in wholesale banking.
In fact, many of these borrowers such as MNCs and other banks are headquartered in 
a few centres, hence establishing offices in a few centres is sufficient for wholesale 
banks to remain close to borrowers. This suggests that a large part of wholesale 
banking does not necessarily involve regional or international trade since most 
wholesale banking business is performed in financial centres (See also Arndt, 1988).i7
However, since not all multinational borrowers reside in the centre, there is also a 
dispersion force in wholesale banking activity because banks may find it necessary to 
locate abroad near multinational borrowers. However, such a dispersion force is less 
powerful in wholesale banking than retail banking due to two main factors. First, in 
general, multinational customers are likely to show a much higher degree of 
centralisation than retail customers. Even if they do not locate in one centre, 
wholesale customers are likely to centralise in a small number of centres. As a 
consequence, banks do not need to decentralise all over the globe. Instead, by 
establishing a few offices in financial and regional centres, a bank is able to locate 
near the main borrowers. Wholesale banks’ main customers are other banks and 
financial firms. These firms are likely to centralise in a few centres and as a 
consequence, banks would only need to establish in these centres in order to be near 
borrowers. This has resulted in a high degree of interconnectedness between financial
17 Equally important, wholesale banks depend mainly on the interbank market as the main source for 
funds. Since highly liquid interbank markets are centralised , this may enhance the centralisation of 
banks.
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• 1 Rcentres (Choi, 1986). MNCs are also main customers of wholesale banking. Again, 
these are likely to show a high degree of centralisation. Given that three quarters of 
total multinational investment is concentrated in developed market economies 
(Dicken, 1992), establishing in the major financial centres of the developed world is 
sufficient for these banks to remain close to their multinational borrowers. The 
uneven distribution of private capital flows is more acute within the developing 
world with very few countries in Latin America and Asia having captured the bulk of 
these flows, especially in the boom of international private flows from 1990 to 1997. 
In response to this uneven flow of capital, banks locate in few regional centres, rather 
than decentralise in all parts of the globe.
Another important factor that may enhance the centralisation of wholesale banking 
is the fact that wholesale banking products are more standardised than retail financial 
products. Hence, wholesale banking products can be delivered from a distance 
without the cost structure of the bank being affected. Securitisation has increased the 
tradability of financial products by the separation of credit rating from issuing (as in 
the case of credit rating agencies who continuously evaluate and collect information 
on MNCs) and by the possibility of sharing financial risk (syndicate lending). 
Wholesale banks have also utilised information and telecommunication technology 
infrastructure for a longer time than retail banks, not only in back office operations, 
but also in customer related services (UN 1994). This had the effect of making a 
wider range of wholesale banking products more tradable across distances. In fact, 
this is supported by Table 3.2 below which shows that in general wholesale banking
18 Choi et al (1986,1996) suggest various indicators of the degree of interconnectedness between 
financial centres. A linkage between the two centres is assumed to exist when a bank headquartered in 
some centre I has an office in centre j. Such linkage may reflect the flow of information between
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products are more tradable than retail banking products. This is particularly true in 
risk and liquidity management functions where the actual trade in most of these 
financial products is quite high (except for swaps which are non-standardised). These 
financial services are highly standardised and hence can be delivered at a distance. On 
the other hand, credit activities are less standardised and hence they are less tradable. 
However, in general it is safe to argue that wholesale products are more tradable than 
retail products which may enhance further the centralisation of wholesale banking.
Table 3.2- The Tradability of Intermediate and Final Wholesale-Banking Products
Product Tradability o f  Intermediate 
Product
Tradibility o f  Final 
Product
Actual Trade in 
Product
Bank Draft Book Keeping (ME) Clearing 
(ME)
Good +
Direct Debit Book Keeping (ME) Clearing 
(ME)
Good +
Debit Collecting Document processing (M) Poor _
Letter o f credit Document processing (M) Bank 
Transfer (E)
Poor 4
Home-banking None Very Good 4
EDI None Very Good 4
Forward Contract Credit Rating (S) Good 4
Futures Credit Rating (S) Good 4
Options Credit Rating (S) Good 4
Swaps Credit Rating (S) None _
Guarantee Credit Rating (S) Good 4
Financial loan Credit Rating (S) Interest 
Calculation (E) 
Document processing (M)
Good -
Loan for procurement o f equity Credit Rating (S) Good _
Leasing Credit Rating (S) Poor
Financial leasing Credit Rating (S) Good 4'
Export credit Loan Credit Rating (S) 
Interest Calculation (E)
Poor -
See table (1) for key
Standardised types o f financial services
The discussion has concentrated so far on credit operations which due to asymmetric 
information may not show a high degree of centralisation. However, not all types of 
financial activity utilise local information intensively. In fact, once we consider forms 
of financial activity other than credit activity, the emphasis on local information is no
centres. This is a very reasonable assumption especially if we think that there is a continuous flow of
longer justified. Here another benefit of treating financial products as very diverse 
becomes clear. Even if different types of financial activity have a tendency to be 
centralised within a location, the degree or the extent of such centralisation is likely to 
differ among the various categories depending on its informational content. Take for 
example trading and dealing activity which consists of the exchange of financial 
instruments in various financial markets. Trading in financial markets has become 
highly computerised. More important, these products have become highly 
standardised. In some markets such as the foreign exchange and government bond 
markets, the nature of information required (mainly macroeconomic data and political 
information) can be obtained by almost any trader from financial information vendors 
such as Reuters. Due to such factors, these types of standard or "transparent" financial 
services can be delivered to customers all around the world (Clark et al, 1997). 
Because the location of these markets relative to borrowers or depositors is not 
important, banks may decide to locate near each other in order to benefit from various 
externalities that arise from centralisation. The sources of these externalities are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
3.5 Wholesale Banking and Financial centres
The above discussion highlights the importance of the distinction between retail and 
wholesale banking. Although the growth of cross border lending activity and 
international branching occurred simultaneously during the last three decades, these 
two forms of expansion reflect the internationalisation of two types of banking 
activity: wholesale banking and retail banking respectively (Coakley, 1984). The 
internationalisation of retail banking activity occurred through the establishment of
information between the parent bank and the office in that centre.
bank offices all over the globe, rather than establishing in a few international or 
regional centres. Despite the fact that the bank may decide to extend credit to retail 
borrowers at a distance, this may not be the optimal solution. In fact, if the costs 
involved in monitoring increase substantially beyond a certain distance, the bank may 
decide not to extend credit to borrowers located beyond that distance. As a 
consequence, the bank may lose its competitive edge to local lenders. It follows that 
in the case of retail banking, being close to the source of information can act as a 
powerful dispersion force and as such it is not likely that retail credit activity will 
show a high degree of centralisation. On the contrary, we are likely to witness a very 
wide branch expansion which is not directly connected with the growth of financial 
centres.
On the other hand, wholesale lending activity is likely to show a high degree of 
centralisation. In fact, the internationalisation of wholesale banking took the form of 
establishing branches in a few major international financial centres (Coakley, 1984). 
These centres provided banks with opportunities to locate near main borrowers since 
these centres are also host to a large number of MNC headquarters, other banks and 
wealthy individuals. Since the number of wholesale customers is small, the 
establishment of banks in few international financial centres and banking centres is 
sufficient to maintain a close relationship between banks and major borrowers.
Empirical Evidence
The internationalisation of wholesale banking was manifested by the establishment of 
bank offices (branches, subsidiaries, representative offices) in few financial centres, 
the most important of which are London and New York. In 1970, London was a host
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for only 73 foreign banks. By 1993, the number of foreign banks in London had risen 
to 512 banks. The same pattern can be observed in New York City. In 1971, the 
number of foreign banks in New York was 73. By 1993, the number of foreign banks 
in New York had risen to 328 foreign banks (Brealy and Kaplanis, 1997).
Despite the fact that the world’s major financial centres have managed to capture a 
large share of bank offices, international branching occurred in almost every part of 
the world. Table 3.3 shows the location of overseas offices of the world's largest 1000 
banks in terms of assets (end of 1992). This table gives us an indication of the 
distribution of bank offices across different regions. According to the table 3.3, 
international financial centres and banking centres capture a significant share of bank 
offices. The leading financial centres (United Kingdom, United States, Japan, 
Germany, France, Hong Kong and Singapore) capture around 38% of these offices. 
However, it is obvious that there are limits to the extent of centralisation of banks' 
foreign offices. In fact, most international branching has not been associated with 
wholesale banking and hence it is not associated with the emergence of financial 
centres. In order to have a competitive position in retail markets, banks must establish 
offices in other parts of the world which is very much reflected in Table 3.3.
►
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Table 3.3 - Location of Overseas Offices* of the World’s 
Largest 1000 banks
Host country Num ber of o v e rseas  offices
Latin America/Carribean 228
USA 204
Canada 55
Africa 63
Australia 85
Japan 98
Hong Kong 144
Singapore 115
Other Asia 332
Middle East 134
Spain 68
Italy 43
UK 257
France 70
Netherlands 41
Germany 96
Switzerland 92
Other W estern Europe 143
E ast Europe 61
Offshore 232
* Bank offices include subsidiaries, branches and representative offices 
Source: Brealey, R A and E.C. Kaplanis (1996)
3.6 Information Technology: An Agglomeration or Dispersion Force?
The tension between centralisation and de-centralisation within the financial services 
industry has been intensified by recent developments in information technology. 
O’Brien (1991) defines the end of geography as a concept mainly applied to 
international financial relationships and “refers to a state of economic development 
where geographical location no longer matters in finance, or matters much less than 
hitherto". On the one hand, the end of geography suggests that communication and 
information technology renders financial centres obsolete and exerts pressure on 
financial intermediaries towards decentralisation.19 According to the end of geography
19 Many economists that adopt the decentralising thesis argue that information technology merely 
facilitates decentralisation and is not responsible for decentralisation. According to these economists, 
decentralisation has to be viewed as having its own driving force. For instance, Hepworth (1990) 
argues that decentralisation should be viewed in the context of the conflict between the capitalist and 
labour class. Decentralisation is part of capitalists' strategy to diffuse the power of the labour force. 
Another reason is the one suggested by Vernon (1979) who argues that decentralisation occurs at later 
stages of the product cycle when the production process utilises large numbers o f  unskilled labour that 
can be found only in the periphery. Although these arguments have been presented in the context of the
thesis, recent advances in telecommunication and information technology undermine 
the importance of the location of financial institutions since these can locate in any 
part of the world and still provide services to their customers which are scattered all 
over the globe. Central to this thesis is the assumption that information technology 
enables banks to obtain all relevant information without being close to borrowers or 
competitors.
On the other hand, this thesis also suggests information technology can enhance 
centralisation (Martin, 1992; O’Brien, 1991). Being able to provide financial services 
to borrowers who are far away means that banks do not need to establish offices near 
them. As such, banks can locate in a centre and take advantage of all the benefits of 
centralisation that arise from interaction among banks and borrowers. Martin (1992) 
argues that "the new technologies will actually reinforce the concentration of 
expertise and business within existing major centres, in that firms located in the latter 
can now easily access customers and funds wherever these are located. In other 
words, the new technologies allow firms even greater possibilities to develop 
economies of scale and scope through concentrating activities in a relatively small 
number of leading financial centres, selling and servicing global products from a few 
strategic locations" (p. 263). Furthermore, advances in information technology have 
affected the degree of centralisation within financial and non-financial firms. In 
particular, they have increased the degree of centralisation of control and decision 
making within multinational borrowers such as MNCs (UN 1994, Amirahmadi and 
Wallace, 1995). This may increase the benefits that banks can obtain from locating 
near MNC headquarters which show a high degree of centralisation in few financial
manufacturing sector, they make clear that it is not necessarily true that information technology is the
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centres. Within the multinational bank, information technology may induce further 
centralisation in some specialised areas such as risk management and strategic 
planning which banks prefer to undertake in a centre (Edwards, 1998).
A running theme throughout this chapter is the assumption that distance matters in the 
provision of some financial products, mainly credit products such as loans. Banks by 
locating in certain regional financial centres are able to engage in cross-border lending 
to their regional borrowers without their cost structure or the quality of information 
being adversely affected. As far as this activity is concerned, information technology 
does not undermine the importance of financial centres, but actually may intensify the 
centralisation of financial activity by reducing the cost of obtaining information. 
However, we would not expect all potential borrowers to reside within that region. 
Banks overcome this problem by locating near borrowers. In particular, by 
establishing a network of branches in other regional centres, wholesale banks accrue 
the benefits that arise from centralisation of financial activity as well as overcome 
some of the problems inherent in financial intermediation. In general, the size of the 
network that a multinational bank wants to establish or maintain depends on the 
nature of its activities. In this respect, moves toward the provision of more retail 
services and the shift toward financing small and medium sized firms by some banks 
can act as a decentralising force (Jacobs et al, 1990).
In the case of “transparent” financial services, information technology may enhance 
further the degree of centralisation of these activities as suggested by Martin (1992). 
Here it is true that location of the supplier relative to the borrower does not matter
driving force behind decentralisation as some economists tend to argue.
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anymore. But precisely because of this fact, banks may still decide to provide 
standardised services from a financial centre in order to benefit from the externalities 
that arise from centralisation such as access to deeper and more liquid interbank 
markets, highly specialised intermediate inputs and skilled labour, and highly 
complex infrastructure.
The above discussion treats the financial firm as a single entity. As a consequence, the 
impact of information technology on the financial industry is not fully explored. In 
particular, the impact of information technology on front office and back office 
activities is neglected. Front office activities such as funding, arranging syndicated 
loans, raising capital, issuing new bonds, mergers and acquisitions require continuous 
interaction and face to face contacts with clients. Back office activities, on the other 
hand, do not involve direct contact with customers. The bulk of the back office 
activity consists of data processing, cheque processing, credit card operations and 
accounting services which are highly standardised.
Traditionally, back and front offices were located together or near each other. 
However, with technological advancement and the development of electronic data 
transfers, physical proximity between these two lines of activity has become less 
important. Given that direct contact with customers is not essential for back office 
activities and given that recent advances in information technology make it possible to 
connect and control the different parts of the bank, many banks have shifted part of 
their back office operations to the suburbs of the city in order to economise on costs. 
An important development is the electronic transfer of data between the back office 
and front office which replaced the paper flow facilitating the separation between
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these two types of activities (Jacobs et al, 1990). In this sense, recent developments in 
information technology contributed to the dispersion of financial activity by moving 
part of back office activities to low cost locations and away from financial centres. 
The location of front offices however is not primarily affected by cost considerations, 
and other strategic concerns such as closeness to MNC headquarters, other 
competitors, skilled labour and specialised services play a greater role in the 
locational decision. This explains why despite the high operating costs in financial 
centres, financial firms still run most of their front office operations from these 
centres (Martin, 1992; Edwards, 1998).20
It is important to note that despite the possibility of shifting part of a firm’s operations 
to cheaper locations, many financial firms have kept their back office activities close 
to the front office. Various back office activities require technical support and skilled 
labour which are usually not found in cheaper locations. These factors constrain the 
ability of the bank to shift its back office activities to cheaper locations. Furthermore, 
many small and medium financial firms may not have the necessary resources to
20 Ota and Fujita (1993) provide a theoretical framework to explain this recent trend o f organisation 
within some financial firms. In their model, the location problem can be viewed as the outcome of the 
interaction between agglomeration force in the form of informational spillovers and dispersion forces 
in the form of higher operating costs (higher wages and higher rents). If die firm locates at x, then its 
profit function can be written as: Il(x) = A(x) -  R(x)Sf -W (x)Lf where A(X) is the aggregate benefit 
that the firm can enjoy from operating in the financial centre ( inversely related to the location of the 
bank with respect to the centre), R(x) and W(x) are the wages and rents prevailing at location x. 
Assuming that each firm consists o f a front office unit (located at x) and back office unit (located at y), 
the profit function can be written as:
II(x) = A(x) -  R(x)Sf -W (x)L f -  R(y)Sb -W (y)Lb - r(x,y)
where r(x,y) is the intra-firm communication costs and subscripts b and f  refer to front office or back 
office. Assuming that the benefit function and intra-firm are linear in distance, Ota and Fujita show 
that at least 11 configurations are possible depending on the value o f the parameters. One very 
interesting case where intra-firm costs are low, front offices show a high degree o f agglomeration 
surrounded by residential area, while back office units agglomerate in the border o f the city together 
with its employees.
116
undergo costly relocations. A related point is that there may be considerable sunk 
costs involved in shifting operations outside the centre. These costs are usually 
associated with construction of building, installation of information technology and 
computer networks, and build up of training systems for employees (Thrift, 1994). In 
the case of front offices, sunk costs can be more substantial since they may involve 
loss of clientele and weakening or even loss of established relationships with main
i
borrowers and other banks. This is especially true in primary markets (Davis, 1990). 
Such sunk costs could prevent financial firms from relocating or shifting part of their 
activities away from centres. Finally, it is interesting to note that this pattern differs 
across different types of financial firms. For instance, although investment banks have 
exploited information technology to minimise costs, this trend is not observed in 
money centre banks where most back offices remain close to front offices (Jacobs et 
al, 1990).
►
3.7 Conclusion
Given the importance of information in the provision of certain types of financial 
services, this chapter analyses the impact of information asymmetry on the degree of 
centralisation of lending activity. The framework used in this chapter draws on recent 
models of financial intermediation. Specifically, it extends Williamson (1986) model 
of credit rationing with ex-post monitoring. The extension of the model is achieved 
I through making the additional assumption that monitoring costs are increasing and
convex with distance (Porteous, 1995). The cost structure can take different shapes 
according to the type of financial service being provided. It is important to note that 
this assumption applies only to non-standardised financial products and that non­
standardisation is associated with information asymmetries. Based on this model, we
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show that there is a certain distance beyond which the profits of the bank would fall 
below the required return and hence the bank decides to ration credit to borrowers 
located beyond that distance. In order for the bank to have access to these borrowers, 
for instance in an attempt to increase its share of the loan market, the bank has to 
establish near these borrowers. As such, information asymmetry can act as a powerful 
dispersion force. It is argued that this dispersion force is fully operational in retail 
financial services while it plays a less important role in the case of wholesale banking 
services. This is the case due to two main factors. First, wholesale borrowers - mainly 
MNC headquarters and other financial institutions - show a high degree of 
centralisation. Second, wholesale financial products are more standardised than retail 
services. These two factors enable financial institutions to engage in cross border 
lending and deposit taking activity from a central location, typically a financial centre. 
The main conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that although cross-border 
lending activity and international branching occurred simultaneously during the last 
three decades, these two forms of expansion reflect the internationalisation of two 
types of banking activity, wholesale and the retail banking, and it is only the former 
which is associated with the emergence of financial centres. In fact, the 
internationalisation of wholesale banking is manifested in the emergence of these 
centres. The impact of recent advances in information technology on the
agglomeration of financial activity is also analysed. It is argued that such an impact is 
not straightforward and contrary to the “end of the geography” thesis’s main 
argument, information technology can enhance the centralisation of financial activity, 
especially wholesale banking activity. This section also notes that the impact of 
information technology has contributed to the separation of front office and back
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office activities, which were traditionally located near each other. However, despite 
these transformations, front office activities still show a high tendency to centralise.
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Chapter 4 - Factors Responsible for Agglomeration of Banks
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the impact of information asymmetry on the degree of 
centralisation of credit activity has been examined. It was argued that while retail 
banking is subject to a powerful dispersion force as a result of banks5 decision to 
locate near their main borrowers and depositors, wholesale banking is likely to show a 
higher degree of centralisation. Factors such as centralisation of wholesale banks5 
main customers and the more standardised nature of wholesale banking products can 
explain the high degree of centralisation of wholesale banking. In line with the 
previous analysis, this chapter identifies the main agglomeration and dispersion forces 
in the financial industry. But instead of analysing the impact of the bank-borrower 
relationship on the centralisation of the banking industry, this chapter focuses only on 
the factors that push banks to locate near each other or in other words, bank-bank 
relations.
Daniel's survey (1986), which examines the features that bankers consider most 
attractive in a geographic location, indicates that proximity to other banks is the most 
important factor responsible for banks to locate in London and New York (Table 4.1). 
Ninety percent of the 150 foreign banks interviewed consider physical proximity to 
US/UK banks as a major factor pushing them to locate in these two cities; 60 % of 
them citing this factor as the most important one. The survey also shows that 
proximity to foreign banks in these two markets is an important factor that affects the 
locational decision of banks. The empirical evidence presented in the last chapter also 
shows that a large number of banks agglomerate in few established financial centres. 
This chapter addresses the question of why banks decide to locate near each other.
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Table 4.1- Ranking o f  factors affecting choice o f  London and N ew  York for banking
operations
Factor Proportion of all banks citing factor Proportion ranking factor as “1”
London New York London New
A 26 15 9 -
B 16 15 - -
C 79 53 37 23
D 89 91 60 60
E 25 45 14 27
F 62 34 13 -
G 28 34 8 4
H 45 31 13 6
I 28 26 20 -
J 54 52 10 10
Key:
A = A vailability o f  suitable office space 
B = Satisfactory rental agreement 
C= Proximity to foreign banks
D = Proximity to U S/U K  banks and other financial institutions 
E= Proximity to headquarters o f  manufacturing corporations 
F= Availability o f  suitable qualified labour 
G= A ccess to intermediate services 
H= Prestige
1= Good transport links w ith other U K /U S metropolitan areas
J= Transport and telecom m unication links with financial centres outside the U S/U K
Source: Daniels (1986)
The fact that economic activity in general shows a high tendency to centralise did not 
initially attract the attention of economists. It is not until very recently that economists 
have developed a framework to explain economics of agglomeration. The main reason 
for this neglect is linked to the assumption of non-increasing returns to scale, which is 
widely used in neo-classical models. Fujita and Thisse (1996) argue that under the 
assumptions that non-increasing returns to scale exist and that resources are uniformly 
distributed, “the economy is reduced to a Robinson Crusoe type economy where each 
individual produces his/her own consumption” (p.342). In such a framework, any 
point in the map can form the basis of an autarkic economy, where goods are 
produced on a small scale unless the economy is open to trade. It is obvious that in 
such a setting, the concepts of location and agglomeration become redundant 
(Krugman, 1995).
121
In general, the location of economic activity can be viewed as an outcome of the 
interaction between agglomeration and dispersion forces (Kindleberger, 1974; Fujita 
and Thisse, 1996).1 A major agglomeration force can be found in the existence of 
externalities. It is usually the norm to distinguish between two types of externalities: 
Technological externalities and pecuniary externalities. Technological externalities 
usually refer to non-market interactions which can affect directly the production 
function of a firm or the utility function of a consumer. Pecuniary externalities on the 
other hand occur through market interactions via the price mechanism. Specifically, 
this type of externality is associated with supply and demand linkages (Krugman, 
1991).
Although both types of externalities can create agglomeration forces, the literature on 
financial centres has mainly focused on technological externalities.2 In particular, 
these studies focus on informational spillovers among banks, which are likely to 
reduce the problems inherent in financial intermediation arising from information 
asymmetry and moral hazard (Scholtens, 1992). Many economists have argued that 
these informational spillovers are quite substantial and usually increase the size and
1 The fact the location problem is generally viewed as an outcome o f agglomeration and dispersion 
forces is seen most clearly by referring to the Hicks-Alien partial elasticity (Matsuyama, 1995). Instead 
of focusing on the physical characteristics o f a good, Hicks and Allen argue that complementarity 
should be based on market demand. Hicks-Allen partial elasticity is expressed as:
Pi/xi * dxi/dPi = e-cr
Allen partial elasticity holds if  e> g . T o put it in words, the equation above of partial elasticity suggests 
that the concentration o f firms in one location results in reduction o f prices and/or the loss of 
customers, a  in the above equation captures this effect. On the other hand, the entry of new banks into 
the market attracts new customers that would benefit the incumbent firms, e captures the effect o f the 
attraction of new customers. If the effect o f attracting new customers is greater than the reduction of 
prices/customers effect, then financial firms will have the incentive to locate near each other in one 
central location. In this case, firms are complementary to each other regardless of the goods they 
produce.
2 The focus of these studies on “technological externalities” is quite understandable since with 
technological externalities the assumption of perfect competition can be maintained.
enhance the liquidity of existing markets, such as the interbank market (Davis, 1990; 
Code, 1991).
Very few studies have analysed systematically the major factors responsible for the 
centralisation of financial activity (Davis, 1990; Scholtens, 1992). Despite their 
usefulness, these studies do not provide a comprehensive picture about other possible 
sources of agglomeration. In particular, they neglect the impact of pecuniary 
externalities as an agglomeration force. As Krugman (1991) emphasises, these 
externalities are real and are as important as technological spillovers in explaining 
economics of agglomeration. In a competitive market, these externalities do not exist 
and hence in order to explore the impact of this type of externality, we need to make 
the assumption of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale in production 
which introduces major complexities into the analysis. For several reasons, pecuniary 
externalities can generate a powerful agglomeration force. For instance, it is often 
argued in the literature that agglomeration of financial activity produces a pool of 
skilled labor and allows for specialisation in intermediate services (Grilli, 1989; 
Davis, 1990; Scholten, 1992). Similarly, it is argued that agglomeration of banks 
allows for the construction of a sophisticated and complex infrastructure necessary for 
the operation of financial markets and the provision of financial services (Park, 1982; 
Scholtens, 1992). Under certain conditions, these specialisation effects can increase 
the productivity of banking capital and hence provide a rationale for bank 
agglomeration. Although these externalities are recognised in the literature on 
financial centres, their origins and mechanics remain unexplored. This chapter 
addresses more thoroughly the impact of pecuniary externalities on the agglomeration 
of financial activity.
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This chapter is divided into four main parts. Part 2 deals with technological 
externalities in the financial industry. It is argued in this section that agglomeration of 
banks generate spillovers which have the effect of increasing the extent of the 
interbank markets. Part 3 deals with pecuniary externalities. It makes a distinction 
between financial services and producer services. It is argued that including financial 
services within the category of producer services does not allow for the possibility of 
identifying a distinct producer service complex in financial centres similar to the one 
found in industrial centres. In fact, financial centres, which are made up of very 
complex financial markets and offer a wide range of financial products, require an 
infrastructure of highly specialised inputs for its organisation and operation. This part 
describes a model where increasing returns to scale in the service industry and the 
desire for financial firms to employ a wide variety of specialised intermediate services 
can provide a possible explanation for agglomeration of financial activity. This type 
of externality is ignored in the existing literature on financial centres. In Part 4, it is 
argued that agglomeration of banks generates a pool of skilled labour which is 
essential for the operation of financial firms. In particular, it is shown that 
agglomeration of banks results in higher wages which justify investment in human 
capital. Furthermore, it lowers the probability of skilled labour being unemployed 
providing an incentive for skilled labour to centralise around banks. In Part 5, it is 
argued that centralisation of financial activity reduces the cost structure of financial 
firms by economising heavily on operating costs. This provides an additional 
incentive for financial firms and clients to centralise in a single centre. The last part 
contains my conclusion.
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4.2 Informational Spillovers Among Banks: An Agglomeration Force
Studies that deal with financial centres usually equate technological externalities with 
informational spillovers among banks (Davis, 1990; Code, 1991). For instance, Code 
(1991) argues that the most important decisions are usually undertaken by a small 
number of people or what he calls the financial community. The financial community 
is highly "compact" and the members of this community are in continuous contact 
with each other. Despite recent advances in information technology which allows for 
electronic exchange of information, face to face contacts and direct interaction among 
members of the "financial community" still form the major source of information.3 
Furthermore, such an interaction enhances trust among banks, which is essential for 
transfer of funds among banks. In a similar vein, Davis (1990) argues that 
centralisation of banks lowers liquidity costs and improves the efficiency in 
establishing prices in some markets, such as the interbank market.4 Lower liquidity 
\ costs and higher efficiency in pricing arise because these centres allow banks to have
direct contacts with large number of competitors which facilitate the flow of 
information among banks.5
The international interbank market
International financial centres and banking centres play an important role in the 
collection and allocation of international funds between non-bank surplus units and 
, non-bank deficit units across geographical regions. For instance, some banks are
3 Benefits that arise from direct contact have been used to explain agglomeration in other industries.
For instance, Saxenian (1994) argues that face to face communication is a major factor responsible for 
agglomeration o f large number of firms in Silicon Valley.
4 Davis (1990) defines liquidity as " entailing low dealing costs and rapid execution of large orders with 
minimum disturbance to prices " whereas efficiency refers to the notion that prices reflect all available 
information in the market.
5 These studies are correct in emphasising the association between bank agglomeration and the 
interbank market. In fact, the bulk o f interbank activity concentrates in a few financial centres around 
the world.
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faced with excess liquidity and hence decide to channel these funds to one of the 
regional or international financial centres6. The financial centre, through its deep and 
liquid interbank market, distributes the available funds to bank or non-bank units who 
have liquidity needs. In a sense, international financial centres and banking centres 
form some type of network which is responsible both for the flow of capital across 
geographical regions. Central to this network is the international interbank market. 
One of the central functions of the interbank market is to match banks’ liquidity 
requirements. Based on Diamond and Dyvbig (1983), Bhattachraya and Gale (1987) 
develop a model to explain the liquidity distribution function of the interbank market. 
In autarky where trade between banks does not take place, the bank is restricted ex- 
ante to its choice of investment and as such depositors bear the liquidity risk of their 
bank. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) show that this risk can be completely eliminated 
by opening the interbank market which can decentralise the optimal allocation of 
funds.7 This optimal allocation is achieved by matching liquidity needs across banks. 
In particular, in this model there are two types of banks: type k which faces fewer 
early withdrawals than the average and hence has excess liquidity and type I which 
faces early withdrawals and hence demands liquidity. The demand and supply of 
liquidity are matched in the interbank market.
This framework can easily be extended to the international interbank market. Banks in 
type k country may be faced with excess liquidity due to low investment 
opportunities. On the contrary, type / countries may have liquidity requirements say
6 This reflects financial centre’s role o f fund collection.
7 For this theory to work, a few assumptions must hold. On such assumption is that there must exist a 
large number o f banks such that liquidity shocks are completely diversifiable. Another assumption is 
that liquidity shocks are observable. In case o f unobservable liquidity shocks, Bhattacharya and Gale 
(1987) show that a second best solution dominates which involves imperfect insurance for depositors.
because of high investment opportunities. The international interbank markets, the 
most liquid of which are concentrated in a few financial centres, can match these 
liquidity needs across geographical locations by attracting idle funds from type k 
countries and extending interbank loans to banks in type / countries. This liquidity 
matching can result in an optimal global allocation of liquidity resources which also 
minimise the liquidity risk for depositors.
The interbank market is characterised by a very important feature: the flow of funds 
between banks occurs without the exchange of any collateral (Saunders, 1987). This 
indicates that the smooth operation of the interbank activity is based to a large extent 
on confidence among banks.8 In order to attain and maintain this confidence, 
availability of information about the financial structure, investment techniques and the 
quality of management of other banks is vital. The question becomes, how do banks 
obtain such information?
There are various ways by which banks can obtain such information. Dufey and 
Giddy (1978) emphasise trading in the interbank market as the most efficient means 
for producing information. Continuous interaction in the interbank market, both by 
buying and selling deposits, produces information about banks and their investment 
techniques. It could even be argued that a large part of trading in the interbank market 
takes place in order to maintain this confidence among banks (BIS, 1983). Another 
way for banks to obtain information is through direct contact. It is not very unrealistic 
to assume that banks can obtain information about each other through direct contact
It is interesting to note in this case, over-investment or under-investment (relative to the first solution) 
could occur depending on the size of the liquidity shock.
8 BIS's description o f the interbank market as "informal" indicates the importance of confidence in the 
operation of the interbank market.
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and maintaining personal relationships.9 In this case, physical proximity may be 
important for banks to improve the quality of their information stock about bank 
borrowers. Although physical proximity between banks is not essential anymore for 
existing inter-bank transactions, it may be still important for gathering information 
and enhancing trust among banks (Code 1991).
During the 1970's, very few banks participated actively in the interbank market 
(Saunders, 1987). The limited number of banks made possible the construction of a 
network based on confidence alone. Although direct contact between banks is not 
essential for trading anymore, the interaction and regular communications among 
these banks for a very long time have made this possible. The nature of this network 
has changed as the size of the interbank market and the number of players increased 
dramatically (Lewis and Davis, 1987). The increase in the number of players resulted 
in a greater credit risk. More important, new banks with different nationalities and 
features (such as different investment techniques and management strategies) became 
new players in this market. This contributed to the heterogeneity of the network and 
made the assessment of other banks much more complex. Furthermore, this situation 
created new types of risks; the most important of which are sovereign risk and 
settlement risk (Saunders, 1987). Due to these transformations, a tiering system in the 
interbank market was developed in which banks are classified according to their 
creditworthiness.10 Such a system contributes greatly to an efficient flow of funds 
which is indispensable for an active interbank market. In particular, large banks
9 According to a BIS (1983) report, “ The relative ease with which such offices are able to take up 
funds appears to be partly due to the web of personal relations which can be established by being 
physically in large centres" (p. 16).
10 The perceived creditworthiness o f every bank is mainly reflected in his access to the market i.e. the 
size of funds that the bank can acquire and to a lesser extent in the price charged for these funds as 
reflected by the spreads between the best and worst borrowers which are in general very small.
128
usually establish credit lines which specify the maximum amount of funds that the 
bank is willing to extend to a particular class of borrowing banks. In some cases, 
lending banks also specify the maximum maturity of the loan. This suggests that the 
lending bank assesses the risk of different groups of banks beforehand which 
contributes to speedy and efficient transfer of funds. It is interesting to note that under 
this system, it is usually the case that large banks are able to obtain funds at a cheaper 
cost and/or will have a continuous access to funds while smaller banks are “red-lined” 
out or excluded from the interbank market (Allen and Saunders, 1986). More 
generally, the tiering system suggests that confidence among banks is no longer taken 
for granted and banks may decide to exclude other banks from the interbank market.
A framework suggested by Greenwald, Levinson and Stiglitz (1993) and based on 
Stiglitz and Weiss model (1981), can be used to explain some important features of 
the inter bank market, specifically the red-lining phenomenon. In this framework, 
banks are allowed to invest in a risk-less asset (government bonds). As can be seen 
from figure 4.1, the introduction of a risk-less asset lowers the contractual interest rate 
since the efficient portfolio frontier (EPF), which is defined as the tangency of a ray 
from the safe government bond at rg on the vertical axis to the LF curve, occurs 
necessarily to the left of r*. In the present context, we can apply the same principles to 
bank loans to other banks instead of their loans to industrial, agricultural or other non­
bank projects.
The development of a tiering system in the interbank market means that bank 
borrowers are classified into various risk groups, each with a different loan frontier. 
This feature can be integrated in a credit rationing framework by assuming that there
129
are several observable classes of borrower banks in the interbank market, each with a 
different loan frontier corresponding to the perceived riskiness of that group. This is 
shown in the figure below where borrower banks are ranked according to the 
attractiveness of their loan frontiers. The lending bank can either lend its excess funds 
in the interbank market or invest them in alternative assets such as government bonds 
which pay a return rg at least equal to the cost of funds which for simplicity can be 
assumed to equal to interest rate paid on non-bank deposits,11 At equilibrium, the 
level of the contractual interest rate (r*i,r*2) corresponding to the class of borrowers 1 
and 2, must lie along a single line from (rg) on the vertical axis to the final tangency 
with the loan frontier curve of the marginal class of borrowers.12 The equilibrium in 
the credit market is obtained at r*2 where the efficient frontier is tangent to the loan 
frontier of the marginal class of borrowers (group 2 in our case). At equilibrium, total 
supply of funds equals total demand for funds. It is interesting to note that in the 
figure below, group 3 is redlined out of the interbank market. Unless rg declines or the 
loan frontier of banks in the less risky groups shifts upwards, banks in that group 
will remain excluded from interbank market.
11 In this context, it is assumed that interest rate on deposits is less or equal to rg. This condition will 
hold in any banking system which guarantees depositors against loss which make these deposits at least 
as safe as government bonds (GLS, 1993).
uFor instance, if  i'i > ri**, then the bank would seek only to lend to group 1. Since we are assuming 
competitive market, these returns are mled out by interbank competition and investors will be
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Figure 4.1
Expected
Return
Group 3 is “red-lined” out of 
The interbank market
cr
Banks in the more risky group can react to this "discrimination" in various ways. 
They can become more active players in the interbank market in order to improve 
trust and send signals to other banks about their investment practices. Regular 
borrowing and lending in the interbank market could achieve this. Another possible 
way is for these banks to locate near the major suppliers of funds. For instance, 
Saunders (1987) argues that the decision to include a bank in a certain group depends 
on the location of the bank.13 By locating near the main players who are mainly 
established in the major international financial centres and banking centres, lending 
banks can obtain better information about borrower banks’ activities. Furthermore, 
face to face contacts and direct interaction between bank members can enhance trust 
among banks, which is essential for an active and liquid interbank market. In general, 
under the assumptions that (a) direct contact and physical proximity facilitate the 
exchange of information and improve its quality and (b) that more and better quality 
of information can reduce various forms of risk such as credit risk, reduce monitoring
constrained only to point rj** in the LF. On the other hand, if ri < r1*j then the bank will not be willing 
to lend to that group of borrowers.
13 The BIS also points out that, " a bank might give a line to the London Branch of a bank but not the 
head office in say Latin America. A majority of banks appear to allocate the risk primarily by 
nationality of ownership but also make some allowance for location. Often this allowance is informal. 
Branches located outside major financial centres may be treated with caution; one procedure used in
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costs, and other costs involved in information gathering, then the decision by financial 
firms to centralise in one location is “rational” since the desire to establish such 
contacts and information flows is satisfied more easily when financial firms 
concentrate in a centre. Based on these assumptions, it could be argued that other 
things being equal, locating near bank clusters would increase banks’ access to the 
interbank market by shifting upwards the perceived expected retum-risk loci. The 
above framework may also suggest that banks may be excluded from the interbank 
market because of their relative location to the interbank market. Therefore, easier 
access to an active interbank market can act as a pull factor for banks.14
In short, many economists have emphasised the importance of technological 
externalities in explaining the centralisation of financial activity in few major 
locations. For instance, according to Davis (1990), "external economies are precisely 
what international financial centres have to offer" (p. 10).15 External economies of 
scale arise mainly due to information spillovers as a result of direct contact and 
interaction among financial firms. There are two limitations however when dealing 
with these types of externalities. First, in these studies, technological externalities are 
not modelled. In other words, the existence of these externalities enters the model as 
an arbitrary assumption. Second, it is very difficult to measure or quantify these 
informational spillovers or their impact on the agglomeration of financial activity. At
such cases is to refer to the head office of the bank concerned to ask why that particular branch needed 
funds" (p.35).
It is interesting to note that the above discussion points out the possibility of cumulative causation in 
interbank activity. Agglomeration o f banks results in a more active interbank market (Choi et al 1986), 
but banks want to locate near their competitors since a more active market provides them with 
profitable business, opportunities for risk hedging and diversification, and acts as an important source 
for liquidity provision. Centralisation o f financial institutions in a single location can also expand the 
size of other existing markets. One widely cited example is loan syndication (Davis 1990) which 
requires continuous interaction between the project manager and other financial institutions.
However, as Krugman (1991) notes, this emphasis may be the result o f the insistence o f some 
economists to "preserve perfect competition" models.
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best, it is possible to construct surveys to examine hypotheses about the 
agglomeration of financial activity. Based on the assumption that such informational 
spillovers among banks exist, this section has shown that this externality can act as a 
powerful agglomeration force.
4.3 Financial Centres and Demand for Specialised Intermediate Services
As implied in the above discussion, the literature on financial centres has focused 
mainly on technological externalities to explain agglomeration of financial activity 
and financial firms. Another type of externality, pecuniary externalities, has been 
neglected as a possible source of financial agglomeration. As Krugman (1991) 
emphasises, these externalities are real and are as important as technological 
spillovers in explaining the economics of agglomeration.16 The question is, why has 
the literature on financial centres neglected these pecuniary externalities?
There are two main reasons for this neglect. The first is related to the fact that this 
type of externality does not exist in a competitive market structure. Under the 
assumption of perfect competition, all firms are price takers and hence benefits of 
interaction can not arise through usual market mechanism via the mediation of prices. 
Hence, in order to examine the impact of pecuniary externalities on the agglomeration 
of economic activity, it is essential to assume imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale in production. Under such assumptions, the analysis becomes quite 
complex since non-convexities are introduced into the analysis. The second factor is 
related to the fact that the financial industry is usually considered as part of the 
producer services sector. The main implication of such treatment of financial services
is that it does not allow for the possibility of identifying a distinct producer service 
complex in financial centres similar to the one found in industrial centres (Sassen, 
1991). This is explored further below.
Recently, many studies have explored the impact of pecuniary externalities under the 
assumptions of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale (Rivera-Batiz, 
1988; Krugman 1991; Matsuyama, 1995; Fujita and Thisse, 1996). Such studies have 
shown that under these assumptions, pecuniary externalities matter and more 
importantly, they can act as a powerful agglomeration force. Despite their diversity, 
models explaining economic agglomeration constitute common elements. Increasing 
returns to scale in the service industry and positive transport costs can generate 
agglomeration forces. In fact, this idea is not original and has been known for a long 
time in economic theory as one of the “Marshallian externalities”. However, it is not 
until very recently that economists tried to explore this externality in a rigorous 
manner.
In order to explain agglomeration of financial activity along these lines, it is essential 
that we first make a distinction between the financial industry and other producer 
services such as advertising, legal services, and accounting. Given that there is no 
single classification of services and the difficulty of handling output concepts in the 
service industry, this is not an easy task. A widely used classification is based on the 
distinction between services meeting final demand (consumer services) and those 
meeting intermediate demand also known as producer services. Consumer and 
producer services could be further subdivided according to the utility they provide
16 Krugman (1991) writes: “ if  one firm’s actions affect the demand for the product o f another firm
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(Daniels, 1993). Some services yield immediate utility (restaurants, cinemas), while 
others offer medium term (automobile repair, taxation advice) or long term utility (life 
insurance).
It has been the norm in the literature to include banking and financial services within 
the producer service category (Daniels, 1993). Despite the fact that few banking 
products satisfy this category, the treatment of all types of financial services as 
producer services is quite binding. In fact, this classification fails to recognise that the 
financial service category is very diverse and equally important, it neglects recent 
innovations in the financial industry, which have changed the nature of financial 
products and the financial industry. As emphasised in the previous chapter, within the 
category of financial services, it is possible to distinguish between trading and credit 
activities (Thrift, 1987). Despite the fact that they are provided by financial firms, 
these products have different characteristics. While lending activity accrues income in 
the form of interest, trading activities accrue income in the form of commissions or 
fees. This implies that the credit product is somehow different. In particular, when a 
bank grants a loan to a borrower, both parties enter in a contract which specifies 
among many things, the interest rate, the amount of repayment and the action to be 
undertaken by the borrower. This contract which entails the transfer of funds satisfies 
the demand of the borrower. In other words, the utility is originally attached to the 
loan which suggests that the loan17 made to the borrower satisfies his need for money. 
This is different from trading activities where utility is not derived from the actual 
consumption of the product, but rather from the ease and speed with which the
whose price exceeds marginal cost, this is as much a real externality as if  one firm’s research and 
development spills over into the general knowledge pool” (pp. 485).
17 That idea conforms to the idea of a utility function represented in (p, cr) space. But a Fisher type 
utility function is inter-temp oral (ci,c2) space implies the loan is used because Ci and c2 have utility.
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product is purchased or sold. In other words, utility is derived from the tradability of 
the financial product (Sassen, 1991). This distinction has an important implication. 
While credit products such as loans can be considered as inputs necessary for the 
production of a non-financial firm, many types of financial products (shares, bonds, 
option, etc) are closer to commodities rather than to intermediate inputs in the sense 
that utility from these services is not obtained from their consumption like in the case 
of other services such as accounting or advertising, but from their tradable nature.
The treatment of financial products as part of producer services did not allow for the 
fact that financial centres could support a producer service complex on its own. 
Financial centres, which constitute a set of very complex and diverse financial 
markets, require in addition to skilled labour and capital, “a vast infrastructure of 
highly specialised services” (Sassen, 1991). Such services are not only important for 
the organisation and operations of markets, but can also create new products and 
expand existing markets.
Demand for specialised producer services
The main objective of this section is to describe a simple model of economic 
agglomeration. In this model, only two sectors are considered: the financial sector and 
the producer service sector. It is assumed that banks produce an output given a certain 
technology which is summarised by the following production function:
X ~ La Dsc (1)
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Where X  is the banks’ output, L is the amount of labour required to produce X  and Ds 
is a sub production function of the variety of intermediate services the features of 
which will be explained below, a, b, and c are the shares of expenditure on each type 
of inputs.
In order to take into account the banks’ preference for variety of intermediate inputs, 
we need a special utility function for Ds. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the 
preference for variety is presented by a concave sub-utility function which takes the
1 Rfollowing form :
U  S D n > D n ’~)  - (  Z  D P, ) '  P 0<P<1 where P ~ 1-Ifo
1 =  1
Where Di is the quantity of variety i consumed by an individual, n is the number of 
varieties available and cr is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties. The 
sub-utility function above has three important properties: First, every pair of varieties 
can be substituted for each other. Second, the degree of substitution does not depend 
on the level of consumption of other varieties. Finally and most importantly, it reveals 
the fact that variety is valued per se. In particular, the parameter p can be interpreted 
as the desire for consuming a variety of consumer goods. When p is close to one, 
consumer goods are close to perfect substitutes and the consumer does not place any 
value on variety. On the other hand, as p declines towards zero, the desire to consume 
a variety of consumer goods increases.
18 This section draws on the discussions by Helpman and Krugman (1985), Rivera-Batiz (1988) and 
Matsuyama (1995).
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Moving from the consumer utility function to the production function is 
straightforward. In particular, the RHS of the above equation can be used as a 
production function of a competitive firm (Ethier, 1982). In other words, the RHS can 
be interpreted as a sub production function of a firm which is a composite of 
differentiated goods. Hence, Ds in equation 1 is sub-utility production function which 
takes the following form:
i )  i = (  Z  i )  f )  9 0< P <1 where p = 1-Dv (2)
i * = i
Where Di is amount of specialised input i demanded by financial firms, n is the range 
of intermediate inputs, and p  in this case represents the desire by the banking firm to 
employ a greater variety of inputs which usually reflect increased specialisation of 
labour across variety of activities . Note that in order to make sense of imperfect 
competition in the service sector, we require that a  (the elasticity of substitution 
between two inputs) be greater than 1 otherwise as we shall see later, we would obtain 
negative marginal revenue. The concavity of the sub-production function implies 
that a bank will always choose a wide variety of intermediate service, given that their 
prices do not differ much. In the case when all intermediate services are equally 
priced (Poi) (which is the case at equilibrium), then whatever the level of spending 
(is), the banking sector would demand all types of intermediate services (Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985).19 Given this assumption, then the sub-production function can 
be written as:
19 This is a simplifying assumption which does not alter the main results o f the model.
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Ds = n 1/P D, (3)
Given that D = nDi {D is total demand for intermediate services), the above equation 
can be written as:
Ds = D n 0 ^ p)/p (4)
Substituting equation (4) in (1), yields the following fundamental equation:
X = n c(l-pyp LaDc (5)
Equation 5 captures the idea that the provision of a wider variety of specialised 
services shifts outwards the banks’ production function . In particular, an increase in 
the number of specialised inputs can increase the level of output without changing the 
amounts of inputs utilised.20 This result is obtained because of our inclusion of the sub 
production function Ds which reflects the desire of the bank to employ specialised 
services. Note that the shift in the production function depends on the value of p. 
When p  approaches one, the influence of n disappears since all services become 
perfect substitutes. On the other hand, when p  declines towards zero, the variety of 
intermediate services matter and hence we will witness a shift in the production 
function.
Now suppose that the price of the banking is P, then the profit function of the 
banking firm can be written as:
20 This idea goes back to Young (1928) who notes that growth can be sustained by increased 
specialisation of labour across an increasing variety of activities.
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 ^= PX-wL-YjP dD: (6)
1=1
The problem is to choose L and Di that maximises the profit function. This first order 
conditions are:
The supply o f intermediate inputs: Pricing, Output and Diversity Decisions 
The intermediate sector is assumed to operate under monopolistic competition a-la 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This assumption is not unrealistic. On the one hand, the 
service sector is highly competitive and barriers to entry and exit are minor. On the 
other hand, demanders have very specialised tastes in respect of the sectors’ products, 
allowing for differentiation of the service sector. The differentiation between brands 
of lawyers, accountants, etc. derives mainly from considerations of trust and the stock 
of relational knowledge.
Given that the service sector is labour intensive, I assume that labour is the only input 
used in the provision of intermediate services. The labour requirement for a service 
firm is :
P aX/L= W (V
D, = [cPX/D fP] m -p (8)
L i —  Ct~hj3 D { (9)
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Where Li is the total labour requirement, a  is the fixed labour requirement, J3 is 
variable labour, and A  is the demand facing the service firm. In the Chamberlinian 
framework, it is assumed that the technologies used by these service firms are 
identical i.e. a  and J3 are the same for all service firms.
The production function of each firm in the intermediate sector exhibits internal 
economies of scale. This can be easily shown by constructing the average cost 
function which is decreasing as a function of the quantity produced21:
ACi = wL/Di = wj3 + aoo/Di
Profit maximisation requires that we equate marginal revenue to marginal cost:
i
wj3 = Pdi (St- 1/si) (10)
where £/ is the elasticity of the demand facing the firm i.e. et = (Poi/Di) (dDi/(dPDi).
In order to derive the price charged by each firm, it is obvious we need to determine 
Si. Assuming (1) that each firm acts on the conjecture that other firms in the sector
►
would not change their output to changes in the firm’s own price and (2) that there is
21 Although the firms are subject to increasing returns, the downward sloping demand ensures that 
output can’t grow indefinitely.
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a large number of firms in the market such that the influence of each firm’s output on 
total output is insignificant, then the elasticity of demand can be written as22:
S = 1/1-p (11)
Notice that as p  approaches 1, elasticity of demand tends to infinity. The economic 
explanation for this is that as p  increases towards one, the bank does not value 
specialisation and treats all inputs as perfect substitutes. As a result, all firms in the 
market can supply these services resulting in an increase in competition and hence the 
response of quantity demanded to a change in the price is quite high. On the other 
hand, when p  declines, then the bank values more differentiated services allowing 
each firm to affect its demand and hence reducing the value of elasticity.
Substituting (11) in (10) we get:
PDi = p ~ 1J3w (12)
Where PDi is the price of an intermediate input and w is the wage rate in the economy. 
This equation tells us that the firm maximises its profits by setting the price equal to 
the marginal cost plus a mark-up. Note that the mark-up is an inverse function of
22 There are various ways to derive the elasticity of demand. Equation 8 describes a demand curve 
facing a single service sector firm. Let us consider another service producer, say j. Then, it is possible 
to obtain the following relationship: Dj = Dj (Pj/Pi),/1'p * Under the assumption that the number of firms 
is large enough such that the behaviour of one firm does not influence the behaviour of other producer 
services (as in the Chamberlinian framework), the above relationship represents the demand faced by 
firm i, given Pj and qj. This demand curve has a constant elasticity of 1/1-p (Ethier, 1982).
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p . As p  declines towards zero, the differentiation required by the banking sector 
increases, giving the service more power to increase the mark-up.
In order to derive the quantity produced by each firm, we assume free entry such that 
a large number of firms operate in the market driving profits to zero. The firm would 
attain zero profits when its total revenues (P diD )  equals to total costs (wT,). Using 
equations 8 and 12, the quantity supplied by each firm such that profits are zero can 
be expressed as:
A =  (a/p) (p /l-p ) (13)
In order to determine the number of firms in equilibrium, we need the assumption that 
each differentiated good is produced by a single firm. In the Chamberlinian 
framework, firms can differentiate their products without incurring any costs. Given 
that the demand for products is symmetric, then it is not profitable for firms to share 
the demand with other firms. Given this assumption, then we can write PD* Di*n = 
P d *D. Hence, the number of firms in the market is:
n= ((3/a) ( l /p - l)D  (14)
Equation (14) states that the smaller the fixed costs, the larger the variable 
component, the less the degree of substitution between financial products, and most 
important the higher the demand for specialised services from financial firms, the 
larger the number of specialised firms. This last effect is important since it reflects 
endogenous agglomeration economies i.e. a larger D will result in larger n. In other
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words, a larger market would result in a more specialised and wider variety of these 
inputs shifting the financial sector’s production function.23 It is important to realise 
the cumulative causation effect in the above description. Financial agglomeration 
allows for the provision of a wider variety and more specialised services. This is 
expected to improve the productivity of the financial sector, resulting in greater 
demand for these services which may reinforce further specialisation of the service 
industry.
It is clear that in order to make sense of agglomeration, we need the assumption of 
non-tradability of some services. In other words, the increase in the demand can be 
achieved by localisation of banks which is likely to increase the "extent of the market" 
(Stigler, 1951).24 That geography still matters in the provision of some services is 
assumed throughout the thesis. First, the costs of delivery of some services may 
increase substantially beyond a certain distance. Second, despite the revolution in 
information and telecommunication technology and the technical possibility of trade 
in some services, not all services are actually being traded across regional (or 
national) borders. Other cultural, regulatory and economic factors can influence the 
actual tradability of these services. Many of the above mentioned intermediate inputs 
(legal services, real estate services, advertising services) still require some form of 
presence in the local market and hence are likely to be influenced by centralisation of 
demand. In fact, this is supported by the fact that most of the intermediate service 
industries are centralised in the very few cities in the world that are also locations for
23 In particular, a larger market makes it worth paying the fixed cost o f producing a large number of 
intermediate inputs which in turn improve the productivity of the banking firm. This idea is widely 
used in modelling of endogenous growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1998).
24 Stigler argues that: " Localisation is one method o f increasing the economic size o f an industry and 
achieving the gains from specialisation. The auxiliary and complementary industries that must operate 
in intimate co-operation can seldom do so efficiently at a distance" (Stigler 1951, p. 56).
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a large number of banks and multinational corporate headquarters (Smith and Walters, 
1997).25
It is important to note that agglomeration economies also depend on the extent to 
which financial institutions "externalise" the purchases of such intermediate inputs. If 
most of these services were provided from within the bank (vertical integration), then 
these economies would not exist. Whether most of these services are provided 
internally or not requires empirical investigation. Unfortunately, data on the volume 
of banks' expenditure on these services or the ratio of "internal" to "external" 
expenditures are not available for most banks. However, Daniels' survey (1986) 
provides us with some evidence on the importance of external purchases in the 
banking industry. In this survey, bankers were asked to specify the proportion of 
intermediate services provided internally and externally to the bank. Intermediate 
i services are divided into the following categories: Marketing, accounting, computing,
insurance, legal, real estate, and advertising services. The results of the survey 
indicate a clear dichotomy among these services. While most of marketing, 
accounting, and computing services are provided "in-house", insurance, legal and real 
estate services are mostly obtained from external sources. For instance, around 78% 
of banks interviewed obtain more than 70% of their accounting services internally, 
while around 65% of banks obtain most of their legal services from external sources.
) More importantly, the survey shows that banks have increased the external demand
for these services because these banks can obtain highly specialised services at lower 
costs. The survey also indicates that most of external demand concentrates in
Of course, lines of activity other than finance usually require these services. However, this does not 
negate the fact that financial firms may decide to locate in cities where producers services are highly 
efficient. In fact, some scholars consider that the development of financial centres is the highest stage
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Manhattan and the City of London. At least 70% of these banks' external purchases 
are concentrated in these two areas. Suppliers in metropolitan regions may also 
benefit, but to a much lesser extent. Suppliers beyond metropolitan regions do not 
benefit at all from foreign banks' presence.
In short, under certain assumptions regarding tradability of services, it is shown in this 
section that financial firms’ demand for differentiated intermediate services can 
generate a powerful agglomeration force. Rather than treating financial services as a 
part of the producer services or simply as an input required for the production of non- 
fmancial firms, most financial products have become close to commodities where 
utility is not derived from the consumption of the service, but rather from trading the 
financial service, i.e. tradability is the basis of utility. The organisation and operation 
of financial markets and institutions, which constitute a financial centre, require the 
use of such intermediate service. Based on this categorisation, it has been shown in a 
partial equilibrium model how the desire to employ a wide variety of specialised 
services can generate an agglomeration force. In particular, agglomeration of financial 
activity, which creates a localised demand, can support the establishment of a highly 
specialised service complex.
4.4 Agglomeration of Firms and a Market for Skilled Labour
The provision of financial services depends to a large extent on a highly qualified and 
specialised labour force. In fact, Walter’s survey (1988) shows that skilled labour is 
the most important input for the provision of most types of financial services. Hence, 
the desire to acquire skilled labour can provide an incentive for banks to locate in
of metropolitan development which is achieved only after certain level o f development o f intermediate
certain geographical areas. There are strong reasons to think that agglomeration of 
firms allows for a pool of highly skilled labour (Grilli, 1989).26 One reason is that 
agglomeration of firms, which entails competition between firms for skilled labour in 
a centre, allows for a level of wages high enough to justify investment in human 
capital (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990). If wages fall below a certain level, it may 
discourage labour from acquiring the necessary skills required by financial firms. 
Human capital externalities can in turn cause an increase in productivity gains 
(Rauch, 1991). Going back to the model suggested above, it could be shown that the 
level of wages is positively related to the number of firms at equilibrium. Substituting 
equation (5) in (7) yields the following result:
W = P a L a'! 1? D° n 0*0 ' ^  (15)
Equation (15) shows that the level of wages is positively related to the number of 
firms. The number of specialised services in a location affects wages in both banking 
and service sectors due to the assumption of homogenous labour.
Krugman considers a model in which the interaction between increasing returns to 
scale and uncertainty of demand for labour provides firms and skilled labour with 
incentives to centralise in one location. Consider n banks with uncertain and 
imperfectly correlated demands for labour. This could be due to the fact that banks 
provide different types of services, the demand for which is uncertain and not
services is attained (Kindleberger 1974).
26 Although it is cheaper for financial institutions to cover search costs, it is not necessarily that they 
will pay lower wages for skilled labour in a financial centre. This depends on the nature of the labour 
market which could differ from one location to another (Walter 1988). However, regardless of the 
costs, financial centres by attracting the highly skilled and specialised workers will provide the 
financial institutions with the best quality of labour at low search costs.
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perfectly correlated. It could also be the case that banks are subject to firm-specific 
shocks as a result of their past lending policies, management practices or their 
exposure to different types of borrowers.27 Because of the uncertainty of demand for 
their labour, skilled labour has the incentive to locate where there are a large number 
of firms. In line with the above model, it is assumed that each bank can operate in one 
location only (West or East). In other words, the model requires that banks have the 
incentive to choose one location over the other, otherwise agglomeration forces would 
not arise. The assumption of increasing returns to scale entails that firms concentrate 
in a single location, rather than disperse in space. Although there is not much 
evidence for the existence of increasing economies of scale in financial production in 
the technological sense, there are undoubtedly other external economies, discussed in 
this chapter, which provide banks with incentives to centralise in a single centre.
The main results of Krugman’s model can be derived from figure 4.2 below. The 
upward sloping curve WW that shows the distribution of banks and labour in a 
location (west) that will leave skilled labour indifferent between the two locations. 
Intuitively, given the number of banks, skilled workers prefer to share the demand for 
labour with fewer workers. In order to compensate for this increased competition, the 
number of banks in a location must increase.28 In a similar manner, it is also possible 
to derive the curve that leaves banks indifferent to their locations (FF). Given a 
certain pool of skilled labour, banks prefer to share the available labour with fewer 
firms. In order to compensate for this, the number of skilled workers has to increase.
27 In other words, uncertainty in the demand for financial services generates uncertain demand for 
labour.
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The main conclusions of the model can be illustrated by graph 4.2 below which shows 
that there are three possible equilibrium points with point 1 being unstable. 29 The 
graph indicates that both banks and skilled labour have the incentive to centralise in 
one location. Centralising in a single location maximises both the expected wages and 
expected profits. The location chosen is indeterminate and depends of course on the 
initial conditions such as the initial distribution of skilled labour and firms.30
Figure 4,2
West’s 
Share of 
Firms
West’s Share 
of Workers
Although the model is quite simple, it clearly shows that there are gains from 
centralising in one location. The fact that financial centres provide a pool of skilled 
labour for banks has been recognised by many economists before (Grilli, 1989: Davis, 
1990). However, how this pool comes about was never explained. Krugman’s model 
suggests useful insights into this matter. First, competition among a larger number of 
banks may push wages upward in the market for skilled labour giving an incentive for 
skilled labour to centralise around these firms. Second, skilled labourers have the 
incentive to centralise around those banks because the probability of being
28 This might suggest that risk aversion on behalf o f labourers is responsible for labour market pooling. 
Although it is important, this assumption is not required. Even if  we assume that labourers are risk 
neutral, the conclusions of the model still hold.
29 We need to show that the FF is steeper than WW. Points below FF are preferred to points above FF 
because they offer banks with larger pool o f skilled labour. Points above WW are preferred to those 
below WW because at that point, larger share of firms. Now consider point 2 where the number of
unemployed is much lower than other areas characterised by smaller number of 
firms.31 Finally, a market for skilled labour provide banks with incentive to locate 
near that pool not necessarily because wages are lower, but because the availability of 
skilled labour increases the expected profit for banks providing them with the 
incentive to locate near a pool of skilled labour.32 In short, Krugman’s model shows 
that this externality produces not only agglomeration of firms, but also agglomeration 
of skilled workers.33
In addittion to these agglomeration forces, some economists have argued that 
economising on operational costs can generate a powerful agglomeration force (Park, 
1982). By centralising in one location, financial institutions can share the fixed costs 
of a complex infrastructure such as communicative infrastructure, education schemes, 
settlement systems, payment systems, and document transport systems which are 
necessary for the provision of financial services (Thrift, 1994). This has the effect of 
reducing banks’ individual costs (Scholtens, 1992: UN, 1994). Many economists 
consider that economising on operating costs is the major factor responsible for the 
agglomeration of financial firms. For instance, Park (1982) argues that “ it would be 
cost inefficient to establish an elaborate infrastructure of international finance in each 
country to service just one national market. By locating most international banking
firms is larger and labour market is deeper. At point 2, both skilled labour and banks prefer that 
location (i.e. point 2 has to be above WW and below FF). This occurs only if  FF is steeper than WW.
30 These initial conditions are discussed in the next chapter.
31 This result is attained because of the assumption of uncertain demand for labour.
32 For instance, financial firms’ access to professional expertise in the major international financial 
centres is cited as a major factor responsible for the concentration of derivative activity in those 
centres. The incapability o f other banking centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore to increase their 
share of derivative activity is due to the lack o f such professional expertise (Cassard, 1994).
33 As Krugman notices, this type o f externality has been recognised by Alfred Marshal who writes: " A  
localised industry gains a great advantage from the fact it offers constant market for skills. Employers 
are apt to resort to any place they are likely to find a good choice of workers with special skill which 
they require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places where there are many employers 
who need such skills as theirs..." (cited in Krugman 1991, p. 37).
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and financial infrastructure in one central place, banks can spread their overhead costs 
in servicing clients in various countries."
It is unlikely that a financial firm would build its own a private network of 
communication since such an option is very costly for any individual bank to 
undertake.34 Instead, the bank can make use of an available infrastructure, which is 
likely to be established in a few major cities where other financial institutions and 
MNCs headquarters concentrate. It is important to note that the establishment of such 
a complex infrastructure may not materialise if banks do not centralise in few 
locations. In fact, financial firms may decide to locate in certain geographical 
locations near their competitors because they perceive that centralisation of activity is 
likely to facilitate the establishment of a complex infrastructure. A scattered 
distribution of firms may not justify public or private investment in infrastructure due 
to low levels of demand (Goddard, 1991; Scholtens, 1992).35
It is important to note that against agglomeration forces, there are various dispersion 
forces that tend to diffuse financial activity. Different time zones can generate 
decentralising forces and is cited as an important factor for the emergence of offshore 
centres (Kindleberger, 1974). Another widely cited force is the fact that the costs of 
inputs in a financial centre can be very high (Grubel, 1980). High levels of operating 
costs such as rents, transportation costs, and wages may act as a deterrent, driving 
financial activity away from financial centres to other areas with lower costs and thus
34 Some banks have established their own private network of information and communication 
technology. However, only very large banks (such as Citibank) were able to do so. Instead, most of the 
medium and small sized banks make use o f private network established by larger banks or independent 
service firms or connect to public networks. This last option has been widely adopted mainly to benefit 
from payment clearing activities (UN, 1994),
counteracting the forces of agglomeration. Finally, many economists have suggested 
that information technology can act as powerful dispersion force. However, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the impact of information technology is not 
straightforward and could act either as dispersion or an agglomeration force.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has identified many processes that may cause agglomeration of financial 
activity. Although many of these processes also apply to other firms and types of 
economic activity, I have shown the significance of the special features of the 
financial industry and the unique role of the financial firm as information producer 
and user. Given that, information is an important input for the provision of financial 
services and given that its efficient use can create profitable opportunities, this chapter 
emphasised the importance of informational spillovers between banks as generating 
an agglomeration force. Information spillovers among banks can increase the extent 
of existing markets, such as the interbank market by reducing the problems related to 
information asymmetry and by enhancing trust which is essential for the operation of 
the interbank market. This chapter has also made an attempt to differentiate between 
financial products and other producer services and examined the implication of this 
separation for the agglomeration of financial firms. In particular, this separation 
allowed us to examine the possibility of identifying a distinct producer service 
complex in financial centres similar to the one found in industrial centres. This 
chapter has also considered how bank agglomeration can generate a pool of a highly 
skilled labour. Given the importance of skilled labour for financial production, the 
creation of a pool of highly skilled labour provides an incentive for banks to locate
35 This is similar to the argument made above about the importance of localisation of demand on the
near each other. Finally, centralising in a centre greatly economises heavily on banks’ 
operating, acting as an additional agglomeration force in the financial industry.
provision o f intermediate services.
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Chapter 5 - Path Dependence in the Growth of Banking Centres
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has identified the major processes responsible for the 
agglomeration of banks in a few centres. This chapter identifies another such force, 
that of path dependence. Financial centres can be subject to path dependence in the 
sense that once a financial centre has attracted a certain level of financial activity, it is 
likely to maintain its advantage over other locations for a considerable period of time. 
In other words, a path dependence process can create a momentum that reinforces the 
self-growth of certain established financial centres. Such a "self reinforcing 
mechanism" can continue for a very long time and banks and other financial firms 
would be reluctant to establish in other locations, unless some radical changes take 
place that alter the attractiveness of an established centre (Jones, 1992b).
The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the path dependence process in the 
financial industry in detail. Arthur’s conceptual framework (1988, 1989) is very 
useful in explaining many important aspects of the path dependence process. In this 
framework, neither chance nor economic determinism can solely determine the 
agglomeration of economic activity in a location. Instead, the interaction between 
geographical benefits and “external” or “agglomeration” economies plays the primary 
role in the determination of the location of economic activity. The application of 
Arthur’s framework to the financial industry provides some useful insights on the 
major features of financial centres. However, this framework suffers from one main 
shortcoming: it does not allow for the path dependence process to be broken and 
therefore appears to be inconsistent with historical and empirical evidence. 
Historically, financial centres have been subject to both growth and decline. An
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important example is Beirut which has lost its role as the financial centre of the 
Middle East as a result of strong shocks, mainly political instability and civil war. 
Another recent example from the same region is Bahrain which has failed to diversify 
its financial infrastructure and has lost a large part of its banking activity to other 
centres. Unlike Beirut, Bahrain did not witness a strong shock, but rather a series of 
small shocks. Structural changes in international financial markets, deregulation of 
financial markets in many parts of the Middle East, and poor economic performance 
of the region have undermined the role of Bahrain as a “collection centre”.1 The 
empirical evidence presented in chapter 2 suggests that during the 1990s, financial 
centres in Asia, especially Japan and Hong Kong, have lost a large share of their 
financial activity to other centres. It is not clear whether the decline of these two 
centres’ activity is permanent, but the evidence shows clearly that financial centres 
are dynamic establishments. More importantly, the evidence suggests that despite the 
fact that path dependence can act as a powerful agglomeration force, a shift to a new 
negative growth path could occur due to a strong shock or a series of small shocks.
This chapter is divided into five sections. In section 2, the theoretical framework, 
which forms the basis for this chapter’s analysis, is presented. In section 3, the static 
and dynamic benefits in a location are analysed while section 4 discusses how a 
decline in dynamic benefits over time or due to a shock can break the path 
dependence process. The last section contains my conclusions.
1 In reality, all financial centres are affected by negative shocks. However, such negative shocks will 
not necessarily place the centre on a declining path. Despite negative shocks, the centre is likely to 
maintain its advantage to reinforce its growth. Hence, we should not generalise from Middle Eastern 
centres as these centres have been subject to very strong shocks which are largely region specific.
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5.2 Arthur’s Theoretical Framework
Arthur (1988) argues that " firms that are not tied to raw material localities and that do 
not compete for local customers are often attracted by the presence of other firms in a 
region. More densely settled regions offer better infrastructure, deeper labour markets, 
more specialised legal and financial services, better local availability of inventory and 
parts, and more opportunity to do business face to face" (p.90). Although Arthur was 
not addressing the location of financial activity or the financial firm, his description 
fits these types of firms very well. Financial institutions operating in a centre do not 
need physical raw materials. Furthermore, financial firms are usually attracted to 
areas where financial activity and other competitors centralise because such 
centralisation generates substantial external economies of scale such as an access to a 
pool of skilled labour, specialised intermediate inputs and sophisticated infrastructure.
The model proposed by Arthur (1988a,1989) provides the general framework for the 
analysis of the location decision of banks. In his model, Arthur constructs a payoff for 
a firm that wants to establish in a specific region. Assume that there are two groups of 
banks (A and B), with equal number of banks in each group, but different preferences 
for regions. Group A favours region j  while group B favours region L The payoff or 
the net present value of a bank of group A locating in region j  is described as:
N P V AJ (yj l = B Aj  + g (yJ)
are "geographical benefits" inherent in region j  and g(y j  are the benefits derived 
from the presence of other firms in region j or what Arthur calls "agglomeration
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benefits".2 Thus, the net present value of a bank A locating in region j  depends on the 
inherent geographical benefits, which are enhanced by agglomeration benefits as a 
result of the existence of other firms in region j.
Agglomeration Benefits
Each firm, one by one, is allowed to establish in the location that maximises its payoff 
or NPV. An element of " chance " is introduced in the model. Although it is not 
possible to know which firm is going to appear in the next round, the probability of 
some firm within a particular type appearing next is known. In other words, the next 
economic action can not be determined in this system; only the probability that the 
next economic action will happen is known to the observer (Arthur, 1994). If pa is the 
probability that a firm of group A will appear next, then the probability that a region j  
will be chosen can be written as qj -  Zpk for k eK  where K  is the set of types of firms 
that maximise their net present value by locating in region j i.e. K  is the set of firms 
with APE;- (yf >NPVi(yi).
Starting from zero firms, entry into the market by individual firms, sequentially or 
firm by firm, is assumed. If one region (region j in our case), either because of chance 
or its geographical attributes, was able to attract a certain share of the industry's 
activity, its ability to attract further firms is enhanced. In fact, it can be shown that if 
benefits from agglomeration increase without bound, then with probability of unity 
"one of the regions will gain enough firms to offer sufficient location advantages to 
shut the other regions out in all subsequent locational choices. From then on, each 
firm entering in the industry will choose this region, and this region's share of industry
2 The previous chapter has discussed in details these agglomeration benefits.
will tend to 100 percent with the others' shares tending to zero percent" ( Arthur, 
1988, p. 90). This suggests that regardless of banks' preferences, the new entrant 
would always choose region j. This is the case because agglomeration benefits in 
region j are great enough such that NPVj (yj) always exceed NPVj (ys). Hence, there 
is a tendency towards complete agglomeration in one location because the benefits 
that arise from agglomeration are substantial and increase with the number of banks in 
that location.
In this framework, the location of economic activity can not be explained solely by 
"economic determinism." We know with certainty than one region is able to "lock-in" 
financial activity, but we can not predict which region is likely to assume this role. It 
is quite obvious that the self-reinforcing mechanism creates multiple solutions for the 
location problem . Many factors interact in determining the location of financial 
activity. These factors can be purely geographical, historical, institutional, or cultural 
(Grilli, 1989). Arthur focuses on "historical chance" as a very important determinant 
of the location of economic activity. He argues that we “can not explain the observed 
patterns of cities by economic determinism alone without reference to chance events, 
coincidences and circumstances in the past. And without the knowledge of chance 
events, coincidences, and circumstances yet to come, we can not predict with 
accuracy the shape of the urban system in the future" (p. 96).3 More importantly, this 
reasoning suggests that the path dependence process can not be reversed. In other 
words, the ability of a centre to attract a large share of financial activity before other
3 Robert Hall provides a similar argument when he argues that: "... the distribution o f economic activity 
is probably close to indeterminate, so the location of economic hot spots is largely a matter of historical 
accidents." (Robert Hall, " Noise over Space and Over Time", 1988 Arthur Okun Memorial Lectures, 
Cited in Grilli, 1989).
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centres is all that matters. This condition ensures that the centre remains in a dominant
position.
Despite its usefulness, it is important that we make some major modifications to the 
above framework to take into account the major features of financial centres. It is true 
that agglomeration of financial activity is likely to produce positive externalities 
which tend to reinforce path dependence; however the history of financial centres 
suggests that financial centres are dynamic establishments that are always subject to 
rises and falls. The historical and empirical evidence suggests quite clearly that a path 
dependence process can be broken reducing or even eliminating the initial advantage 
of an established centre (Porteous, 1995). Hence, in order to apply the above 
framework to financial centres, it is important to take into account the possibility of a 
shift to a new growth path. This requires that we extend the framework to include not 
only the bank entry process, but also other features that could enhance or diminish the 
attractiveness of a certain location. Such features (discussed in detail below) can be 
captured by the term B in the above payoff. Shocks or continuos transformations in a 
centres’ features can lead to a shift to a new negative growth path.
The proportion-to-probability mapping can explain more fully the path dependence 
process and the possibility of a shift to a new growth path. In this mapping, all we 
need to know is the probability (pj) that a certain region will be chosen next. This 
probability is a function of the region's current share (proportion) of the industry 
(n/N). If the probability of a firm locating in a region is greater than the current 
industry’s share (pj > n/N), then the country’s share of the industry tends to rise. On 
the other hand, if the probability of the firm locating in a region is less than the
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region's current share of the industry, then the opposite will happen, i.e. the region’s 
share will decline. However, as the number of firms increase, changes in proportions 
would fluctuate much less and will eventually disappear. In particular, when the 
probability of a firm entering a region is equal to the share's industry, then the region's 
share would become stable.4
The figure below shows the probability of region j receiving the next firm as a 
function of the proportion of industry in region j. The non-convexity of the 
probability-proportion function implies that the location problem has multiple 
solutions.5 The figure below shows that there are two possible solutions: 0 or 1. If a 
certain region has attracted a large number of firms (FC in the figure below), it is 
likely to keep attracting other financial firms and the region’s share will converge to a 
stable point (1). On the contrary, if a region is at point (NFC), then it is likely to 
converge to point zero. It is possible to visualise a case where two centres find 
themselves at two different points in the probability-proportion function with one 
centre attracting most of the financial activity while the other is continuously losing 
its share to the other one (Porteous, 1995).
4 The elements for formal proof of the above hypothesis can be found in Arthur (1988).
5 It is important to note that the probability function takes the following form due to the presence of 
increasing returns to scale. As Arthur (1988) argues, that “ to establish non-convexity, all we need is 
the existence of at least one unstable point, a watershed share of die industry, above which the region 
with share exerts enough attraction to increase its share and below which it tends to lose its share. Yet 
in a way, this is another definition of the presence of agglomeration economies: if  above a certain 
density of settlement a region tends to attract further density, and if  below it tends to lose density, there 
must be some agglomeration mechanism present. The underlying system will then be non-convex, and 
history will count" (p. 95).
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More relevant for my analysis is that it is possible for a country to find itself on a 
declining part of the probability-proportion function after being on the increasing part 
of the function. This may be the result of a shock which may cause the financial 
centre to lose its attractiveness. A more interesting case is when the decline in 
“geographical” benefits (analysed in the next section), accompanied by a series of 
small external shocks, reshape the probability map and a financial centre would find 
itself in the declining part.
Some points are worth mentioning regarding the change of a centre’s position on the 
probability-proportion function. First, the more established a financial centre is, the 
greater the shock is needed for that financial centre to find itself on a declining part. 
Second, great external shocks to the economy such as wars (in the case of Lebanon) 
or the enforcement of anti-laundering laws (Bahamas, Panama) can place an 
established centre in a declining part of the function.6 In the above model, the shock 
must be big enough such that pj fall below (tij/N). This condition corresponds to a
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situation where the NPV of establishing in region j  declines fast enough such that 
alternative regions become more attractive for all banks. Third, small shocks may 
move a centre from 1 to 2 in the above figure, but at point 2, the financial centre still 
has the advantage to reinforce its growth. This requires that p j still exceeds n /N  or 
NPVj>NPVi despite the effect of the shock. Fourth, a succession of small shocks over 
time can place a financial centre on a declining path. This is the most interesting case. 
If there are some transformations that make a region unattractive over a long period of 
time, or due to obsolescence the centre loses its comparative advantage, then it is 
possible for that centre to find itself on the declining part of the probability-proportion 
function.
5.3 Static and Dynamic Benefits of a Location
The term B, the geographical benefits in the payoff, captures the inherent advantages 
in a geographical location.7 The literature on financial centres has identified many 
conditions that a geographical location must satisfy in order to emerge as a centre. 
Banks tend to locate in centres characterised by strategic location that are easily 
accessible to international and/or regional intermediaries and their clients, good 
communications and supportive services, a regulatory climate favourable to the 
financial industry, general economic and political stability, a favourable balance of 
payments, a strong and stable currency, a historical character, modem infrastructure, 
skilled labour market, efficient clearing system, etc. (Scholtens, 1992). These features 
constitute a source of advantage for certain locations, which are responsible for 
attracting financial activity, especially banking. To put it differently, banks that
6 Although such shocks are important in explaining the fall o f some centres, these will not discussed in 
this chapter, as these are quite obvious.
7 The concept o f inherent advantage is similar to the concept of "natural" comparative advantage 
developed in trade theory or “location-specific” advantages developed in the MNC theory.
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establish in such locations can benefit greatly from these inherent advantages, hence 
increasing the payoff to financial institutions for that locational decision.8
Other than the fact that some of these features are very general9, the above approach 
suffers from one serious limitation. It attempts to explain the attractiveness of 
financial centres in terms of static factor endowments while in reality, financial 
centres are dynamic establishments subject to growth and decline. In particular, static 
inherent advantages can not account for transformations in the probability-proportion 
mapping and hence adopting such an approach can result in a very fixed 
understanding of financial centres. In fact, the "static" advantages might explain why 
some cities emerged as financial centres, but can not explain why some centres 
maintain or lose their supremacy (Jones, 1992b).10 This suggests that inherent 
advantages in a geographical location may change over time and thus it would be 
more accurate for the first term of the payoff to be written as Bt where t is a time 
subscript (Porteous, 1995). These inherent advantages may change due to political 
shocks, transformation in the real economy, technological advances, economic 
shocks, and regulatory changes. Some locational advantages become obsolete, while 
others are created.
8 In terms of MNC theory, such location-specific advantages provide banks with an incentive to 
establish in such locations. By locating abroad, the bank can reap the benefits o f location advantages 
(Dunning, 1988).
9 The above list is so large that some of the conditions cited are necessary for the establishment of any 
other lines of activity and not necessary finance. For instance, political and economic stability is cited 
as important for the attraction o f financial activity. However, this condition is necessary for the 
establishment of any line o f activity.
10 Commenting on this point, Geoffrey Jones (1992) argues that "factor endowments approach might 
suggest that international financial centres developed in economies with abundant or surplus capital. 
This may help to explain the growth of London in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent 
emergence o f New York and Tokyo, but it does not explain London's continued primacy when Britain 
ceased to be a capital exporter, or New York's when the United States became a net debtor."
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In addition to the static advantages mentioned previously, it is important that the 
payoff be very comprehensive to include other dynamic “benefits” which can enhance 
the attractiveness of certain locations,11 This section emphasises three major features 
which enhance the attractiveness of a location. These are the ability of the centre to 
reduce the cost structure of financial firms, to generate profitable business 
opportunities, and to attract information flows. It is argued in this chapter that these 
features are the major determinants of the location of financial activity. More 
importantly, these features of financial centres can change over time (i.e. they are 
dynamic) and hence their inclusion in the general payoff function allows for the 
possibility of a shift to a new (negative) growth path. In particular, a decline in these 
dynamic benefits over time can reduce the “inherent advantages” of a centre and 
hence an established centre may find itself in the declining part of the probability- 
proportion function.
5.3.1 The Tax and Regulatory Structure: Reducing Financial Firms ’ Cost Structure 
Many economists have emphasised the importance of the tax and regulatory structure 
in the emergence of financial centres (Cassard, 1994). In the “eclectic approach” as 
applied to banks, government regulations are considered as an important location- 
specific advantage which provides banks with an incentive to establish in certain 
locations (Dunning, 1993). Banking activities are usually subject to a number of 
restrictions in onshore markets. For instance, banks are usually subject to controls on 
market entry, restricting banks from operating or branching to certain regions or 
states. Further restrictions can be imposed on the types of financial services that could 
be delivered to borrowers and depositors. Both these restrictions can affect the
11 In addition, I think those factors such as public infrastructure, time zone, etc. are quite obvious and
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volume of the banks' operations and limit their ability for diversification. 
Furthermore, there are other restrictions on the amounts of funds that banks can lend 
to a single corporation mid the interest rates charged on loans and offered on deposits. 
Of great importance in this century have been the required reserve ratios, which act as 
a tax on financial intermediation (Fry, 1995).
Many multinational banks have been able to avoid regulations by locating in certain 
centres. By avoiding regulations, multinational banks are able to achieve higher rates 
of return on banking capital adjusted for risk (Gray and Gray, 1981; Cassard, 1994). 
This can be made clear by considering the determinants of the rate of return on 
banking capital which can be written as:
P(l-t)/EQ = P(l~t)/EA * EA/TA * TA/E
P is profits before taxes, EQ is the value of bank equity (paid-in capital and surplus 
and retained profits) t is the marginal tax rate, EA is earning assets and TA is total 
assets. Fierce competition in an unregulated market is likely to result in lower ratios 
of profit to earning assets than the ratios obtained in the regulated market. However, 
an unregulated market allows for higher ratio of earning assets to total assets since 
banks are not subject to reserve requirements and hold only a small fraction of their 
assets in the form of reserves (Rivera-Batiz, 1994). Furthermore, banks by attracting 
large volumes of financial activity are able to increase their total assets and hence 
increase their financial leverage. These markets not only attract borrowers, but also 
depositors for they offer higher rates of return on deposits as well as provide
nothing much can be added. Instead, I focus only on regulatory and real factors.
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depositors with tax incentives such as low withholding tax rates. This is expected to 
increase the overall activity in these centres. Under favourable conditions, the 
increase in the last two ratios of the above equation is likely to offset the decline in 
the ratio of profits to earning assets.12 Consequently, the ratio of profit to total equity 
would be greater in an unregulated market. In addition, the after tax rates of return 
would also be higher since these markets are usually subject to lower taxation.13
Many economists have argued that tax and regulatory measures are sufficient to 
provide an explanation for the emergence and rise of financial centres. Because these 
centres enable banks to increase the rate of return on their capital and because they 
can offer higher rates of return on deposits, these centres attract a large number of 
financial institutions and financial assets (Cassard 1994). Although this explanation is 
valid, it is rather one sided. It is true that tax and regulatory structure can explain the 
location of banks in microstates and small islands, but they can not account for the 
expansion of foreign banks in the US where corporate and withholding taxes have 
been relatively high and the regulatory structure has been very restrictive.14 
Furthermore, this approach can not explain the continuous supremacy of a few 
financial centres despite the recent movements towards full financial liberalisation in 
many countries. Recent waves of deregulation must have reduced considerably the
12 It is important to note that the thesis doesn’t address central banks’ monitoring role as part of the 
regulation variable. Although tighter regulations by monetary authorities may affect adversely banks’
► profitability and volume of business, such regulations may enhance the soundness o f the banking
system, lower systematic risk and produce “reputable” effects which are necessary for the 
sustainability o f a financial centre.
13 Higher rates o f return should be offset against the risk of the variations o f profitability as the result o f 
foreign exchange exposure, higher leverage ratios and greater maturity mismatching. However, it 
should be stressed that these risks are associated with the position o f the bank and not necessarily with 
the unregulated market.
14 The failure to distinguish between different types of financial centres limits our understanding of the 
emergence of centres. In particular, the regulatory and tax structure contributed greatly to the 
emergence of functional banking centres and was decisive in explaining the rise of “booking” or
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“inherent advantage” of established centres, but financial activity still shows a high 
tendency to centralise in a few centres. One possible explanation is that regulatory 
and tax incentives must have placed a few centres in a positive growth path which 
resulted over time in a self reinforcing mechanism due to the existence o f 
agglomeration forces. In other words, although low taxes and a flexible regulatory 
structure have a diminished importance as determinants of the location of financial 
activity, such features must have constituted a source of competitive edge for the 
“first movers”. As a result, these centres were able to attract a critical mass of 
financial activity large enough to propagate agglomeration forces, hence reinforcing 
the growth of these centres,
5.3.2 Profitable business opportunities: Trade Activity and Foreign Direct 
Investment
Trade activity provides banks with important business opportunities (Smith and 
Walter, 1997). Goods are usually exchanged across borders and in different 
currencies. This gives rise to a number of potential risks such as credit risk (inability 
of the importer to pay his bill due to insolvency), foreign exchange risk (the 
possibility that the price of a currency moves either against the importer or the 
exporter) or country risk (the inability of the importer to pay his bill because of 
exchange controls or other regime changes). Because of these potential risks, most 
payments relating to international trade take place through banks. This may prove 
quite profitable for banks. Banks charge fees for services such as issuing letters of 
credit and collection of payments. Furthermore, they can earn income on activities 
related to the purchase and sale of foreign exchange as well as interest income from
"paper” centres. However, the regulatory and tax structure can not account for the centralisation of
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extending credit to importers. Hence, many banks find it profitable to locate in 
regions characterised by high volumes of trade activity. For instance, if  a country A is 
a big exporter to country B, then banks in country A have an incentive to locate in B. 
This activity creates demand for banks' services especially if payment settlement 
occurs through the foreign branch of the "home" bank. Of course, this can be done 
through correspondent banks. However, in countries where there are doubts about the 
creditworthiness of corespondent banks, the establishment of subsidiaries or branches 
in these areas becomes necessary. Furthermore, even if creditworthy corespondents 
are available, a bank may still have the incentive to establish in that region since it can 
internalise its transactions reducing transaction costs and contributing to better 
management of its operations. In short, regions with large volumes of trade are likely 
to increase the payoff to financial firms’ locational decision placing the region in a 
more favourable part of the probability-proportion function.
Potential sources of business opportunities also arise in regions which attract large 
flows of foreign direct investment. The flow of foreign direct investment into certain 
regions creates potential sources for deposits and loans as well as generates demand 
for other types of services such as portfolio management, syndicated loans, or share 
flotation providing banks with opportunities to earn fees and interest income. Hence, 
an inherent advantage of a geographical location is its physical proximity to the 
location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the attractiveness of certain 
locations is affected by their ability to attract MNCs1 headquarters or regional 
headquarters. Because MNC headquarters generate demand for banks' services, banks 
have the incentive to locate in regions that attract MNC headquarters.
financial activity in the major international financial centres such as Tokyo or New York.
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5.3.3 Regular flow o f information
Given that financial firms are heavy users of information, banks are likely to 
agglomerate in locations which attract large flows of information. In particular, that 
location must receive information which is a) timely; b) reliable c) and valuable or 
profitable (Porteous, 1995).
The ability of a geographical location to receive timely information depends on 
natural inherent advantages such as its time zone or geographic location. More 
importantly, timely information depends on a complex telecommunication and 
information technology infrastructure which reduces the cost and speeds up the 
process of acquiring information. The centralisation of other related industries such as 
research agencies, universities, and other public and governmental agencies are also 
likely to enhance the timely flow of information in a location.
Throughout this thesis, it has been assumed that the quality of information 
deteriorates with distance as modelled explicitly in chapter 3. Hence, the ability of a 
location to provide reliable and high quality information depends on its position near 
the major sources of information such as borrowers, lenders, traders and other banks. 
Hence, geographical locations that attract MNCs are likely to attract reliable flows of 
information. In a similar manner, it could be argued that countries that are active in 
financing trade activity could also attract large flows of information. For instance, 
trade creates expectations about future flows of goods that determine the flow of 
foreign direct investment. Another important source for information is banks 
themselves. Few economists have argued that large volumes of information are 
generated by the interaction of financial institutions with each other (Code 1991).
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Hence, locations which attract large number of banks are likely to be characterised by 
a timely flow of reliable information.
Finally, the ability of a location to generate valuable information depends on the type 
of financial activity involved. For instance, in case of tradable financial instruments 
the ability to act very fast on a piece of information is vital. This requires that the 
centre contain very deep and liquid markets with large trading opportunities which 
provide conditions in which transactions can be made quickly and at low cost; 
minimise the risk of illiquidity; and reduce large fluctuations in asset prices (Porteous 
1995, Economists Advisory Group, 1984). These can be only achieved in centres with 
high volumes of business. Furthermore, large volumes of business may generate large 
flows of information. For instance, the Economists Advisory Group (1984) argues 
that “ where an asset is rarely traded, information about it is hard to come by, but 
where there is a regular and substantial flow of business, brokers, journalists and 
others find it worthwhile to conduct research” (p. 15).
It was argued that the ability of a location to attract information flows, generate 
profitable business opportunities, and minimise tax and regulatory costs contribute to 
the agglomeration of financial activity in that location. However, these agglomeration 
forces are not static. They can change significantly over time. Continuous decline in 
these benefits over time due to a series of small shocks can lead to a shift to a new 
(negative) growth. In terms of the general payoff, a decline in these dynamic benefits 
may cause the term Bt in the above payoff to decline enough to offset the benefits 
from agglomeration, hence decreasing the NPV of that centre relative to others. For 
instance, a series of shocks that hit the centre’s regional economies or the centre’s
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financial structure in such a way that it re-directs the flow of information away from 
certain geographical location and/or decreases profitable opportunities available for 
financial firms is likely to place the centre in the declining part of the probability- 
proportion function. In a similar fashion, the impact of the regulatory and tax structure 
on the agglomeration of financial activity can change over time. For instance, it could 
be argued that regulatory and tax incentives were responsible for the attractiveness of 
a geographical location at the first place. By attracting a certain number of firms at the 
beginning, some regions’ positions were enhanced because of economies of 
agglomeration enabling them to attract more and more firms, hence reinforcing the 
attractiveness of those centres. However, the position of a financial centre in the 
probability-proportion function may change due to factors such as deregulation in all 
parts of the world which may render this advantage obsolete. If as a consequence, the 
payoff of a location becomes relatively less attractive, then the centre may lose out 
part of its share of financial activity to more attractive centres.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the path dependence process in financial centres. Path 
dependence powerfully interact with agglomeration forces since it suggest that once a 
centre has attracted a certain level of financial activity, it would continue to do so. 
However, this analysis is incomplete since it takes into account only the bank entry 
process. In fact, there are many other features which are responsible for attracting 
financial firms to a location. The literature’s main focus has been on static factors 
such as political and economic stability, time zone, etc. Despite their importance, 
these static factors can not account for the possibility of path dependence reversal. 
Furthermore, the focus on static factors resulted in a very fixed understanding of
financial centres. A more fruitful avenue to explore is the impact of a location’s 
dynamic benefits on the agglomeration of financial activity. This chapter has 
discussed three such benefits which are important for attracting financial firms to a 
certain location. In particular, locations that reduce banks’ cost structure, provide 
them with profitable business opportunities and attract large flows of information are 
likely to attract large number of banks. It is important to stress that these benefits are 
dynamic in the sense that they can increase or decrease over time. Including these 
dynamic benefits in the payoff allows for a shift to a new (negative) growth path. In 
particular, a decline in these benefits over time can result in the fall of some 
established centres and hence cause a possible dispersion of financial activity or re­
centralisation of financial activity and firms in other centres.
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Chapter 6 - Determinants of Competitiveness of Banking Centres
6,1 Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s, banks’ reliance on correspondent relationships declined 
in importance and instead multinational banks started dealing directly with their main 
customers abroad. This has resulted in a dramatic growth in multinational banking in 
which US banks have taken a leading role (Pecchioli, 1983). The “eclectic approach”, 
primarily applied to the manufacturing MNC, has been widely used to explain the 
rapid growth of multinational banking during that period (Grubel, 1977; Gray and 
Gray, 1981; Aliber, 1984; Sabi, 1987). The eclectic theory identifies three possible 
sources that may provide banks with incentives to go multinational. These three 
sources are ownership-specific advantages, internalisation-specific advantages and 
location- specific advantages (Dunning, 1993). The main focus of empirical studies 
has been on identifying the main location-specific advantages of the world’s major 
financial centres. The focus on financial centres is mainly due to the fact that many of 
the world’s largest multinational banks have established offices in major international 
financial centres.
Two approaches have been used to identify the location-specific advantages relevant 
for financial firms. The first approach consists of conducting open interviews with 
bankers and/or constructing questionnaires aimed at identifying the major factors that 
push multinational banks to establish bank offices in these centres (Daniels, 1986; Ter 
Hart and Piersma, 1990). The second approach uses econometric analysis to study the 
major determinants of the location pattern of the world’s largest banks across centres 
(Choi et al, 1986, 1996) and/or examine the major factors responsible for banks to 
locate in an international financial centre, mainly the US and the UK (Grosse and
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Goldberg, 1991; Fisher and Molyneux, 1996). Given that a financial centre’s 
competitiveness can be measured by its ability to attract a large number of banks and 
high volumes of financial activity, such empirical studies contribute to the literature on 
financial centres by identifying the major determinants of competitiveness of financial 
centres.
This chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part provides a critical review of 
the existing empirical literature. Such a review allows us to identify various empirical 
approaches and the main problems associated with testing empirically the determinants 
of financial centre’s competitiveness. The empirical studies dealing with financial 
centres can be divided into three different groups according to the nature of the issues 
they tackle.1 The first group examines the determinants of competitiveness of a 
financial centre where competitiveness of a centre is measured by its ability to attract a 
large number banks or large volumes of financial activity. This type of work is mainly 
associated with Goldberg et al (1989), Choi el al (1986,1996), Heinkel and Levi 
(1992) and Hultman and McGee (1989). A related group of studies focuses on the 
major determinants of cross-border deposits. The focus on deposits can be justified 
since deposits are the main source of funds for banks. Furthermore, banks tend to 
establish in areas where there are large inflows of deposits. This line of work is 
associated mainly with Grilli (1989) and Alworth and Anderson (1992). The third 
group deals with the issue of multinationality of banks and tries to address the 
following question: What are the major factors that push banks to move abroad? The 
main focus of these studies is on the expansion of US banks abroad. This work is
1 Although the various empirical studies answer different questions, they are very inter-related and all 
aim at providing useful insights about the major determinants of financial centres and financial activity.
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mainly associated with Goldberg and Saunders (1980, 1981) and Goldberg and 
Johnson (1990).
The review of existing studies shows that despite its usefulness, empirical work on 
financial centres is not very informative. Given that these studies test different
hypotheses, it is not possible to reach definite conclusions regarding the major
»
determinants of financial centres’ competitiveness. This is complicated by the fact that
empirical studies use a variety of dependent variables to capture the competitiveness of
centres. Although various measures of competitiveness should in principle be highly
correlated, the review shows that the impact of explanatory variables is different
1
according to the dependent variable being used. Further problems arise due to the fact 
that many determinants of competitiveness of financial centres are qualitative in nature 
and hence it is necessary first to transform these variables into quantitative ones. This 
transformation process is difficult and involves subjective considerations, which can 
create doubts about the main implications of the empirical models.
In the second part, an alternative empirical framework based on the theoretical 
discussions of chapters 3 and 4 is presented. The method used in this section is 
different from the existing literature in many aspects. First, empirical analysis is only 
limited to the location of banks in the world’s major financial centres. As discussed in 
chapter 2, multinationalisation of banks took the form of establishing bank offices 
throughout the world in order to provide financial services to retail and corporate 
customers. Hence, the inclusion of a large number of countries in the sample may not 
necessarily be capturing the decision of banks to locate in financial centres. This 
section develops a measure of financial diversity based on the variety of financial
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products provided and the level of complexity and size of a centre’s financial markets. 
Only centres with highly diversified financial markets are included. Furthermore, 
using logit and probit analysis, this chapter examines the impact of explanatory 
variables on the probability that a bank would establish in a centre. Given the nature of 
the hypotheses tested, setting the problem in terms of probabilities can be more 
meaningful. The last part contains my conclusions.
6.2 Review of the Empirical Literature
The main objective of this section is to review the existing empirical studies in detail. 
Empirical studies can be divided into three groups according to the issues they tackle. 
Despite the fact that they deal with different issues, these studies are very related and 
all three groups provide useful insights about the location-specific advantages of 
financial centres.
The determinants o f competitiveness offinancial centres
Goldberg, Helsley, and Levi's (1989) study is aimed at identifying the major factors 
responsible for a city to emerge as a financial centre where financial centre is defined 
as a location which attracts large volumes of financial activity.2 The dependent 
variable used in the estimated equation is a measure of the size of financial activity 
based either on the balance sheet of banks or the proportion of the total work force 
employed in the financial sector. The explanatory variables are chosen in an ad-hoc 
manner and are added or subtracted from the equation according to their statistical 
significance. This “general to specific” method (Hendry, 1980) is a common
2 This study is analysed in details in this thesis because it highlights the main problems involved in 
examining empirically the location of financial activity. Furthermore, this study makes use o f a very 
large list of dependent and independent variables and applies various econometric techniques to several 
data sets.
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characteristic of empirical studies dealing with financial centres. The following list of 
independent variables are chosen to explain the level of financial activity: Income per 
capita, imports, exports, saving rate, total debt, foreign debt, investment abroad, 
foreign investment, reserve ratio, and an offshore dummy.3
GDP per capita is included as a proxy for economic development in order to test for 
the hypothesis that more developed countries tend to have higher levels of financial 
activity. Imports are included to account for the increase in demand for financial 
services in connection with import activity. Import activity involves the provision of 
different financial services such as the purchase of foreign exchange and the extension 
of letters of credit and hence higher level of imports are likely to be associated with 
higher levels of financial activity. The same reasoning also applies to exports. Reserve 
requirements were included to test for the hypothesis that countries with lower reserve 
requirements tend to attract larger volumes of financial activity while an offshore 
dummy4 was used to test for the hypothesis that countries with lower tax requirements 
tend to attract larger volumes of financial activity.5
Using cross sectional analysis at the national level, the estimates are consistent with 
the above hypotheses, except for reserve requirements where the coefficient is 
insignificant, and exports where the coefficient on this variable is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. The authors endorse this last result and provide a very 
weak argument to justify it; an example of how the empirical model is dictating the 
theoretical content. The authors argue that exporters tend to borrow in the markets they
3 Countries were not selected according to any criterion and it seems that the authors' choice of countries 
was subject to availability o f data.
4 The method used to construct the offshore dummy is not explained in their paper.
5 As to the rest of the explanatory variables, it is not clear why they have been included in estimation,
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export to keep their payments in the same currency which affects adversely the level of 
financial activity in the “home” country.6
When applying the same equation to time series analysis for the US (1900-84), UK 
and (1960-84) and Canada (1964-84), the authors obtain similar results, except for 
reserve requirements which seems to have a depressing impact on the level of financial 
activity in the US and Canada.7
When applying the same equation to time series-cross section analysis8, the authors 
obtain quite different results. The coefficient on GDP becomes negative but 
insignificant. In addition, the coefficient on investment abroad becomes significant at 
the 1% level. When the percentage of the labour force is used as a dependent variable, 
the coefficient on GDP becomes positive and highly significant; both the coefficients 
on exports and imports become insignificant; the coefficient on saving rate becomes 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Total debt carries a negative sign and is 
significant at the 5% level and investment abroad, foreign investment, and portfolio 
investment9 all cany positive signs and are significant at the 5% level. 10
Using cross sectional analysis and employing data at the state level (50 US states),11 
the authors add two variables to the original equation: corporate taxes and the number
6 Because imports and exports are usually highly correlated in most countries, it could be the case that 
the variable imports is capturing the effect of the variable exports. An alternative is not to include both 
of the variables in the same equation and use one variable at a time.
This might suggest that cross sectional analysis may not reveal the impact o f the regulatory 
environment on the level of financial activity.
8 Data was only available for 16 OECD countries over the period 1975-1984.
9 This variable is used for the first time in estimation.
These results clearly show that the choice o f the dependent variable is important in the estimation. 
Various measures o f the size o f financial activity can produce completely different results.
1 The dependent variable used in this equation is total financial assets o f all banks and near banks. No 
justification is given for the use of this variable.
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of US multinational headquarters. The coefficient on the number of multinational 
corporations is positive and highly significant indicating that banks tend to cluster 
around headquarters of big companies. The coefficient on the corporate tax is negative 
but insignificant. The coefficients on personal income, imports and exports are as 
expected.12 When data at the city level are used, further variables are included in the 
estimation. The concentration of banking system is added first. This variable has a 
positive coefficient. The authors do not explain the rationale for the choice of this 
variable or why banking concentration should have a positive impact on the level of 
financial activity. Time zone is another variable added to the equation.13 The 
coefficient on this variable is positive and highly significant implying that time zone is 
very important determinant of financial activity. Finally, the authors include a variable 
to capture the age of the city. The coefficient on this variable is insignificant implying 
that " historical accident does not seem to be a determinant of financial activity."14
Despite these mixed results, the authors conclude that " it would seem that there is 
little else other than domestic income, foreign trade and the location of corporate 
headquarters that is relevant for the development of financial centres". The study's 
conclusions may have some theoretical relevance, but unfortunately these are not 
based on the model’s estimates. In fact, the mixed empirical results make it very 
difficult to draw any firm conclusions. First, the dependent variable varies from one 
equation to another (foreign assets, total assets of banks and near banks, total assets of 
banks, percentage of the labour force employed in the financial sector). Different 
dependent variables produced different results. The same applies to the selection of
12 The rest o f the explanatory variables just disappear from the estimated equation.
13 Time Zone is measured by some strange ratio of "assets to total number o f assets within the time zone
in which the city falls. "
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explanatory variables where the choice of the explanatory variables is completely ad- 
hoc. Some variables are dropped from the equation, while others are added without the 
authors providing any explanation for their inclusion (for instance the concentration of 
banking in a country or personal income). Most importantly, the empirical results are 
not informative and the authors' conclusions about the main factors responsible for the 
emergence of a city as a financial centre are not completely based on the results of the 
estimated equations. Although they emphasise the importance of domestic income, the 
coefficient on GDP was insignificant in many specifications and in some specifications 
it was negative. On the other hand, despite the fact that reserve requirements were 
significant in explaining the level of financial activity in many specifications, the 
authors disregard this variable as being not important.
A more consistent study that examines the determinants of competitiveness of 
financial centres is that of Choi, Tschoegl and Yu (1986). In their paper, the authors 
examine the location pattern of the offices of the world’s 300 largest banks in fourteen 
financial centres. Choi et al (1986) argue that banks would establish in those centres 
that provide them with profitable opportunities. There are two main sources for banks' 
profits: " First, there are those activities which the centre provides a convenient 
location, but which are independent of the presence or absence of other banks. Second 
there are the activities which are a consequence of agglomeration of institutions" (p. 
52). By the first source, the authors refer mainly to trade and foreign flows that are 
expected to increase the demand for banking services. Because centres are the host for 
multinational headquarters and major points of distribution, they create larger a 
demand for banking services. These benefits can be obtained by the bank irrespective
u It is quite interesting to notice the willingness of the authors to make such a strong conclusion based 
on this result, especially that the variable used to capture the historical character is unsatisfactory.
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of the existence of a large number of other banks. The second source of profit arises 
because the agglomeration of banks activates the interbank markets which are 
profitable for financial institutions. Furthermore, agglomeration can increase the 
market size by reducing buyers' search costs. Thus, banks would have the incentive to 
locate in areas with a large number of banks.
Two equations are estimated (1970 and 1980) using both OLS and non-linear weighted 
least square (NLWLS).15 The dependent variable used in the equation is the number of 
offices located in centre j from banks headquartered in centre i. This variable can be 
considered as a measure of competitiveness since it reflects the ability of a centre to 
attract large number of banks. The authors include the following list of independent 
variables. The number of banks that are in centre j from other centres other than centre 
i. This variable is expected to capture the benefits of agglomeration. As expected, the 
coefficient on the variable is positive and significant implying that centres with already 
large number of banks are likely to attract more banks.16 Another variable, which 
reflects the potential of each centre to send offices abroad, is also included. A centre 
can not establish more offices abroad than the number of headquarters in the centre. 
This variable has a positive coefficient implying that centres with more headquarters 
tend to establish more offices abroad. Finally, similar to the arguments proposed in the 
foreign direct investment literature, longer distances are expected to increase the costs 
for banks moving abroad. On the other hand, the establishment of local offices abroad 
may reduce operational costs; the costs involved in the extension of a loan to a firm 
abroad are reduced if the bank has an office abroad. Therefore, banks tend to establish
15 The authors claim that NLWLS technique achieves better results when dealing with count data. 
However, the results do not differ much between OLS and NWLS.
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local offices in more distant centres. The airline distance between the centres was used 
to proxy for this effect. The estimates give some, but weak support to the latter 
hypothesis for the coefficient on distance is positive but not significant in most of the 
equations.17
Choi et al (1986,1996) work is the most consistent among the few empirical studies 
that examine the determinants of banks' location. First of all, the authors are consistent 
in the choice of the dependent variable and independent variables. Second, this study 
pays special attention to the selection of centres. In other words, financial centres are 
not selected subject to availability of data, instead the selection is based on Reed’s 
study (1981), which aims at identifying the major centres of the world. Examining the 
location of offices among similar centres limits the effect of variations in factors that 
can not be accounted for explicitly in empirical models such as efficient infrastructure 
and stable legal, regulatory and political environment. This study, however, suffers 
from two major shortcomings. First, it does not examine the impact of trade and 
foreign direct investment on location of banks. Second, it does not make any attempt 
to differentiate between the various forms of physical presence (branches, subsidiaries, 
representative offices).
Heinkel and Levi's (1992) treatment of banks’ location is quite original and hence it is 
worth reporting. The study’s main objective is to provide a theoretical framework that
►
could explain the form of foreign presence (representative offices, agencies, branches
16 In the extended version o f this equation, the authors use the ratio o f centre's GNP as a proxy for the 
attractiveness of the centre. The centre's share of GNP is also supposed to capture the agglomeration 
effect. As expected, the coefficient on this variable carries a significant positive coefficient.
17 This basic model is extended to include another variables which captures the "exchange o f threat" i.e. 
banks in centre j are establish in centre i if  banks in centre i invade centre j. The coefficient on this 
variable is positive and highly significant indicating that banks retaliate to other banks' penetration.
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or subsidiaries). The decision to establish any of these forms depends on a distinct set 
of factors. Heinkel and Levi (1992) criticise the previous empirical studies for not 
taking into account the different forms of foreign presence. More importantly, 
according to the authors, the previous studies do not differentiate between the various 
activities within the category of banking. This is highly relevant because according to 
their model, the number and the form of foreign presence of banks depend mainly on 
banking activities.
Heinkel and Levi (1992) divide banking services into three broad categories: 
Commercial services, merchant banking services, and participation in the money and 
capital markets. Commercial services consist mainly of collecting receivables for 
exporters back at home. Merchant banking services are mainly related to brokerage 
services such as arranging loans between home borrowers and host lenders. 
Participation in the foreign markets consists mainly of investing foreign currency 
booked at home and gathering information on investment opportunities in the host 
economy.
The forms of overseas banking are divided into four. Representative offices usually 
engage in commercial and merchant banking services. These offices do not handle any 
retail business such as accepting deposits and extending loans. These are usually 
established at low cost and are relatively flexible investment. Agencies are usually 
active participants in the money markets and foreign exchange operations. These do 
not handle any retail business and are more costly to establish. The branch is usually 
active in the wholesale deposit market and money markets and gathers information to
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the parent bank. The establishment of branch involves high costs. Finally, subsidiaries 
act like home banks and enter into direct competition with locals.
The authors use cross section analysis to examine the factors that influence each type 
of foreign banks' operations. The dependent variable is the number of branches, 
agencies and representative offices in the US market instead of any balance sheet 
measure. Independent variables are selected to reflect the importance of the above 
functions. Commercial services are proxied by the value of the exports from the bank's 
home country to the US. The larger the volume of exports from the home country to 
the US, the higher the demand for commercial services. Merchant banking is 
measured by the size of claims of foreign banks' US customers on foreigners from 
each country. This measure includes total loans arranged by foreign banks in the US to 
main borrowers back at home from American residents. Participation in the money 
markets in the US is related to the size of the money and capital markets in the home 
country. Countries with larger money capital markets will tend to have larger 
participation in the US markets. The proxy used for the size of the capital and money 
markets is the stock market capitalisation of the home country.
The empirical results show that the level of exports, the size of the capital market and 
the amount of merchant banking activity are important determinants of the number of 
representative offices. The authors take this result to indicate that representative 
offices can engage in all these activities and hence any function can justify establishing 
a representative office abroad. The number of agencies, on the other hand depends, 
only on the level of exports and the size of capital markets. This is contrary to the 
expected, since agencies are known to be active in brokerage services. However, it
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could be argued that offering merchant banking services does not necessarily justify 
establishing an agency because representative offices can perform these services. 
Finally, the number of branches depends only on the size of capital markets. This 
indicates that representative offices and agencies can perform banking activities 
related to exports and merchant banking activity. However, large capital market and 
large volume of trading requires the establishment of branches abroad.
Cross -Border Deposits
The study of the determinants of the flow of deposits can also shed some light on the 
competitiveness of financial centres. Financial centres compete with each other in 
attracting deposits and hence their competitiveness can be summarised by their ability 
to attract all types of deposits.18 The following two questions need to be answered in 
the analysis of deposit flows. First, why investors place their deposits abroad? Second, 
in which locations are these funds placed? The answer to the last question can give an 
indication of the determinants of banks’ location since banks tend to locate at places 
where there are inflow of deposits (Alworth and Anderson, 1992).
In their paper, Alworth and Anderson focus only on non-bank deposits.19 The authors 
use cross sectional analysis to assess the relative importance of the different factors 
that may have an effect on the outward deposit decision and its location. 20 The 
dependent variable used in the equation is the level of non-bank US dollar deposits of
18 A major limitation of this type o f work is that it deals only with banks and ignores completely the role 
of financial markets and the growing importance of securitisation. However, as indicated above, these 
types of studies can prove very useful in the analysis o f offshore centres where banking activities are 
still dominant.
19 The special treatment of deposits is understandable since they constitute the main source of funds for 
banks (Grilli, 1989).
20 The authors discuss an array o f factors that may be responsible for outward position of deposits, but 
were not able to include all o f them in the estimated equation for some unspecified reason.
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country i in centre j. 21 According to the authors, the determinants of the location of 
deposits should give us an indication of where banks tend to locate since " many of the 
factors that are of importance to non banks in choosing a deposit location are relevant 
for banks' location decision as well. Indeed, banks may locate where deposits tend to 
accrue" (p.l 18).
The outflow of deposits from country i to centre j depends on the number of banks of 
origin i that are in centre j. However, the number of banks located in centre j from 
country i also depends on the flow of deposits. Thus, the causation can be reversed. In 
order to avoid this problem, the authors estimate an equation in the number of banks 
first and then use the fitted values to estimate the original equation. The results show 
that higher claims of centre j on non bank entities of country i gives an incentive for 
banks from country i to locate in centre j. Second, countries with higher GNP tend to 
establish more banks in the centre. Third, the decision to establish abroad also depends 
on the number of banks that already exists in the centre. Fourth, the corporate tax is 
highly significant indicating that banks tend to locate in those centres where the 
corporate tax is lower.22
The original equation, which uses non-bank deposits from country i to centre j as a 
dependent variable, is estimated for the same years. Mostly bilateral trade, the number 
of home banks that are located in the centre, and GDP of the home country explains 
the outflow/location of deposits. The major determinants of the attractiveness of a
21 The dependent variable is the non-bank US dollar deposits o f 17 industrial countries which have 
banks located in twenty-four centres. The estimation was carried for the following years*. 1983, 1986, 
and 1990. The data is obtained from the BIS.
22 Coefficients on the bank secrecy and turnover ratio are insignificant and coefficients on bilateral trade 
and GNP surprisingly change sign from one year to another. Other factors such a withholding tax rates 
on dividends, the level of stock market capitalisation, and reserve requirement were dropped from the 
equation since they are statistically insignificant.
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centre are the depth of its financial markets and its political and macroeconomic 
stability. Reserve requirements in the centre have a negative influence on the volume 
of deposits attracted by a centre. Tax and regulatory measures can also affect 
positively the volume of deposits in a location.
Grilli (1989) estimates a similar equation, but his main focus is on the impact of 
regulatory and institutional factors on the competitiveness of a centre. Grilli divides 
these factors into three groups: Capital controls, withholding taxes, and secrecy. 
Capital control affects the outflow and inflow of deposits; withholding taxes affect the 
after rate of return on deposits; and secrecy provides customers with confidentiality. 
The dependent variable in the estimated equation is the stock of non-resident deposits 
in banks of country i, both bank and non-bank deposits. This distinction is important 
because according to the author these two types of deposits react differently to 
incentives and hence should be analysed separately. The list of explanatory variables 
used for the estimation of both equations is the same and it consists of the following 
variables: Countiy's contribution to total OECD output which is used to capture the 
"thick market externality " effect; withholding tax rates on interest; withholding tax 
rates on dividend income; and two dummy variables for capital inflow and capital 
outflow restrictions are used to capture the effect of regulatory and institutional factors 
mentioned previously.23
Consistent with the previous study, the results show that for non-bank deposits, 
withholding taxes and secrecy are the most important factors in determining the 
location of deposits. For interbank deposits on the other hand, it seems that GNP
23 Panel Data technique was used for 10 OECD countries over the period 1972-1985.
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which is expected to capture agglomeration benefits, is the most decisive factor in 
explaining its level.
Causes for bank expansion
The emergence and competitiveness of financial centres are directly related to their 
ability to attract a large number of foreign banks or other financial institutions. Hence, 
examining the factors responsible for the multinationality of banks can shed some light 
on the emergence of financial centres. A recent study by Goldberg and Johnson (1990) 
examines the determinants of US banking expansion abroad using national data from 
22 countries. Two equations were estimated: An asset equation model which uses the 
assets of US foreign branches as a dependent variable and a branch equation which 
uses the number of US branches abroad as a dependent variable. A regulatory variable 
was included in the equation in order to test the hypothesis that the less restrictive the 
regulatory environment, the larger the US presence would be, both measured in total 
assets and in the number of branches. Both empirical models provide support for this 
hypothesis. Foreign direct investment is included in the equation in order to test the 
hypothesis that banks move abroad in order to service their customers. This is 
supported by the asset equation but not by the branch equation where the coefficient 
on FDI is significantly negative. The authors argue that it might be the case that larger 
foreign presence is required to service multinationals and that " smaller bank 
presence (i.e. a branch) is not positively affected by this aspect of banking business." 
The coefficient on ratio of exports to GNP is positive and significant in both equations. 
Population was included in the equation to test for the hypothesis that larger 
populations are associated with a larger number of potential customers which 
encourage banks to expand their cross-border business abroad. This hypothesis is
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supported by the empirical results. Income per capita is included in the equation in 
order to test the hypothesis that banks tend to have more offices in developed areas. 
The empirical results support this hypothesis in case of branches but not in the case of 
total assets. Domestic deposits (measure of the size of the domestic banking activity) is 
included in the equation in order to test the hypothesis that countries with higher level 
of domestic deposits are more likely to satisfy the needs of their local customers and 
hence they do not require the services of foreign banks. In addition, foreign banks may 
find it less profitable to operate in markets already controlled by domestic banks. The 
final variable included in the equation is the exchange rate. The coefficient on 
exchange rate is insignificant in both equations indicating that exchange rate is not an 
important factor in explaining the expansion of US banks abroad.
Conclusion
The review of the literature shows clearly that existing empirical work on financial 
centres is very broad and hence it is not possible to reach definite conclusions 
regarding the major determinants of competitiveness of financial centres. The lack of 
uniformity across studies is reflected in three important aspects. The first aspect is 
related to the choice of the dependent variable. Many measures of competitiveness 
have been suggested in the literature. Table I below, shows the list of dependent 
variables used in these empirical studies. The selection of dependent variable is 
important because the results differ from one equation to another according to the 
dependent variable being used. For instance, the factors that explain the number of 
banks in a certain location are different from those that determine the level of cross 
border banking. Furthermore, because various measures of competitiveness are used, 
there is no basis for comparison between the different studies and as such the empirical
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literature is sometimes uninformative on the major factors that affect the size of the 
financial activity or the number of banks in a location. Hence, in dealing with financial 
centres, special attention should be given to the choice of the dependent variable. What 
exactly reflects the attractiveness of a certain centre? Is it its ability to attract large 
number of banks or higher levels of financial activity ? Or are these measures highly 
correlated? Furthermore, should we use different set of explanatory variables for each 
equation? Without addressing such questions, the empirical literature is likely to 
remain uninformative.
Table 6.1 -  List of Dependent Variables Used to Measure Competitiveness 
of Financial Centres
A. Size of Financial Assets
Domestic and Foreign Banks’ external 
assets
Domestic and external assets of banks
Total assets of foreign Branches 
Total deposits of foreign banks
B. Number of employees in foreign 
banks or proportion of total work 
force employed in the financial sector
C. Number of Banks 
Number of foreign bank offices
Number of representative offices 
Number of foreign agencies 
Number of foreign branches
Number of foreign Subsidiaries
D. Cross Border Deposits 
Non-bank cross-border deposits
Interbank cross-border deposits
Goldberg, Helsley, Levi (1989)
Grosse and Goldberg (1991), 
Goldberg et al (1989)
Goldberg and Johnson (1990) 
Goldberg and Saunders (1981) 
Fisher and Molyneux (1996) 
Goldberg et al (1989)
Choi et al (1986); Grosse and 
Goldberg (1991)
Heinkel and Levi (1992) 
Heinkel and Levi (1992) 
Heinkel and Levi (1992) ; 
Goldberg and Johnson (1990) 
Heinkel and Levi (1992)
Grilli (1989); Alworth et al 
(1992)
Grilli (1989)
►
The second aspect is related to the choice of explanatory variables. These studies have 
identified many factors that can explain the level of financial activity or the number of 
banks in a certain location. Table 2 below summarises the most widely used 
explanatory variables. Each of these explanatory variables tests for a certain 
hypothesis. However, in some of the reviewed studies, variables were included in the
190
equation without providing any explanation for their selection. More importantly, the 
impact of explanatory variables varies from one study to another and hence one can 
not reach definite conclusions regarding their impact on the levels of financial activity 
or number of banks. The only variable that seems to be significant in most equations is 
the volume of trade. However, different measures of trade resulted in different 
estimates. For instance, in Goldberg et al's study (1989), import activity was the main 
determinant of the level of financial activity while exports did not have any significant 
effect. In Hultman and Mcgee's study (1989), it is the other way around. Also 
surprising is that the empirical results are leading and suggesting the theoretical 
content. Hence, if the sign of the coefficient on a variables is " wrong” or unexpected, 
the authors do not doubt the quality of their data or question the problems involved in 
estimation. Instead, the authors endorse the result and try to provide a justification for 
the unexpected sign. Consequently, a number of weak arguments were provided in 
order to justify for the empirical models' results.
Table 6.2 -  List of Explanatory Variables used to Explain Centre’s Competitiveness
Economic and structural variables Regulatory Variables Other Variables
GDP Concentration of the Banking 
System
Capital Controls Political and Economic 
Stability
Imports Bank's price earning ratio Taxation Age of Cities
Exports Stock Market Capitalisation rate Secrecy Time zone
Saving Rate Stock market Turnover Ratio Operational and entry 
Restrictions
Total Debt The number of banks Reserve requirements
Foreign Debt The location of Headquarters
Inward and Outward 
Foreign Direct 
Investment
The size of the financial sector
Portfolio Investment Agglomeration effects, 
Positive externalities
Exchange Rate Geographic Distances
Eurodollar Interest Rate 
.
Population
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The third aspect is related to the selection of countries. Countries that are included in 
the analysis should be selected according to a criterion clearly identified. This is absent 
in most empirical studies. For instance, although Goldberg et al's (1989) study is 
concerned with international financial centres, the authors do not identify any criterion 
for the selection of these centres and hence countries like Argentina, Venezuela and 
Yugoslavia were included in estimation. Furthermore, most empirical studies tend to 
treat all financial centres alike and make no distinction between international financial 
centres and banking centres. This is quite restrictive since the factors that determine 
the competitiveness of international financial centres differ from those that determine 
the competitiveness of banking centres.
There are other problems of estimation that are related to the complexity of analysis of 
financial centres. Many of the variables that explain the competitiveness of financial 
centres are qualitative in nature such as political stability, time zone, historical role, 
age and regulatory variables (capital controls, taxation, and secrecy). Problems of 
estimation arise because of the difficulties involved in transforming these qualitative 
variables into quantitative ones. Trusting the empirical result means trusting the ability 
of the authors to transform successfully these qualitative variables into measurable 
ones. Some of these studies were convincing, others unfortunately were not and hence 
their results should be interpreted with caution.
It should be emphasised that many of the shortcomings mentioned above arise due to 
data limitations. However, attributing all problems to unavailability of data is quite 
misleading. It should be recognised that few problems arise due to authors' 
inconsistent approach in estimation. The next sections try to address few of these
problems and provide an alternative specification which we think is more adequate 
than the ones found in the existing empirical literature.
6.3 An Alternative Empirical Specification
In this chapter, an alternative empirical model to test the major competitiveness of 
financial centres is examined. The method used in this chapter differs from the existing 
empirical studies in four aspects. First, the selection of countries included in the 
regression analysis is not based on availability of data, but according to a specified 
criterion. That is only countries with diverse financial markets are included. This 
chapter develops an index of diversity of financial markets which can be used to 
differentiate between the level of complexity of various financial systems. Second, the 
constructed index is used in estimation to examine the impact of the diversity of 
financial markets on banks' location. The inclusion of this index is very important 
because it is precisely the diversity of financial markets that distinguishes a financial 
centre from other cities. Third, this chapter differentiates between the various forms of 
physical presence. We expect the impact of the explanatory variables to be different 
across branches, subsidiaries, and representative offices. Finally, this chapter utilises 
more than one econometric technique (linear regression and also probit and logit 
estimates). Because of the nature of the hypothesis being tested, it would be more 
meaningful to examine the impact of explanatory variables on the probability that a 
bank would establish in a certain centre. The probit and logit models allow us to carry 
out such an exercise. Furthermore, the adoption of different econometric techniques 
with different assumptions can increase our confidence in the obtained results.
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6.3.1 The Selection o f Centres
Our approach pays special attention to the selection of centres which are chosen
according to very specific criterion: the diversity and size of their financial markets.
Our analysis is limited only to countries with highly developed and complex financial
structure. The differentiation among countries based on their financial structure has
many advantages. As discussed in chapter 2, the multinationalisation of banks took the
form of establishing overseas offices all over the world and not only in financial
centres. Since we are interested in examining the major factors responsible for banks
to locate in financial centres, we limit our sample to financial centres only. Including
financial centres and other cities in the sample can result in a biased sample towards
the latter. Furthermore, because we are dealing with centres with similar features, it is
possible to control for factors such as variations in political stability or major
*
differences in the level of complexity of physical infrastructure. All the centres 
selected are characterised by a stable political, legal, and regulatory environment and 
an advanced telecommunication and information technology infrastructure. Finally, 
this distinction enables us to examine the impact of diversity of financial markets on 
the trade of bank offices. Controlling for bilateral trade and FDI between centres, a 
positive coefficient on the index of diversity suggests that banks may still decide to 
locate in major financial centres in order to participate in the centre’s financial 
markets. In fact, it is this particular feature in addition to existence of agglomeration 
economies what characterise a financial centre (Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996).
Very few countries have been successful in diversifying their financial structure and as 
such it is possible to construct a diversity index only for a limited number of countries,
mainly developed countries.24 The index constructed for financial market diversity is 
based on the activity in three markets: the foreign exchange market, the derivative 
market, and the stock market. 25 In each market, data on market capitalisation and 
turnover are collected. The level of market capitalisation or turnover instead of a 
relative variable (relative to GDP or exports) is used because banks are likely to be 
more interested in the absolute size of the market rather than its relative size. In 
financial markets such as the foreign exchange market, a meaningful measure of 
market size is not available and hence the index would only be capturing the liquidity 
of that market. The construction of the index follows the method suggested by Levine 
and Zervos (1995) which consists of subtracting the actual turnover of each individual
market from the group average and then dividing the difference by the group
26  * * * average. This index allows us to rank centres according to their importance in a
particular activity.
The Foreign Exchange Market
Table 6.3 reports the daily averages of foreign exchange market turnover in 24 
countries in April 1995. Data include spot, outright forwards and foreign exchange 
swap activity. The INDEX FX shows that UK is by far the most important trading 
centre for foreign exchange in the world, followed by the United States and Japan.
24 The countries included in the derivation of the index are those suggested by the BIS. The BIS collects 
data only on centres with considerable amount o f foreign exchange and derivative activity and hence it 
is likely to cover the global market activity. The list o f countries are provided in the table 6.3.
25 In principle, the diversity index should also include Eurobond market activity. However, many 
problems arise when it comes to providing data on bond market activity. First, countries have different 
methods in collecting data on turnover o f bonds and hence figures are not comparable. Second, even if 
data were comparable, turnover bond data usually do not include over the counter trade activity. This 
limits the usefulness o f comparison across centres especially that the bulk o f trade occurs over the 
counter. The only
26 For instance the index for the foreign exchange market would be equal to = (Actual turnover -  Group 
Average) / Group average.
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Other important centres for foreign exchange trading are Hong Kong, Singapore,
Switzerland, Germany and France.
6.3 -  The Foreign Exchange Turnover Index 1995 1
Country Amount1 Share
(%)
INDEX FX
United Kingdom 463.8 30 6.73
United States 244.4 16 3.07
Japan 161.3 10 1.69
Singapore 105.4 7 0.76
Hong Kong 90.2 6 0.50
Switzerland 86.5 6 0.44
Germany 76.2 5 0.27
France 58.0 4 -0.03
Denmark 30.5 2 -0.49
Canada 29.8 2 -0.50
Australia 29.0 3 -0.52
Belgium 28.1 2 -0.53
Netherlands 25.5 2 -0.58
Italy 23.2 1 -0.61
Sweden 19.9 1 -0.67
Luxembourg 19.1 1 -0.68
Spain 18.3 1 -0.70
Austria 13.3 1 -0.78
Norway 7.6 0 -0.87
New Zealand 7.1 0 -0.88
Finland 5.3 0 -0.91
South Africa 5.0 0 -0.92
Ireland 4.9 0 -0.92
Greece 3.3 0 -0.95
Bahrain 3.1 0 -0.95
Portugal 2.4 0 -0.96
1. Based on average daily turnover in the Global Foreign Exchange Market
2. In billion o f US dollars, April 1995
Source: BIS (1998) “ Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives 
Market Activity in April 1998: Preliminary Global Data”, BIS Press Release
The Derivatives markets
Table 6.4 reports daily averages of derivative market activity and the size of that 
market. The data include OTC derivative activity for two main categories: Foreign 
exchange derivative instruments and single currency interest rate derivative 
instruments. The INDEX DER reveals similar conclusions where United Kingdom, 
USA, and Japan capture most of OTC derivative market activity. Other important 
centres are France, Singapore, and Germany.
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6.4 - Over-the-counter Derivatives Markets Index 19951
Country Notional Amounts Share INDEX DER
United Kingdom 73.8 27 6.12
United States 53.2 20 4.13
Japan 32.8 12 2.16
France 22.3 8 1.15
Singapore 18.1 7 0.75
Germany 13.8 5 0.33
Belgium 6.2 2 -0.40
Canada 5.3 2 -0.49
Netherlands 5.2 2 -0.50
Switzerland 4.4 2 -0.58
Hong Kong 4.3 2 -0.59
Bahrain 4.1 2 -0.60
Denmark 3.9 1 -0.62
Australia 3.8 1 -0.63
Spain 3.6 1 -0.65
Italy 2.4 1 -0.77
Austria 2.3 1 -0.78
Sweden 2.3 1 -0.78
Luxembourg 2.2 1 -0.79
Finland 1.8 1 -0.83
Ireland 1.5 1 -0.86
Norway 1.5 1 -0.86
South Africa 0.4 0 -0.96
New Zealand 0.2 0 -0.98
Greece 0.1 0 -0.99
Portugal 0.1 0 -0.99
1. Based on the turnover and size of the OTC Derivatives Market
2. Daily average in notional amounts in billion o f dollars
Source: BIS (1998) “ Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives 
Market Activity in April 1998: Preliminary Global Data”, BIS Press Release
The stock Market
A similar index is constructed for the stock market (Table 6.5). This index incorporates 
information both on the size of the stock market and value of share trading. According 
to this index, the US is the most important centre both in terms of market capitalisation 
and share trading value, followed by Japan, United Kingdom, France Germany and 
Canada. Other important centres are Netherlands, Hong Kong and Australia.
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6,5 -  Stock Market Index 1995
Country Stock market 
capitalisation 
(end of 1995)
Value of share trading 
(end of 1995)
INDEX CAP INDEX TURN INDEX STOCK
United States 6917.70 3082.92 9.58 9.31 9.45
Japan 3667.29 884.00 4.61 1.96 3.28
United 1346.64 1153.22 1.06 2.86 1.96
Kingdom
Germany 577.36 593.94 -0.12 0.99 0.43
Switzerland 398.09 340.11 -0.39 0.14 -0.13
France 499.99 213.16 -0.24 -0.29 -0.26
Canada 366.34 151.56 -0.44 -0.49 -0.47
Netherlands 286.65 125.68 -0.56 -0.58 -0.57
Hong Kong 303.70 95.82 -0.54 -0.68 -0.61
Australia 244.34 98.31 -0.63 -0.67 -0.65
Italy 209.52 87.12 -0.68 -0.71 -0.69
Sweden 172.55 94.21 -0.74 -0.68 -0.71
Singapore 150.96 63.98 -0.77 -0.79 -0.78
Spain 150.91 54.03 -0.77 -0.82 -0.79
Belgium 101.75 18.34 -0.84 -0.94 -0.89
Denmark 57.69 28.34 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91
Norway 44.59 24.93 -0.93 -0.92 -0.92
Finland 44.14 19,21 -0.93 -0.94 -0.93
Austria 32.51 13.36 -0.95 -0.96 -0.95
Ireland 25.84 13.33 -0,96 -0.96 -0.96
New Zealand 31.95 8.72 -0.95 -0.97 -0.96
Luxembourg 30.44 0.49 -0.95 -1.00 -0.98
Greece 15.88 6.08 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98
Portugal 18.36 4.24 -0.97 -0.99 -0.98
Source: IFC, Emerging Stock Market Factbook, 1996
The diversity index
The diversity index is a non-weighted average of INDEX FX, INDEX DER and 
INDEX STOCK.27 According to this overall index, United States, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Germany, France, Singapore, Switzerland and Hong Kong are the world’s 
largest financial centres. Initially, data were collected for the largest fifteen financial 
centres. However, due to data unavailability, Denmark and Belgium were dropped 
from the equation which leaves us with thirteen centres. These are: USA, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Spain, Italy, UK, France, Netherlands,
27 The diversity index can be extended to include banking centres’ external deposits and assets. Given 
that cross-border deposit and lending activity are highly correlated with other types of banking 
activities, the exclusion o f these two variables in the diversity index is unlikely to have an impact on the 
empirical results or on the ranking o f banking centres.
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Germany, and Switzerland. Given that we collect bilateral data on each series, our 
sample consists of 156 observations.
6.6 -  The Diversity Index 1995
Country Overall INDEX (1995)
United States 5.55
United Kingdom 4.94
Japan 2.38
Germany 0.35
France 0.29
Singapore 0.24
Switzerland -0.09
Hong Kong -0.23
Canada -0.49
Netherlands -0.55
Australia -0.60
Belgium -0.61
Denmark -0.67
Italy -0.69
Spain -0.71
Sweden -0.72
Luxembourg -0.82
Austria -0.84
Norway -0.88
Finland -0.89
Ireland -0.91
New Zealand -0.94
Greece -0.97
Portugal -0.98
Notes: The overall index is as a non-weighted average 
of INDEX FX, INDEX DER and INDEX STOCK.
The empirical literature on finance and development has suggested a number of 
measures of financial development based on stock market and banking development 
(Zervos and Levine, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1995). It would be interesting 
to compare our index of diversity and the various indices suggested in the literature. 
After all, our index of diversity also reflects the level of development of the financial 
system. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995) construct a financial intermediary index 
which combines averages of M3/GDP (i.e. liquid liabilities of the financial 
intermediaries divided by GDP) and the ratio of domestic credit to private firms 
divided by GDP calculated over the 1976-1993 period. Since our index does not 
capture any measure of banking development, we expect to find a low correlation 
between our index and the financial intermediary index. In fact, a positive correlation 
between these two indices was found but the correlation coefficient is relatively low 
(0.40). The index which is likely to be more correlated with our over all index is stock
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market development index constructed by Demirgu-Runt and Levine (1995), which is 
the average of market capitalisation, total value traded to GDP and turnover. As 
expected, we find a high and positive significant correlation coefficient (0.62) between 
these two indices. This suggests that while our index is correlated with various 
indicators of financial development, the diversity index captures different features of 
financial market development.
6.3.2 Measure o f Competitiveness o f Financial Centres
This chapter has emphasised in more than one place that special attention should be 
given to the choice of the dependent variable. The choice of one dependent variable 
over the other can produce different results. For instance, Goldberg and Johnson’s 
study (1991) which uses both number of bank offices and foreign assets as dependent 
variables reached interesting conclusions concerning foreign direct investment. 
According to this study, foreign direct investment has a positive impact on the level of 
cross border assets, but does not seem to affect the number of branches in a location. 
On the other hand, trade activity has a positive impact both on the number of offices 
and level of cross border assets. Because of such differences, it is important to 
examine the competitiveness of banking centres making use of both dependent 
variables.
Unfortunately, data do not permit us to carry out this exercise and hence we focus on 
one measure of competitiveness only*, the number of foreign offices of the 250 largest 
banks in the world.28 The number of offices is chosen for a number of reasons. 
Obviously, the first reason has to do with data limitations. The Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) publishes data on the position of reporting banks (according to its 
nationality) against individual countries in its semi-annual report; This set of data
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would have served the purpose of the empirical model. Unfortunately, data on the 
external position of reporting banks against countries within the reporting area are not 
available. For instance, although the BIS publishes data on the position of German 
banks against Lebanon, such data are not available for German banks against France or 
United Kingdom or any country in the reporting area. Since this chapter deals with the 
location of offices in countries with relatively diversified financial markets, mainly 
centres in the reporting area, this data set can not be used for our purposes.
Another reason for the choice of the number of offices is that external assets of banks 
measures only one aspect of banks' activity: their international lending activity. This 
can be less binding in financial systems where banks are dominant, but not in the case 
of centres with highly diversified financial structure. Furthermore, using the number of 
offices as a dependent variable allows us to make a distinction between the different 
forms of physical presence in order to examine the impact of explanatory variables on
9 Qthe number of branches, subsidiaries and representative offices.
Table 6.7 below summarises data on the location of overseas offices of the world’s 
largest 250 banks in the end of 1996. Notice the importance of United States, United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore as host countries. On the other hand, Japanese 
banks have the largest number of offices abroad, followed by Germany and France. 
Although our data refers only to the largest 250 banks in the world, this pattern in re­
28 Offices include branches, subsidiaries, and representative offices.
29 This measure has its own drawbacks. One major drawback is that it treats all offices alike regardless 
of their size or their added. One way to overcome this problem is to use employment in foreign offices 
as the dependent variable (Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). However, data limitations do not permit such 
an exercise.
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confirmed by Brealey and Kaplanis data set (1996) which includes data on the location 
of overseas offices of world’s largest 1000 banks.30
Table 6.7 - Location of overseas offices of world’s largest 250 banks in 1996
Host*
Parent* USA Can Aust Japan HK Sing Spain Italy UK France Nether Germany Swit Total
USA 9 11 16 17 12 10 11 22 12 3 9 8 140
Canada 12 3 4 9 9 0 2 9 2 3 3 3 59
Australia 4 0 4 6 5 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 27
Japan 72 16 30 74 39 8 10 60 13 8 28 23 381
Hong Kong 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6
Singapore 0 3 2 2 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 13
Spain 7 1 1 4 3 2 5 6 7 2 5 9 52
Italy 17 3 4 6 7 7 8 12 11 3 12 3 93
UK 10 2 7 7 9 6 4 5 6 3 6 4 69
France 19 3 5 13 15 11 14 15 18 6 13 9 141
Netherlands 2 0 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 25
Germany 18 5 6 14 16 17 11 14 14 19 16 14 164
Switzerland 9 4 4 9 8 8 5 3 3 2 2 4 61
Total 173 46 74 82 171 119 62 68 155 76 46 83 76 1231
*Rows show parent countries; columns show host countries. 
Source: Banker Almanac CD-ROM (1997)
6.3.3 Hypotheses
Explanatory variables are selected to test a number of hypotheses suggested in the last 
two chapters. The list of explanatory variables consists of the following: Foreign direct 
investment, trade activity, the size of the country of origin, differences in the tax and 
regulatory structure. In addition, the existing number of banks in a centre and a 
centre’s index of diversity are included to capture agglomeration benefits offered by 
financial centres and the desire of banks to locate in a centre to participate in a centre’s 
financial markets. Each of these variables and the associated hypothesis are discussed 
below.
30 In fact, our series o f foreign offices is highly correlated (0.90) with Brealey and Kaplanis series. 
However, the latter series is not used in the empirical analysis because it does not contain separate 
information on the number o f subsidiaries, branches and representative offices and instead all types of 
offices are grouped together.
202
Foreign direct investment and trade activity
The empirical evidence suggests that trade activity is the major determinant of 
international banking activity. Both export and import activity generates demand for 
banking services. For instance, import activity usually involves the purchase of foreign 
exchange or the extension of letters of credit to importers and exporters. Most 
importantly, payments related to international trade activity are usually settled through 
banks. Such activities provide banks with an important source of income in terms of 
fees and interest payments. Despite the fact that such transactions can be settled 
through correspondent banks abroad, “home” banks may decide to internalise 
“external” transactions by establishing offices in locations where there is substantial 
volume of trade with the home economy.
Additional business opportunities also arise in countries or regions which attract large 
volume flows of foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment creates potential 
sources for deposits, loans, and management fees. Hence, it is expected for foreign 
direct investment to play a role in the determination of the location of banks. In 
particular, foreign direct investment from country i to country j is likely to push some 
banks in countries i to locate abroad in region j. Notice that this hypothesis is slightly 
different from the “follow the clientele” hypothesis which suggests that banks tend to 
locate near their main multinational borrowers. That is to say that if a multinational 
corporation moves abroad, then the bank that used to service its financial needs 
domestically would have the incentive to move abroad in an attempt to protect its 
market share from host banks and foreign banks operating in the new market. It is 
important to note that in order to test for this hypothesis we require data on the number
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of multinational companies from country i headquartered in country j rather than 
foreign direct investment between these two countries.
The tax and regulatory structure
The decision of banks to locate in other centres can also be attributed to differences in 
tax and regulatory structure. Table 6.8 below shows that there are great variations 
across centres in terms of corporate tax rates. For instance, the corporate tax rate in 
Germany in 1995 was 45% compared with 4-10% in the case of Switzerland. 
Differences in tax structures can affect banks' after tax rate of return and hence 
influence the location of banks. Hence, we would expect that countries would tend to 
establish in centres with low tax requirements.31
Table 6.8 -  Corporate Tax Rates in Selected 
Financial Centres
Country Corporate tax rate in 1995
Germany 45
Japan 38
Italy 36
United States 35
Spain 35
Netherlands 35
Australia 33
UK 33
France 33
Canada 29
Singapore 27
Hong Kong 17.5
Switzerland 4-10
Source: Coopers and Lybrand, International Tax Summaries (1996)
In addition to differences in tax requirements, variations in the regulatory structure 
across countries can affect a bank’s decision to establish in a certain location since 
such variations can affect the rate of return on banking capital (Eaton, 1994; Alworth
31 It is important to note that although differences in tax requirements have been emphasised in the 
previous chapter, they have been stressed in the context o f tax havens and banking centres. Once the 
focus of analysis shifts to large economies with diversified financial markets, the impact of tax 
differences is expected to be less important. For instance, although the US has a relatively high 
corporate tax rate, banks still have the incentive to establish in the US market probably because of the 
size of the US market or the diversity and complexity of their financial structure. The same can be 
argued in the case o f Japan or the UK. In other words, while it is easy to explain the rise o f Cayman
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et al, 1992). Table 1 in the appendix describes the major restrictions imposed on 
financial and capital markets (end of 1995). This table shows that despite recent 
movements towards financial liberalisation, many countries still impose various 
restrictions on financial activity. Australia has the most restrictive environment where 
the government still imposes various restrictions on the purchase and sale of securities 
and money market instruments by non-residents. Further restrictions are imposed on 
commercial bank and other credit institutions5 transactions. France, Japan, and Spain 
also have relatively restrictive environment whereas United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Singapore and Hong Kong and Canada have almost no restrictions on financial 
activity.
The size o f the country o f origin
The existing empirical studies suggest that larger countries of origin are likely to have 
more overseas bank offices abroad. Some economists have considered this evidence 
as an indication of existing of economies of scale (Ter Wengel, 1995). That it is say 
that banks in larger economies are likely to establish more foreign offices abroad 
because of their ability to achieve economies of scale which arise due to large demand 
for banking services (Arndt, 1988). Hence, the size of the economy might constitute a 
source for comparative advantage and could explain the pattern of trade among 
countries. An alternative explanation would be that larger economies usually have a 
large number of banks and hence are likely to establish more bank offices abroad 
(Choi et al, 1996). In other words, there is a mere scale effect which may not 
necessarily involve economies of scale. Hence, a positive coefficient on the size of the
Islands in terms o f differences in tax structure, these differences can not explain the decision of banks to 
locate in very large economies.
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country of origin (usually measured by GDP) may not necessarily imply economies of 
scale, but rather a size effect.
Agglomeration benefits and greater access to financial markets 
As argued in chapters 3 and 4, an important factor that affects banks' decision to locate 
in a certain centre is the number of banks that already exist in that centre. Various 
factors can explain the decision of banks to establish near each other. In addition to 
informational spillover that may arise due to physical proximity and direct interaction 
with other competitors, chapter 3 argued that under certain conditions, financial 
agglomeration increases financial firms’ access to more specialised intermediate 
services, a larger skilled labour force, and more efficient infrastructure. This is 
expected to shift upwards the profit function of banks, other things being equal. 
Furthermore, some economists have argued that geographical centralisation of banks 
results in more efficient and active interbank markets and can expand the size of 
existing activities such as syndicate lending (Choi et al, 1996; Davis, 1990).
It could be argued that a large number of banks in a centre might result in greater 
competition which may affect banks’ profitability. In a highly competitive market, 
attempts to increase market shares are likely to be met by fierce rivalry in the form of 
price undercutting and product differentiation. Furthermore, these markets are likely to 
entice new comers intensifying the risk of future increases in competition. Survey 
results and empirical evidence however suggest that despite the threat of fierce 
competition, banks prefer to locate near their competitors. This indicates that the 
benefits accrued from agglomeration offset the costs associated with intense rivalry
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and competition. A positive sign on the coefficient on the number of existing banks 
would provide support for this argument.
There are two ways to account for this agglomeration effect in empirical models. Most 
studies use GDP of the centre to proxy for these agglomeration benefits (Grilli 1989, 
Alworth et al 1992).32 I think however that GDP can not capture the agglomeration 
effects fully. For instance, although Hong Kong and Singapore have the smallest 
economies in the sample, they still managed to attract a large number of banks. Hence, 
based on the centre’s GDP, agglomeration benefits in Hong Kong and Singapore are 
low while the large number of banks in these two centres suggest that agglomeration 
benefits are substantial. A more direct measure that can be used is the actual number 
of banks in a centre. In particular, agglomeration benefits can be captured by the 
number of banks from countries other than i that are in j (Choi et al 1986, 1996).33 This 
variable is expected to capture the effect of agglomeration better than the mere size of 
the economy. Large number of banks may reflect the existence of more specialised 
inputs, more skilled labour force and efficient public infrastructure.
Including a variable that captures the agglomeration effect in our empirical model is 
essential because it allows us to examine whether banks locate in other centres to 
capture agglomeration benefits after controlling for bilateral trade, foreign direct 
investment, size o f the country o f origin and differences in the regulatory and tax 
structures. In fact, Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) note that countries which attract banks
32 As Grilli argues," large industrialised economies probably enjoy a comparative advantage in 
attracting financial firms from the rest of the world. Such thick market externalities explain why the size 
of the matters, and why the four largest international financial centres (London, New York, Tokyo, and 
Paris) are also the financial centres of four out of the five largest economies."
33 Assume two countries, USA (i) and France (j), then this variables measure the total number of banks 
in France other than banks of US origin.
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only because of their trade relations or the size of their economies should not 
necessarily be considered as financial centres. Instead, they define a financial centre as 
one which foreign banks locate in order to access the centre's financial markets. The 
index of diversity of financial markets can be used to capture the impact of access to 
large and diversified financial markets on the number of banks.
It is important to note that bank agglomeration and deeper financial markets are highly 
related. It is often argued in the literature that agglomeration of banks activates 
existing financial markets (Davis, 1990; Choi et al, 1996) although causality can also 
run in the opposite direction i.e. deep and diverse financial markets can attract large 
number of banks. It is possible to test for this hypothesis using correlation analysis. 
Given the above reasoning, we would expect to find a high correlation between our 
diversity index and number of banks in a centre. In fact, a high and positive correlation 
coefficient of 0.80 was found between these two series which suggests that centres 
with large number of banks have also the most diversified financial markets.
The number of banks in a centre and the index of diversity can in principle be used 
individually or jointly in the model as indicators of the existence of agglomeration 
benefits and access to more diversified financial markets. The use of one particular 
variable may shed light on the effects of existence of agglomeration economies or 
access to more diversified financial markets, but is unlikely to provide reliable 
estimates since this strategy is likely to suffer from omitted-variable bias. Joint use of 
both variables also entails econometric problems as these variables are highly 
correlated. In order to avoid this problem, we can use a summary measure of these two 
variables using the statistical method of principal components (Theil, 1971). This
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summary measure is highly correlated with the underlying variables. This measure 
which we call the agglomeration-diversity index and is used in the empirical model to 
test for the hypothesis that after controlling for other variables, banks locate in 
financial centres in order to have access to deep and liquid financial markets and 
capture the agglomeration benefits offered by financial centres.
6.3.4 The EmpiricaI Model
We estimate the following equation, in which the explanatory variables are lagged one 
period:34
NB{jt= ao + ai EXPyt-i + a2 PCjt-i+ LGDPjn+ 3 4  dRjjt-i+ as dCtjj_i+ et
Where
NBij = number of bank offices from country's i parent banks to centre j 
EXPjj = exports of centre i to centre j
PCj = the first principal component of number of banks and index of diversity of centre
j
GDPj = GDP of the country i
dRy = the difference in the regulatory structure between centre i and centre j 
dCty = the difference in the corporate tax between centre i and centre j
6.3.5. Data
Data were collected for the year 1995. Thirteen countries were included in estimation. 
Data were complete for all variables except for the FDI where figures on Singapore
34 Data on the number o f offices were collected for 1996, while data on the explanatory variables were 
collected for 1995. Because there may be costs and delays to opening and closing branches and 
subsidiaries, the number of bank offices is likely to be determined by lag economic and regulatory and 
tax variables (Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). Furthermore, this specification reduces the problem of  
possible simultaneity.
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and Hong Kong's stock of FDI were not available. Data on GDP were obtained from 
the World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997. The data on the stock of FDI 
were obtained from the OECD, International Investment Statistics Yearbook. Stocks of 
FDI were converted into dollars using year-end exchange rate obtained from the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. The data on bilateral trade were obtained from 
OECD, Monthly Statistics o f Foreign Trade. Data on the stock market capitalisation 
and turnover were obtained from IFC, Emerging Stock Market Factbook. Data on 
derivative and foreign exchange activity were obtained from the Bank for International 
Settlement. Data on corporate taxes were obtained from Coopers and Lybrand, 
International Tax summaries. Data on regulatory factors were obtained from IMF 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. Finally, data on the number of offices for 
1996 were collected from the Bankers' Almanac CD-ROM.
Two general data problems are worth reporting before presenting the empirical results. 
First, financial activity tends to concentrate in major cities (New York, London, 
Tokyo, etc.) and hence it would be more informative to examine the major 
determinants of the competitiveness of these cities. However, data at the city level are 
available only for very few cities. Using data at the national level may seem restrictive 
if the aim of the analysis is to examine the major determinants of New York's 
competitiveness as an international financial centre over time, but not necessarily in 
cross-section analysis for one major reason. In most countries, there is a tendency for 
financial activity to concentrate in one major city. Hence, data at the national level are 
likely to reflect primarily the financial activity of that city. This is especially true in 
small economies. Second, in case of some qualitative variables, data are not available 
at year-end. For instance, data on the regulatory and tax structure of different countries
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are collected at different points in time. Furthermore, most of the data on derivative 
and foreign exchange are collected based on surveys performed during a particular 
month, while other variables are only available at year-end. This may seem to create 
serious estimation problems. However, these problems are not necessarily binding. For 
instance, indices used to capture the regulatory and tax structure of different countries 
do not vary much during the course of the year. Hence, even if data on the regulatory 
and tax structure were collected in March while a measure of financial activity is only 
available at year end, this does not affect the results, especially that these indices are 
constructed in order to rank the importance of different financial centres according to a 
special feature.
6.3.6 Method o f Estimation
Data were grouped and the equation was estimated using OLS both in levels and 
logarithms. Given that there are some zeros in the dependent variable sample, taking 
logarithms of the dependent variable eliminates all zero cells and restricts the 
estimation only to cells with positive entries. To examine whether this affects the 
empirical results, we also apply least squares to the levels of series.
In addition to least square estimation, this chapter uses logit and probit models. The 
use of an alternative estimation technique yields two major benefits. First, logit and 
probit models are based on different assumptions from least squares; the equations are 
estimated using the maximum likelihood method. If these two alternative methods of 
estimation achieve similar results regarding the sign and the significance of 
coefficients, we can be more confident about the obtained results. Second, and more 
importantly, given the nature of the hypothesis, examining the impact of explanatory
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variables on the probability of a bank establishing in a certain centre can be more 
meaningful than calculating mere elasticities. Probit and logit models allow us to 
formulate the hypothesis in terms of probabilities.
Probit and logit models are used widely in labour economics, but they are much less 
familiar in other fields and hence it is worth pausing for a while to describe the major 
features of these models. Consider the following model:
X  j3+s
Where X  is the matrix of the independent variables, J3 is the vector of parameters and 
y* is a latent variable which is not observable. Instead, we observe a dummy variable 
yt which can be defined as:
yt= 1 i f  y*>0 (i.e. the bank has some form of physical presence abroad) 
yt = 0 (otherwise)
Estimating the equation with dummy variables on the left-hand side by OLS (known as 
the linear probability model) is not desirable mainly to the fact that this model does not 
constrain the predicted value to be between 0 and 1 (Greene, 1993; Madalla, 1983). 
One way to overcome this problem is to transform X (3 into a probability:
Pi~Prob (yi=J)= F(X{3)
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If we denote by 1 m as the m observation such thaty,-=(? and such as n-m
as the observations such that y,-=J and assuming the i.i.d sampling, then likelihood 
function can be written as:
L= n yi=1 Pi * n yi=0 (1-P$
The model is not linear in probabilities and hence the equation has to be estimated 
using maximum likelihood. A distribution function or cumulative density can 
transform X  J3 to lie between zero and one. Of course, there is more than one 
distribution which can achieve this role and hence the results of the model depend on 
the choice of the distribution. One such distribution is the logistic distribution function 
which takes the following form:35
Pi=F(Zi) ~exp(Zt)/(1 +exp(Zj)) where Zf is Xf3
In the case of the logit model, it is useful to take logarithms of both sides of the ratio of 
P/l-P (the odd ratios) i.e. the ratio of the probability that a bank will establish in a 
certain location to the probability that it will not:
Li—Log Pi/l-Pi =iog F(Zi)/l~F(Zi) = Zi= X  f3
The left-hand side of the equation ( called the log-odd ratios) is a linear function of the 
explanatory variables.
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6.3.7 Empirical Results
The empirical results are shown in the table 6.9 below. We report three types of 
equations according to the method of estimation being used. In type I equation, the 
model is estimated using linear square estimation procedure, but without taking the 
logarithm of the variables. Type II equation estimates the same model, but the 
explanatory variables are expressed in logarithms (except for PC, dCt and dR).36 Type 
3 equation is estimated using the logit procedure described above. In type 1 equation, 
we reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (based on Goldfeld-Quandt and 
Breusch- Pagan tests) and hence the equation was estimated using the generalised 
least squares (GLS).
The table below shows that the obtained results are sensitive to the method of 
estimation being used. The size of the country of origin and the agglomeration benefits 
-  diversity index are the only two explanatory variables that maintain the same sign 
and significance across equations. Although the coefficient on bilateral exports does 
not change sign, its significance varies from one equation to another. On the other 
hand, the sign and significance of the coefficient on differences in tax structure differ 
across equations. All in all, the empirical results indicate that the following 
explanatory variables are the major determinants of the location of offices: the size of 
the country of origin, the agglomeration benefit-diversity index and bilateral exports. 
As can be indicated from the table below, the coefficient for the size of the country of 
origin is significant in all the equations. Ter Wengel (1995) argues that this is evidence 
of the presence of economies of scale in larger economies, although as argued 
previously this variable could be capturing a mere scale effect. Second, the coefficient
35 The features o f the probit model are the same as those of the logit except that the normal distribution 
is used instead o f the logistic distribution function.
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for the agglomeration benefits-diversity index is highly significant in all the estimated 
equations indicating that banks locate abroad to capture agglomeration economies and 
participate in a centre’s complex and developed financial markets. Third, the 
coefficient for exports is positive and significant in all the equations indicating that 
bilateral trade has an impact on the trade of banking offices.
The results also indicate that differences in the regulatory and tax structure do not 
affect the location of banks. This is especially true for differences in regulatory 
structure for the coefficient on this variable is insignificant in all of the estimated 
equations. Hence, we drop this variable from the equation and re-estimate the model 
again. As can be seen from table 6.9, dropping this variable does not alter the 
empirical results.37
36 Notice that in type II equation, cells with zero entries are excluded from estimation.
37 The three models perform well in explaining the major determinants o f banks’ location. According to 
the adjusted R2, the equation in logarithms performs better than type 1 equation which does not take the 
logarithms of the variables. In the former equation, the explanatory variables explain 62% of the 
variation of trade in offices compared to 44% in the latter equation. Furthermore, using logarithms gets 
rid of the multicollinearity problem. Unlike OLS, there is no single measure such as R2 for measuring 
goodness of fit in logit models. However, it is possible to rely on few measures to assess the general 
fitness of the equation: the pseudo R2 which is based on likelihood ratios (more or less equivalent to the 
conventional R ) and count R2 which is obtained by ratio of the number o f correct prediction to total 
number of observations. In addition, the likelihood statistic which is equivalent to the F-test in OLS 
regression can also be used. In our model, the pseudo R2 is 0.60, die count R2 is 0.92 (44 cases correct 
out of 156) and the null hypothesis o f zero coefficients can be rejected at the 1% level. All these 
measures suggest that the logit model performs very well in explaining the major determinants of banks 
location.
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Table 6.9 -  Determinants of Location of Banking Offices in Financial Centres
Regressors 2
Eql 3 
Level
('GLS')
Eq24
Logs
fOLS)
Eq35
Logit
E ql3
Level
CGLS)
Eq24
Logs
COLS)
Eq35
Logit
Constant 1.987* -3.09* -23.150* 1.954* -3.107 -21.357
(0.343) (0.375) (5.916) (0.297) (0.375) (5.942)
EXPy 0.040*** 0.169* 0.667*** 0.042*** 0.168* 0.707**
(0.02) (0.045) (0.419) (0.024) (0.045) (0.412)
GDPj 0.002* 0.488* 3.176* 0.002* 0.492* 3.154*
(0.003) (0.060) (0.793) (0.000) (0.060) (0.787)
PCj 1.394* 0.16* 1.140* 1.387* 0.172* 1.193*
(0.244) (0.039) (0.539) (0.217) (0.038) (0.579)
DCTy 0.031** 0.003 -0.015 0.031** 0.005 -0.028
(0.016) (0.004) (0.033) (0.013) (0.004) (0.351)
DRy 0.007 0.007 -0.048
(0.03) (0.007) (0.050)
(1) The dependent variables is the number of bank offices (subsidiaries, branches, and representative 
offices) ffom centre i to centre j. Figures in parentheses are the standard errors.
(2) GDP; = GDP of centre i; EXPjj = the value of exports from centre i to centre j;
Div-Agg INDj = the index of agglomeration benefits and participation in financial markets;
DCTjj = the difference of corporate tax rate between centres i and j; DRjj = difference in the 
regulatory structure between centres i and j
(3) The equation was estimated without taking the logarithms o f the variables. Both the Goldfeld- 
Quandt and Breusch-Pagan tests indicate the existence of heteroscedasticity and hence the equation 
was estimated using the generalised least squares (GLS).
(4) The equation was estimated taking the logarithms of the dependent variable, EXPy and GDP;.
(5) The equation was estimated using logit analysis. It is important to check for heteroscedasticity in 
these models as the presence of this problem yields not only inefficient but also inconsistent 
estimates (Maddala, 1983). The null hypothesis o f homoscedastic could not be rejected using the 
likelihood ratio (Greene 1993) and hence only the results o f the homoscedastic model are presented.
* Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant 5% level, *** significant at the 10% level.
Foreign direct investment from centre i to centre j is next added to the original model. 
The results shown in the table below show that FDI is insignificant in all equations, 
indicating that foreign direct investment is not a major determinant of the number of 
banks.38 One possible explanation for the performance of foreign direct investment is 
that the impact of FDI is likely to vary according to the dependent variable being used. 
For instance, FDI may have a positive impact on the level of cross border banking 
assets, but not necessarily on the number of bank offices (Goldberg and Johnston,
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1990). It should be noted that an insignificant coefficient on FDI does not necessarily 
refute the “follow the clientele” hypothesis. To test for the hypothesis that banks 
follow their prime borrowers (mainly the MNCs), the number of MNC headquarters 
from country i to country j should be used instead of the stock of foreign direct 
investment. However, such data are not available. Hence, this result only suggests that 
foreign direct investment into a country does not require the establishment of banking 
offices in that country. This is consistent with our story that banks can service the 
needs of MNCs by establishing in very few established centres which are also host to a 
large number of MNC headquarters.
R egressors 2
Eql3
L evel
(GLS)
Eq24
Logs
roL S i
Constant 2.625* -2.906*
(0.396) (0.426)
EXPij 0.046 0.145*
(0.003) (0.050)
FDIij -0.005 -0.019
(0.003) (0.020)
GDPi 0.002* 0.516*
(0.000) (0.068)
PC 1.713* 0.213*
(0.267) (0.041)
dCt 0.019 0.003
(0.018) (0.004)
Notes:
(1) The dependent variables is the number of bank offices (subsidiaries, branches, and representative 
offices) from centre i to centre j. Figures in parentheses are the standard errors.
(2) GDPj = GDP of centre i; EXPy = the value of exports from centre i to centre j; FDI ij = foreign 
direct investment from centre i to centre j, Div-Agg INDj = the index of agglomeration benefits and 
participation in financial markets; DCTy = the difference of corporate tax rate between centres i and 
j; DRy = difference in the regulatory structure between centres i and j.
(3) The equation was estimated without taking the logarithms o f the variables.
(4) The equation was estimated taking the logarithms of the dependent variable, EXPy and GDP;.
* Significant at die 1% level, ** Significant 5% level.
38 We were not able to apply the logit procedure to the above specification due to non-convergence.
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The results taken together suggest quite clearly that after controlling for variations in 
the regulatory and tax structure, the size of the country of origin and bilateral trade, 
banks’ desire to capture agglomeration benefits and participate in larger and more 
diversified financial markets influences their decision to establish offices abroad. 
Although in principle banks can participate in other centre’s financial markets at a 
distance, the evidence suggests that proximity to other market players still matters.
6.4 A Note on the Distinction Between Subsidiaries, Branches, and 
Representative Offices
In this section, we make a distinction between the various forms of banking presence.
In particular, we make a distinction between subsidiaries, branches and representative 
offices. Heinkel and Levi’s study (1992) indicates that the decision to establish each of 
these forms depends on a distinct set of factors. This section contributes to this 
literature by examining what type of bank offices are likely to be associated with 
access to larger markets.
In table 6.11 below, four models are reported. In the first model, the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if centre i has some type of 
physical presence in centre j (without making a differentiation among the various 
forms of physical presence) and zero otherwise. This model is similar to the one 
reported before but it does not include differences in corporate tax rates which were 
found to be insignificant. In models 2, 3 and 4, we make a distinction between 
subsidiaries, branches and representative offices. For instance, in model 2, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if centre i has a 
subsidiary in centre j and zero otherwise. The list of explanatory variables is the same
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in all models. Differences in tax and regulatory structure were found to be insignificant 
and hence are dropped from the model.
Model 1 which uses the number of bank offices as a dependent variable produces 
results similar to the ones obtained previously with one minor difference. In this 
specification, bilateral exports become significant at the 1% level instead at the 5% 
level. The model performs well as reflected in a high pseudo R2 of 0.57 and high count 
R2 of 0.95. The Chi-square statistics suggests that the null hypothesis of all coefficients 
are zero could be rejected at the 1% level.
The model in the number of subsidiaries, shows quite different results. In this 
specification, bilateral exports become insignificant and the agglomeration benefits -  
diversity index is only significant at the 10% level. These results may reflect the fact 
that subsidiaries act like home banks and enter into direct competition with local banks 
for domestic markets rather than engage in financing bilateral exports. The model in 
the number of subsidiaries performs poorly as reflected in the low pseudo R2 which 
suggests that other determinants, mainly related to investment banking activity, should 
be added to explain the number of subsidiaries in a location.39
39 It should be noted that this thesis is mainly aimed at identifying the major determinants of the location 
of bank offices in major financial centres rather than explaining the form o f these offices. It is quite 
obvious from the above results that studying the form of presence of banks requires a somewhat 
different approach from the one adopted here. The alternative approach should analyse the determinants 
of subsidiaries, branches, and representative offices separately as each o f these seem to be affected by 
different explanatory variables or at least the impact of these variables is not the same across equations. 
However, the results o f the model provide some useful information on the form of bank offices.
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The model in number of branches performs better than the previous model. All the 
explanatory variables have highly significant and correctly signed coefficients. The 
pseudo R2 is relatively high and according to the count R2 measure, the model predicts 
84% of the cases correctly. The positive and highly significant coefficient on the 
agglomeration benefit-diversity index is consistent with Heinkel and Levi’s study 
(1992) which shows that large capital markets and large volumes of trading are highly 
associated with number of branches in a location. In fact, the authors argue that 
participation in capital markets requires the establishment of branches in a location.
Table 6.11 - Determinants of the number of subsidiaries, branches and 
representative offices
________________NB*____________ NSUB2_________ NBRA3_________ NOF4
Regressors5
Constant -20.545* -8.204* -7.922* -8.475
(5.970) (1.736) (0.189) (1.550)
LEXPij 0.926* 0.409 0.418* 0.228
(0.418) (0.174) (0.189) (0.157)
[2.524] [1.505] [1.519] [1.256]
LGDPi 2.760* 0.908* 0.957* 1.022*
(0.680) (0.222) (0.250) (0.212)
[15.809] [2.481] [2.605] [2.779]
PCi 1.061* 0.275*** 1.193* 0.203
(0.526) (0.183) (0.352) (0.155)
[2.890] [1.317] [3.297] [1.225]
Psuedo R2 0.57 0.25 0.40 0.25
Chi2(3) 68.10* 78.71* 62.28* 53.70*
Count R2 0.95 0.78 0.84 0.73
Notes:
(1) The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value o f one if centre i has any form of 
presence in centre j and zero other wise.
(2) The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value o f one if centre i operates a 
subsidiary in centre j and zero other wise.
(3) The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value o f one if  centre i operates a branch 
in centre j and zero other wise.
(4) The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value o f one if  centre i operates a 
representative in centre j and zero other wise.
(5) See the above table for the description of explanatory variables. Differences in corporate tax rate 
was insignificant in all specifications and hence was dropped from the equation.
The model in the number of representative offices does not perform very well. It seems 
that none of our explanatory variables (except for the size of the country of origin) can
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explain the number of representative offices in a location. This could be due to the fact 
that representative offices engage mainly in merchant banking services which are 
related to brokerage services such as arranging loans between home borrowers and 
host lenders (Heinkel and Levi, 1992). None of our explanatory variables capture this 
activity and hence the low performance of this model should not be surprising.
In short, the results show quite clearly that the impact of explanatory variables is 
different across subsidiaries, branches, and representative offices. Only the equation in 
branches yield similar results to those obtained from the total number of bank offices. 
Our agglomeration-diversity index enters with the expected positive sign in all 
equations except for the equation in the number of representative offices which is not 
significant. This may suggest that in order for international banks to participate in a 
centre’s financial markets, they must establish branches or subsidiaries there rather 
than rely on representative offices.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we test a number of hypotheses that emerge from the previous 
theoretical discussion, employing data from the largest financial centres of the world. 
Specifically, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of dynamic benefits in 
explaining the location of multinational banks. Furthermore, we test for the hypothesis 
that banks establish in a centre in order to benefit from the agglomeration economies 
and to have access to diversified financial markets. In order to test this hypothesis, we 
first construct an index of diversity of financial markets based on the variety of 
financial products and the level of complexity and size of the centre’s financial 
markets. Only countries with highly diversified financial markets are included.
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Furthermore, we use this index as an explanatory variable to examine the impact of the 
diversity of financial markets on banks' location. Another important aspect of financial 
centres is their ability to generate agglomeration economies. However, given the close 
association between bank agglomeration and deeper financial markets (Choi et al, 
1986), these two can not be included together in the same equation because of the 
problem of high multicollinearity. In order to avoid this problem, we use a summary 
measure of these two variables using the statistical method of principal components 
(Theil, 1971). The empirical results suggest that after controlling for variations in 
regulatory and tax structure, the size of the country of origin and bilateral trade, banks’ 
desire to capture agglomeration benefits and participate in larger and more diversified 
financial markets influence their decision to establish offices abroad. This conclusion 
applies mainly to the number of branches across countries.
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Chapter 7 - The Emergence and Evolution of Banking Centres
7.1 Introduction
Recent movements towards the liberalisation of trade in financial services and 
implementation of financial sector reforms in many parts of the world have increased 
the importance of cross border banking activity. This is reflected clearly in table 7.1 
below which shows that the ratio of cross border assets to domestic credit has become 
important in many countries.
Table 7.1 -  The Ratio of Cross Border Assets to Domestic Credit
(end o f 1997)
Country Ratio of External Assets to Domestic Credit
Norway 0.11
United States 0,12
Italy 0.18
Canada 0.18
Spain 0.19
Japan 0.21
Germany 0.22
Austria 0.26
Sweden 0.27
Finland 0.28
France 0.45
Netherlands 0.45
Denmark 0.62
Belgium 0.71
United Kingdom 1.02
Switzerland 1.12
Ireland* 2.06
Hong Kong 2.091
Singapore 6.88
Bahrain 60.43
The Bahamas 77.3
* End of 1996
Source: Data on external assets were obtained from the BIS, International 
Banking and Financial Markets Developments', Data on the stock of domestic 
Credit were obtained from IMF, International Financial Statistics and were 
converted into US dollars using the average exchange rate also obtained from 
IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Although all countries engage in some form of international banking activity, only a 
small number of countries have specialised in international banking. The above table
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shows that it is possible to classify countries into four groups according to the 
importance of cross border banking activity as a proportion of total banking activity 
(Arndt, 1988). The first category consists of developed countries with relatively low 
ratios of cross border assets to domestic credit. The second category consists also of 
developed countries with more substantial, but more moderate ratios (Belgium and 
Denmark). The most interesting category is the third one which consist of countries 
with very high ratios of cross border assets to domestic credit (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Ireland). The final group consists of 
some offshore centres with extremely high ratios (The Bahamas and Bahrain). While 
countries in the first and second group engage in cross border lending to an extent 
related to the size of their economies or the volume of their international trade, 
countries in the third group have managed to specialise in cross border lending 
activity.
Despite the growing importance of cross-border banking and the vital role that some 
centres play in that process, the literature has provided very few theoretical models to 
explain the emergence of these centres. In principle, one would expect the literature 
on financial centres to provide some insights into this matter. However, the main 
focus of this literature has been on the study of the major forces responsible for the 
agglomeration or dispersion of financial activity using the elements of industrial 
location theory (Davis, 1990).
Despite the dominance of this trend in the literature, there have been few theoretical 
attempts to explain the emergence of these centres. Most of the theoretical studies 
have dealt with the issue of emergence within the context of MNC and/or trade
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theory. In particular, the ability of some centres to specialise in the delivery of 
financial services has mainly been explained in terms of the locational advantages of a 
centre. These locational advantages can arise from many sources such as easy access 
to multinational corporations or face to face contact with customers and other banks 
(Dunning, 1993; Gray and Gray, 1981). Other studies have focused on features such 
as historical character, favourable regulatory environment, advanced communication 
system, human capital, political and economic stability, time zone, geographical 
location and strong currency to explain the emergence of a certain country as a 
financial centre. For instance, Grubel (1986) argues that the regional banking business 
of Hong Kong “was fostered by comparative advantage which the local communities 
developed during their colonial status, when English banking skills were the best in 
the world and dominated international capital markets. Their comparative advantage 
results from the central locations of these countries and deliberate support which 
government policy provided for its advance. Human capital, good communications 
systems and a favourable regulatory environment are essential ingredients in the 
development of this business” (p.253-54).
In this respect, it is important to note that differences in regulatory and tax structure 
remains the typical explanation for the emergence of banking centres (Eaton, 1994; 
Cassard, 1994). Countries with lower tax rates and flexible regulatory environments, 
reflected for instance in lower reserve requirements, tend to have lower spreads and 
hence would specialise in the provision of both deposits and loans. For instance, in 
Eaton’s (1994) overlapping generation model, countries in which monetary authorities 
place less weight on seigniorage revenue (i.e. systems which rely less on the taxation 
of the financial system) can offer higher rates of return on deposits and charge lower
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rates of interest on loans. As a result, such countries are able to attract deposits from 
abroad and finance non-resident borrowers. This cross border role reflects a country’s 
competitiveness as an intermediary where the source of competitiveness in this case is 
the regulatory environment.
Arndt (1988) suggests a different explanation for trade in financial services, arguing 
that the crude application of elements of trade theory to financial services is 
inadequate. For instance, although countries with abundant capital have a comparative 
advantage in trade in financial services, the source of comparative advantage is not a 
cost advantage due to abundance of capital. Instead, Arndt (1988) stresses the 
importance of economies of scale as the major determinant of comparative advantage 
in trade of financial services. Only countries that achieve economies in scale in the 
provision of financial services are in a position to export financial services. According 
to Arndt, the source of these economies of scale is a large domestic market “i.e. 
demand by residents for banking and other financial services” (p.72).
This chapter’s main contribution lies in building a model of emergence of banking 
centres which is based on a combination of efficiency and economies of scale in 
intermediation. In particular, we show that the rate of return on savings offered by a 
financial centre is a function of a measure of efficiency of financial intermediation 
and a measure of scale of financial activity which reflects economies of scale. But 
unlike Arndt (1988) who considers only domestic demand, we consider the possibility 
of demand arising from regional economies which can form an important source for 
economies of scale for banking centres. An explanation of emergence based on 
efficiency of financial intermediation and a broader concept of economies of scale
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allows us to capture two important features of emergence of banking centres. The first 
feature relates to the possibility of multiple equilibria. In the case when the country 
has sufficient savings and is faced with a certain critical mass of investment 
opportunities at home and abroad, that country could in principle emerge as a 
financial centre since it can offer a rate of return higher than the opportunity cost for 
savers in countries with surplus funds. This case corresponds to the emergence of 
international financial centres such as London (in the 19th century), New York and 
Tokyo which established themselves as important centres as a consequence of the size 
of their economies. However, in principle and in history there are few examples of 
countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong, which do not have a sufficient amount 
of domestic savings and are not faced with a sufficient mass of domestic investment 
opportunities, but still managed to emerge as important banking centres. In such 
cases, the model shows that the emergence of a country as a financial centre depends 
on two demand side conditions. First, the country must face a sufficiently large 
demand for funds which is usually generated from its regional economies. Second, the 
centre must be able to attract a certain critical mass of savings from a sufficient 
number of countries, usually from outside the region. When these two conditions are 
satisfied, then emergence could occur. However, if “surplus” countries channel their 
savings through various countries and/or regional economies satisfy their demand for 
funds from various places, then emergence may not occur.
It is important to note that in this model, efficiency does not determine emergence in 
the sense that it is not necessarily true that the country with the most efficient 
intermediation will emerge as a banking centre. A country with less efficient financial 
intermediation could also emerge as a financial centre, but the amount of savings
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which needs to be intermediated through the centre must be larger for such emergence 
to occur. This allows for some element of indeterminacy in the model, and hence 
other elements such as historical chance or “first mover” advantage can play an 
important role in determining which country emerges as a banking centre. This aspect 
of emergence has not been adressed before.
Our model captures another important feature of financial centres which relates to the 
possibility of a reinforcing mechanism or “path dependence” process which suggests 
that once a centre has been established, it would continue to thrive. In other words, 
once a country emerges as a banking centre, “surplus” countries would have the 
incentive to place funds in it, reinforcing the centre’s supremacy. However, as 
suggested in Chapter 5, a shift to a new negative growth path could occur due to a 
strong shock which reverses the flow of savings or due to a series of small shocks that 
decrease the attractiveness of the centre over time.
A careful examination of the balance sheet of various financial systems shows that 
banking systems can be divided into four categories according to their net position 
against the rest of the world (Eaton, 1994). On the liabilities side, the bank can be net 
borrower or net depositor abroad. On the asset side, the banking system can be net 
borrower or net lender. Based on these categories, we can classify banking systems 
into banking centres, inwards transformer, outward transformers or dis-intermediators 
(Eaton, 1994). Banking centres play an important role in transfer of funds across 
regions. They attract funds from non-resident depositors (mainly through the 
interbank market) and extend loans to non-resident borrowers. These centres are 
likely to emerge in regions with high investment opportunities. A dis-inteimediated
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banking system on the other hand channels deposits abroad and receives loans from 
abroad and hence part of its financial intermediation is being performed abroad. 
Between these two extremes, an outward transformer channels deposits and extends 
loans abroad while the inward transformer attracts both foreign deposits and loans 
(Eaton, 1994). The outward transformer is likely to develop in regions where there are 
excess savings and no investment opportunities due to low absorptive capacity while 
inward transformers are likely to emerge in economies with large investment 
opportunities.
This chapter makes the additional contribution of explaining the above categories by 
taking the analysis one step further. Specifically, we examine the evolution of cross 
border flows where by evolution we mean, that starting from a position where a 
financial intermediary finances both domestic and foreign production, the 
intermediary can evolve and specialise in foreign or domestic funding. In our model, 
crucial for the evolution of foreign and domestic financial intermediation is 
transferability of knowledge related to real production which implies the possibility of 
applying local investment opportunities abroad and vice-versa. Based on 
transferability of knowledge, it is possible to identify three possible processes of cross 
border flows. In case of complete transferability of knowledge by which the domestic 
country and foreign country grow at the same rate, both types of lending activity tend 
to co-exist. In other words, the intermediary would finance both domestic and foreign 
production. This situation can go on indefinitely as long as the economy is not saving 
constrained. On the other hand, when transferability of knowledge is incomplete, a 
financial intermediary specialises in funding one country. As a result, two extreme 
cases can emerge such that the financial intermediary either supports domestic
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production (an extreme case of an inward transformer where the intermediary 
transforms all foreign inflows into domestic loans) or foreign production (an extreme 
case of an outward transformer where the intermediary transforms all inflows and 
large part of its domestic savings into foreign loans).
This chapter is important for two main reasons. First, it tries to explore theoretically 
the links between a banking centre’s development and evolution and the economic 
performance of regional economies. Some economists have suggested that these links 
exist, but they do not provide any theoretical or empirical evidence on this matter 
(Byrant, 1987).1 Second, this chapter analyses the role of these centres in terms of 
balancing savings and investment across geographical countries or regions, an 
important aspect of financial centres which was not discussed explicitly before. 
Previously, the main focus was on identifying the major processes responsible for 
agglomeration and dispersion of financial activity, but no attempt was made to 
analyse the role of these centres. This chapter sets the necessary conditions under 
which a certain country can perform the regional or international role of balancing 
savings and investment across countries. It also proposes an alternative way at 
looking at emergence which is not based on static comparative advantage or the 
concept of locational advantage of MNC theory, but on a broad concept of economies 
of scale. This allows us to explore some interesting features related to financial 
centres some of which have been emphasised in previous chapters such as 
agglomeration effects in financial activity.2
1 Empirical evidence on these links is the subject of the next chapter.
2 It is important to note that modelling techniques used in this chapter are quite different from previous 
ones. This has to do with the different nature o f  issues We are dealing with. While in previous chapters 
the focus has been on agglomeration and dispersion forces, the focus o f this chapter is on emergence 
and evolution of financial centres. Since our story o f emergence is based on economies o f scale and 
comparative advantage, it is very useful to resort to the insights of trade theory.
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This chapter is divided into three parts. Section 2 discusses the emergence of financial 
centres while section 3 analyses its evolution. The last section contains my 
conclusion.
7.2 The Benchmark Model
The aggregate economy consists of a continuum mass of h regions, each has a 
population constituted by a continuum of mass / of three period living agents and a 
continuum of firms distributed on a segment of size H. Each agent has an endowment 
of labour equal to 1. Therefore, aggregate labour equals /. The agent supplies labour at 
period one, gets paid a wage w at period two which is deposited at the bank and 
consumes his income and the return on the deposits in the third period. Each firm has 
access to Mt varieties of investments.3 Each investment requires one unit of physical 
capital and each project has a certain return R> 1 after one period. These firms do not 
have any endowment and therefore fund these investment projects via borrowing. 
Firms operate under perfect competition which implies that each firm makes zero 
profits. Due to the existence of capital market imperfections, which implies a non- 
convex financial transaction technology, borrowing is guaranteed by a single 
intermediary (a bank) which operates as a monopolist pooling savings in the form of 
deposits and issuing loans to firms (Diamond, 1984).4 Note that we assume free entry 
in the financial sector so that the bank operates at zero profits.5 We assume that the
3 M{ measures technical knowledge. Note that to each element of M ,, there corresponds a variety of 
investment opportunity. This is consistent with the standard interpretation provided in the horizontal 
product variety expansion models of endogenous growth (Romer, 1990).
4 In Diamond’s model (1984) for instance, the monitoring activity of the bank reveals information 
which is a public good. Efficiency requires that only one lender (a bank) will perform the monitoring 
activity on behalf o f all other lenders (the depositors). The ability of banks to hold very large portfolios 
eliminates the risk o f bankruptcy and hence solves the problem of “monitoring the monitor”.
5 To keep things as simple as possible, we model the credit market as monopolistic one with free entry. 
Monopoly is sustainable in the long run equilibrium if potential entrants do not have enough market to 
make sufficient profits to compete with the monopoly bank in the market for labour. Specifically, the 
monopoly bank hires workers at time t and commit itself to pay a salary wt. If another bank wishes to
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bank can select only one location. In this case, it is optimal for the bank to locate at 
the midpoint of the segment where it can serve both sides of the market.
7.2.1 The Lending Technology
The lending technology implies that in order to channel funds to firms a positive 
amount of physical resources equal to c = c (zt,l) < 1 per firm i, with ie[0, Mt]  plus a 
fixed amount C are consumed when funds are channelled towards production.6 The 
fixed cost C reflects the existence of economies of scale in intermediation. Note that zt 
is the distance between the location of the bank relative to the firm. We assume c (zt,l) 
is increasing in zt because information quality decays with distance (Sussman, 1993),7 
and decreasing in the amount of labour (/) used by the bank.
7.2.2 Agent’s Behaviour
At each time t, young agents who are paid a salary wt, save via deposits. Deposits are 
paid a rate of return r. As an alternative to deposits, wt can be saved in a safe storage 
technology with a gross return equal to p. It naturally emerges that in order to have 
financial intermediation, r>  p  must hold.
enter the market, it has to commit itself to repay a salary w,. If as a result o f the structure of the 
economy, the entrant bank can not make enough profits to pay w„ then workers who are perfectly 
rational will judge the promise o f the potential entrant as not credible, thereby staying employed where 
they are.
6 Note that c(..) here refers to the costs involved in lending or intermediation technology in general. It is 
possible to be more specific about the nature of these costs. For instance, these costs could correspond 
to monitoring costs as in Diamond’s model or simply costs involved in information gathering about 
different project. For simplicity, we refer to c(..) as the lending technology.
7 z, can be interpreted in terms o f spatial factors or in terms of variety o f investment opportunities. In 
the latter case, the assumption about the cost structure reflects economics o f specialisation. For
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7.2.3 The Closed Regional Economy
We first describe the macroeconomic equilibrium of each region i as a closed 
economy. Specifically, we establish a relationship between the rate of return on 
savings and the efficiency of financial intermediation and the level of technical 
knowledge.
Revenues associated with Mt investments are MtR. In order to run Mt investments, the 
intermediary requires [7+ Mt + C units of funds, and I units of labour. Total 
cost is then equal to payments to savers which equal to r[7+ c(.,.)] Mt + rC plus 
payments to labour, lwt+i. Then assuming c (zt,l) = aztTa where a is a direct measure 
of financial efficiency, the profits over a mass zt can be written as follows8:
7T, = 2 J[* -  * 1  + a Z, n \ M ,  d z - r C - l  Wm (1)
0
The intermediary chooses zt and I in order to maximise profits. The first order 
conditions associated with this maximisation problem are:
[R-r] Mt =Mt (aztr a) r ; (zt > 0) (l.a)
wt+I -  ra l~ a'} azt2Mt ; (I > 0) (1 .b)
The last condition implies that the level of wages paid to labour depend positively on 
the amount of investment funded by the intermediary, ztMt.9
instance, the bank may have better information about certain entrepreneurs due to past relationship and 
hence it is the less costly for that bank to fund that particular firm.
8 Note that for the ease of exposition, we drop region index i .
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Then using the free entry condition together with the above expression we have10:
zt = fC a ta/ M /1-a)] Vl + a  (2.a)
( i - a ) r a-}
where z* is the optimal mass of firms funded by the intermediary11 and / is the amount 
of labour in the economy.
We also derive the rate of return on savings guaranteed by the intermediary,
r = R (1-a)________ (3)
1 + [CaVa /  Mt(l-a)]
Notice that both zt and r depend positively on the efficiency of the financial 
technology (summarised by parameter a)12, labour employed by the bank (I), and the 
level of technical knowledge, M t.
9
In other words, the marginal productivity o f labour is a linear function o f the level o f technical 
knowledge.
10 Substituting for wt+11 = r az2, 1 aM,  (using l.a) and [R-r] Mtz, = M, (az,2r a)  r (using l.b) into the 
profit function and imposing 7it= 0, we find:
[R-r] M,zt ( l - a ) - C r  = 0
Then using the fact that zt-  (R-r) /  a r l 'a'1 which follows from the FOC associated with the choice of zt 
(l.b) and substituting again in the above equation we obtain:
r = R (1-a)___________
1 + [C a ta /  M ,(l-a)] Vl
Then, substituting r back into the expression of zt, we obtain:
zt = fC a ta /  M / l - a ) ] 1/3 + a  
(l-'cc)ra
11 Note that in equilibrium, the optimal level o f z, selected by the bank provides a measure of the mass
z
of firms which are funded in the economy. Specifically, 2 |1  d t  =  2z f is the total mass o f firms funded.
0
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7.2.4 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Financial centres play an important role in balancing saving and investment across 
geographical regions (Kindleberger, 1974). In order to explore fully this aspect of 
financial centres, we need to examine macroeconomic equilibrium in different 
regions. Investment activity in each region implies ~2 zlMt]3, Gross savings (St) are 
given by the total income of young agents, wtl = z2lt.} raba aMt,i. A fraction c( o f  
gross savings, plus C is consumed in the process of channelling funds towards 
investment. Therefore, net savings channelled toward investment can be expressed by:
Sf( — Wtl - az}TaMt ~ C
Or
S t = a la (z2it.j r ccMt.} - z tM 0 ~ C  (4)
Where St denotes net savings. Comparing It with Sh it emerges that in order for 
investment and savings to be equal, the following equality has to hold:
1 = aVa Iz2 i r aM,., -  z, Mf) -  C (5)
2z‘M ,
This inequality however need not hold at each point in time. For each single region i, 
investment opportunities imply a demand for funds which can be higher, equal to or 
lower than the amount of savings. In particular, whenever 1 <\aTa (z2lt.j r aMt.i -  zt 
M,) -  C]/ 2zl M\ holds, savings are more than what is necessary to fund all investment 
opportunities in the region’s economy. This means that the intermediary is not
12 Notice that a could reflect effeiency due to the tax and regulatory structures. That is to say that 
countries with less regulation and lower taxes could offer a higher rate o f return on savings.
13 Since each entrepreneur has access to Mt investments with each one requiring one unit of capital, 
then 2z ,M, is the total amount of resources required to fund the total mass o f investments in the 
economy.
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constrained in its decision about zt , i.e. z, — zl where z' is the optimal level of z, chosen 
by the intermediary.
Whenever the reverse inequality holds, i.e., whenever 1 > [al'a (z2lt.i r aMt.j -  zt Mt) -  
C]/ 2z A ft regional savings are not enough to fund all investment opportunities. In this 
case, the regional economy is financially constrained.
7.2.5 Financial Centre Lending Activity
We consider here a case in which one region could act as a banking centre, pooling 
funds from the region in which savings are greater than investment opportunities and 
potentially channelling funds to the region in which savings are lower than investment 
opportunities. Let us interpret regions as distinct countries. We assume that the one 
country’s intermediary faces no constraints in the amount of savings so that it can 
optimally select the amount of investment activity both in the foreign and domestic 
economy. Furthermore, we assume that as the financial intermediary starts operating 
in the foreign country, it exports the amount of technical knowledge, Mu already 
available in the domestic economy.14 We also differentiate between domestic lending 
activity which requires lx of labour and foreign lending activity which requires P of 
labour and such that I =P + P.
Assuming that lending technology in the foreign region implies a variable cost
c (zti I) = bztr a, the profit function for the country’s intermediary can be written as
follows:
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z i i J  • zl i a  J  • * •
m = 2^R - r^Mtdz+  I  [ /  “ rW  dz~ 2\(rMtax l ) d z - 2 J (''Mt az{ l~ a)dz- rC~Mt-Al “ w + l /
The profit function is the same one as before, but it takes into account the lending 
activity in the foreign region. The banking centre chooses the optimal quantities of 
labour to be used in the domestic (foreign) financial activity /' (/■“) and the amount of 
investments to be funded in the domestic (foreign) economy zl (2/) in order to 
maximise the above. The set of first order conditions is:
[  Rl - r] M } = M l (razi f  'a) 
[ t f - r ]  M i = M i (rbzJi  t  ~a) 
w,+i=r a a M i z ! 2f  
wt+, = r a b  MJ, z{2 f
After some manipulations, we can write:
z i  =  F R - r l  f  a 
ra
z{ = [ R - r l  F a 
rb
M i z i 2 i ^ =  M / z i 2 r a-i
Then,
14 It follows from this assumption that the level o f technical knowledge is the same in both economies. 
This assumption is made for simplification. We could obtain the same results even if  only a fraction of
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zl mb (i/iT
zJt a
m ! z! 2,  (i/f)-a-’ =Xi (Z[ /z{)2 
M{ z{2
Where x, = Ml / Ml. Substituting the latter equation into the former, we get:
(i/f)  a'! =x,(b/a)2
and using the fact that I = /  + l\ we find
2 7 i / i - a
t  = / n/x, (a/b)21 m-a (5)
1 + [1/x, (a/b)2]  m 'a
which shows that f  is decreasing in xt.
To calculate the equilibrium expression for both z' j !  and r we use the no profit 
condition to obtain:
r = R \z/*Xt+ z(* 1 (1-a)_____
C/M l + (z1\ t+z/*)(l-a)
the technology is transferred.
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z{ - C f a /  aa
z{ = C P*a /  ab
7.2.6 Endogenous Emergence o f Financial Centres 
Consider the expression for r obtained in the previous section:
r = R \zt*Xt+ z{* 1 (1-a)______
C/ Mt + (ztl*xt+ zJt *) (1-a)
Substituting the equilibrium values for z/ and z(* , r can be expressed as follows:
r = R \ (C f  a/aa)  + (C f  a /  ab)} (1-a) (6)
a  M} + \ ( C f  a/aa)  + ( C f * /  ab)] (1-a)
For a given distribution of labour, it follows that r depends only on M,1 given the 
values of R, a, and b. In particular, it can be easily verified that the higher is M} , the 
higher is r. This relationship provides the basic insight for our story of emergence as 
we demonstrate below.
For simplicity, we assume that a — b -  k . Then, from the equilibrium equation for /' 
and it follows that /' = f  =1/2}5 The expression of r can be therefore written as:
f  = R frc/a) + (Cfa)l la/2k (1-a)
C/M! + [(C/a) + (C/a)] la/2k (1-a)
15 Since /' + 1 =/ and given that /' = f, then /' = F -1/2.
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It is clear from this expression that rl is an inverse function of k and C/ Mi . The 
coefficient k can be thought of as a parameter which measures efficiency of financial 
intermediation across the h economies: the lower is k, the higher is efficiency. The 
ratio C/ M i reflects the existence of economies of scale in financial activity. Given 
that each firm requires one unit of capital, and given the equilibrium values of zi* and 
z f ,  the overall mass of investments funded by the centre which also reflects the 
overall level of financial activity of a potential financial centre is given by: M{ (zi* + 
zj*). As such, Mt can be thought as a measure of the scale of financial activity.
Assume that countries can be ranked according to k. Thus, to each country there 
corresponds a different level of efficiency i.e. a different value of k. Given that r is a 
positive function of Mti therefore, we can specify a value of M, call it M* such that 
the country with the most efficient financial intermediary (i.e. with the lowest k) could 
become a financial centre because it can offer foreign depositors a rate of return r > p, 
i.e. a rate of return at least equal to p  which is the return on storage technology 
available to savers who can not save via domestic deposits in each of the other h 
economies. We label the most efficient country as country i. Note that countries with 
less efficient financial intermediary could also emerge as financial centres if they are 
able to attract a critical mass of foreign savings, although in order for emergence to 
occur the critical mass of savings needed is higher than that associated with country i.
In this model, despite its efficiency, country i does not automatically emerge as a 
financial centre. It emerges only under the following condition. The critical value M* 
indicates that country i emerges as a financial centre if it can fund an amount of 
domestic investment activity at least equal to z{M* plus an amount of investment
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activity in the foreign country equal to z/M*. In order to meet this scale, two 
conditions are required:
(i) Sufficiently large demand for loans i.e. the mass of investments to be funded,
2Mt (ztl* + z f )  has to be sufficiently high, i.e. Mt (z/* + zj*) > (ztlM*+ z{M*);
(ii) Sufficiently high demand for deposits, i.e. the mass of savings that the 
potential financial centre is able to pool has to be at least equal to 2(zt’M*+ 
z}M*).
The two above conditions are two demand-side conditions which have to be satisfied 
in order for a specific country’s financial system to emerge as a financial centre.
Assuming condition (i) is satisfied,16 then two different scenarios emerge:
Either
(i) Country i has enough domestic savings to fund 2(z/M* + zf M*) investment 
projects.
Or
(ii) Country i does not have enough domestic savings to fund 2(z/M* + zf M*) 
investment projects.
In case (i), country i could emerge as a centre since it can attract deposits from other 
countries and channel part of its savings to fund investment in foreign countries while 
offering a rate of return r higher than the opportunity cost for savers in countries with 
surplus of funds. In this case, there is no indeterminacy. We can perhaps think of this
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situation as corresponding to examples of international financial centres such as New 
York, Tokyo, and London (at the beginning of this century) which emerged as centres 
for the rest of the world as a consequence of the size of their economies. In fact, this 
may explain “why the four largest international financial centres (London, New York, 
Tokyo and Paris) are also financial centres of four out of the five largest economies” 
(Grilli, 1989).
More specifically, given the level of technical knowledge Ml, country i has a level of 
aggregate net savings equal to:
s', = aTa (z2t,., r aM,.j -  z , M J - C
The mass of funds required to fund the aggregate domestic and foreign level of 
investment activity is:
J i+y = 2( i  + i )  Mi
As long as I  > S ,, country i is in a position to attract foreign funds from the other h 
countries. The portion 5<1 of the total mass of countries which channel funds to the 
centre is:
)sl,pdj = f J
16 In case of small open economies such as Hong Kong, the large demand for funds is likely to come 
from its regional economies, which suggests that there exist few links between the banking centre and 
the economies of the region. These links are explored empirically in the next chapter.
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Where for each country j  e[0,h], Sf(p = S1] - • According to our simplifying
assumption, the above equation indicates that these countries channel an amount of 
savings through the banking centre equal to the amount of savings which are not 
invested in local production activity.
7.2.7 Indeterminacy
Differently from the situation just described, in case (ii) where country i does not have 
enough funds to finance the critical amount M* of investment opportunities, the 
emergence of country i as a financial centre is not straightforward. In fact, country i 
can not offer a rate of return to savers higher than the opportunity cost p. However, 
country i is still in a position to pay r > p  if it can attract sufficient funds from a 
number of foreign countries. This requires some sort of co-ordination. Unless a large 
number of countries agree to channel their savings through a certain country, the 
possibility of emergence becomes remote. However, there is no mechanism to trigger 
such collective action. Therefore, there is a clear indeterminacy case due to what we 
can describe as a co-ordination failure problem. This generates the possibility of 
multiple equilibria.
One important implication from this analysis is that it is not true that the country with 
the most efficient financial intermediary (i.e. country z) will emerge as a banking 
centre. To put it differently, efficiency in this model does not determine emergence. 
This is in contrast with the existing literature which explains emergence in terms of 
static comparative (or absolute) advantage only. A country with less efficient 
financial intermediary could also emerge as a regional centre if it is able to attract the 
critical mass of foreign savings, although in order for emergence to occur the amount
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of savings needed is higher than that required by country i. It follows from this 
analysis that explaining the geographical location of centres is not straightforward. 
For instance, factors such as chance or first mover advantage rather than efficiency 
may have contributed greatly to the emergence of centres. In fact, many economists 
tend to argue that the distribution of economic activity is probably close to 
indeterminate, so the location of economic hot spots is largely a matter of historical 
accident.
7.2.8 Agglomeration Effect
Suppose that as M{ grows, I  t+J‘ grows faster than Sd't. Then country i has to attract 
funds from a higher mass of foreign countries. But being a financial centre already, 
country i, by definition, has the ability to offer a level of r such that all foreign 
countries have an incentive to fund it. Therefore, new countries will join the mass 5h 
up to a portion cf>t> such that S51 ~ I ‘+J. This suggests that a reinforcing mechanism, 
similar to the one described in chapter 5, is at work here. In particular, once a region 
has established itself as a centre, it will continue to attract newcomers unless a strong 
shock occurs that reverses the flow of savings.
7.3 Dynamics of Cross Border Lending Activity
We move the analysis one step further and examine the evolution of cross border 
lending. By evolution we mean that starting from a position where a financial 
intermediary funds both domestic and foreign production, the intermediary can evolve 
and specialise only in funding one region. This analysis would help us establish what 
are the main factors that determine the nature of the banking system.
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We assume that Mt+j1 — g  ( Ml) and Mt+jJ' = / ( Ml), with g ' ( .) , /" ( .)  >0, Where M t' 
is the level of technical knowledge developed in country i at time t.11 Then, whenever 
Ml and M l grow at different rates, i.e. g' (.) ^  /'(•)>  the country which initially 
performs external lending activity is subject to a polarisation process by which it 
either performs foreign financial activity only without supporting domestic production 
(the extreme case of an outward transformer) or supports local financing activity (the 
extreme case of an inward transformer). Crucial to this polarisation process is 
international transferability of knowledge.18 If knowledge Mt is perfectly transferable 
from one country to another, then whatever the functions g(.) and /(.) are, 
technological spillovers would lead to a situation in which the level of M  in both 
regions, at period t+1,  will be equal to the maximum between / ( M l )  and g(M l), i.e. 
Ml = Ml = max (/(Ml), g(Mtl)) where /(M l) and g(Mtl)  represent the levels of local 
knowledge developed as a consequence of local production technology. In this case, jtt 
stays constant over time so that the financial intermediary would support both 
domestic and foreign production. This situation carries on indefinitely provided that 
the international intermediary is not saving constrained. Conversely, when knowledge 
is not completely transferable, at each time (t+1), the level of knowledge available in 
both regions will depend on the level of Mt of the region even after accounting for 
spillover effects. Therefore, the ratio xe = M l/ Ml will stay constant if and only if 
g ( ) = / ( ) .  When /(.) •> §(•)> goes to infinity and as a consequence P goes to zero 
(Equation 5), such that the financial intermediary becomes an inward transformer. In
17 We assume that in general Mt+1 -  f(M„ 2z) where 2z is the equilibrium mass o f firms funded by the 
bank. Then as a particular case, we can analyse the linear case in which M,+i = z  M,. Then the growth 
rate is simply z-1. Note that this holds at the local level. When there is more than one country, the 
evolution o f knowledge depends on spillovers.
18 We assume that as the bank starts operating in the other region, all the technical knowledge is 
transferred there. However, this is not crucial a assumption and we could obtain the same results even 
if  a fr action of technology is transferred. What is important is that the subsequent evolution of the local
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the opposite case, t  goes to zero such that the intermediary becomes an outward 
transformer.19
This discussion can be formalised in the following proposition.
Proposition i f  technology is perfectly transferable, the financial intermediary 
does not specialise completely, i.e. foreign and domestic financial activities 
co-exist. When technology is not perfectly transferable, spillover effects do not 
prevent the polarisation o f financial activity.
In this section, we have analysed the evolution of financial centres and given a formal 
theoretical underpinning to previous chapters’ discussion of the nature of various 
banking systems. The theoretical discussion suggests that outward transformers are 
likely to emerge in international regions characterised by low investment 
opportunities and low growth rates. The best historical examples of such type of 
banking system are Beirut in the 50s and 60s and Bahrain in the 80s and 90s which 
emerged in a region characterised by low growth rates and limited investment 
opportunities. These centres channelled surplus savings from the Middle East region 
to Euromarkets which offered a higher rate of return on savings. On the other hand, 
regional banking centres and inward transformers are likely to emerge in regions 
characterised by high growth rates and large investment opportunities. Hong Kong
economy can be independent (at least partially) from the evolution o f the stock o f knowledge in the 
domestic economy. This depends on whether technological spillovers are perfect or not.
19 Notice that these channels work through wage discrepancy between foreign and domestic lending 
activity. If domestic knowledge grows more rapidly than foreign knowledge, given the distribution of 
labour between foreign and domestic lending activity, there will be a wage discrepancy in favour of 
labour employed in domestic lending activity. If this discrepancy persists over time due to differences 
in growth rates of regional knowledge, the intermediary would specialise completely in financing 
domestic production. The opposite holds when foreign knowledge grows more rapidly.
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and Singapore are good examples. These centres played an important role in 
channelling foreign funds to the economies in the region. Many banking systems in 
this region also acted as inward transformers attracting both deposits and loans from 
abroad.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter builds a model of emergence based on a combination of efficiency and 
economies of scale in intermediation. We show that in order for an international 
banking centre to emerge, two demand-side conditions must be met. On the one hand, 
the centre must be able to fund a critical mass of investment opportunities i.e. the 
centre must face a sufficiently large demand for loans. Given the small size of some 
of these centres’ economies, the domestic economy is unlikely to have sufficient 
investment opportunities to generate a sufficiently large demand for loans. Instead, 
the demand for loans usually arises from regional economies. Because of its 
geographical proximity and familiarity with the nature of the business in these 
economies, the regional centre is in a position to finance investment opportunities 
there. On the other hand, the centre must be able to attract sufficient savings to fund 
the critical mass of investment opportunities. Again, given the small size of the 
domestic banking centres’ economies, the centre is unlikely to be able to finance 
foreign operation from its domestic savings. Instead, the centre must attract sufficient 
funds from countries outside or inside the region. The model can also be used to 
analyse how the centre evolves over time. Specifically, we show that in the case of 
complete transferability of knowledge, domestic and cross-border lending activities 
tend to co-exist. In other words, the intermediary would finance both domestic and 
foreign production. On the other hand, when transferability of knowledge is
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incomplete, a financial intermediary specialises in that activity in which it is more 
efficient. As a result two extreme cases can emerge by which the financial 
intermediary either supports domestic production (an extreme case of an inward 
transformer where the intermediary transforms all foreign inflows into domestic 
loans) or foreign production (an extreme case of an outward transformer where the 
intermediary transforms all inflows into foreign loans).
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Chapter 8 - Banking Centres and Regional Links: Empirical Evidence
8.1 Introduction
The theoretical model in the previous chapter has stated a major condition for banking 
centres to emerge. Banking centres must face sufficiently large demand for loans in 
order for emergence to occur. Since many banking centres’ economies are relatively 
small, we would not expect local economies to generate sufficiently large demand for 
loans. Instead the demand for loans usually arises from the centre’s neighbouring 
regional economies. Hence, we expect to find some links between a centre’s banking 
activity and regional economic activity.
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the links between Hong Kong’s banking 
development and regional economic activity. We explore this relationship by 
providing two pieces of empirical evidence. First, we examine the relationship 
between the number of banks in Hong Kong and regional trade (a proxy for regional 
economic activity). We expect the large number of banks in Hong Kong to be related 
not only to Hong Kong’s trade activity, but mainly to the region’s trade activity. In 
order to test for this hypothesis, we examine the determinants of banks’ location in a 
single financial centre. This approach has been applied to two markets, the US and the 
UK (Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Fisher and Molyneux , 1996). Since these studies 
deal with global financial centres rather than regional centres, we modify this 
approach to take into account the regional dimension of banking centres.
Second, in line with the existing empirical literature, we examine the relationship 
between financial and economic development in Hong Kong. Given that Hong Kong 
finances both domestic and regional activity, this relationship is not straightforward.
250
In particular, the various models aimed at assessing the contribution of the banking 
system to economic development are based on the assumption that the banking system 
is linked to the domestic economy (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Demetriades and 
Hussein, 1996). Although this feature characterises banking systems of most 
economies, there are some financial systems in the world that specialise also in 
financing foreign production and regional trade. This fact is likely to have a bearing 
on the relationship between economic and financial development.
One major feature of banking centres is the size of their banking system’s assets 
which is usually much larger than the size of their local economies. More importantly, 
the banking system is likely to be linked with its regional economies. Any empirical 
analysis that examines the relationship between financial and economic development 
must take into account these two important features. In order to do this, we need to 
distinguish between the level of development of the domestic banking system and that 
of the external banking system. We also need to introduce regional economic activity 
into the picture. We expect domestic lending activity to be linked with domestic 
economic activity, but not necessarily with regional activity. On the other hand, we 
expect external banking development of the centre to be linked with regional 
economic activity. Hence, we test for two related hypotheses. The first concerns the 
relationship between domestic economic and financial development. This is in line 
with the existing empirical literature on finance and development. The second 
hypothesis concerns the relationship between external lending and regional economic 
activity. These two hypotheses are tested jointly using cointegration analysis.
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This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2 examines the determinants of the 
number of foreign banks in Hong Kong. Section 3 examines the relationship between 
financial and economic development in the case of Hong Kong. Given that the size of 
the banking system is usually much larger than the size of the domestic economy and 
the possible links of the centre with the economies in the region, this relationship is 
not straightforward. We propose in this section a new method to examine such a 
relationship by differentiating the banking system into domestic and foreign as well as 
introducing an indicator of regional activity into the analysis. The last section contains 
my conclusions.
8.2 Determinants of Number of Foreign Banks in Hong Kong
8.2.1 Li ter a ture Review
Grosse and Goldberg’s study (1991) examines the major determinants of foreign bank 
presence in the US market. Two dependent variables are used to measure bank foreign 
presence: The value of foreign banks’ assets and the number of foreign bank offices in 
the United States. Cross-section and time-series data over the period 1980 to 1988 for 
35 countries were pooled and the data set was estimated by ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). The authors argue that with such a short time period, the assumption that the 
model’s parameters are fixed over time and over country is reasonable. Because the 
source country may have some unique features that affect their banking presence in 
the US market, a least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model was also tested.
The independent variables included in the equation are foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio investment into the US; the size of the banking system in the 
country of origin; a measure of risk and a measure of geographical proximity. FDI is
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used to test for the hypothesis that foreign banks follow their “home” borrowers who 
have expanded in the US market. “Follow the clientele” hypothesis suggests that 
banks follow their main borrowers abroad in order to defend their market share from 
domestic and other foreign banks. Hence, it is expected that the higher the level of 
foreign investment from the origin country to the US, the greater is the presence of 
banks from the source country in the US. In a similar vein, banks establish in the US 
in order to service the needs of importers and exporters who undertake trade activities 
in the US market. The provision of trade-related financial services provide banks with 
an important source of income in terms of fees and interest payments. Hence, 
countries with larger trade relations with the US tend to have larger number of foreign 
bank offices in the US market.
The size of the banking system in the country of origin is expected to affect the 
volume of financial activity and number of offices in the US. Hence, Grosse and 
Goldberg (1991) expect that the largest financial centres outside the US, mainly the 
United Kingdom, Japan and Germany are likely to have a high presence in the US 
market.
A measure of country risk of the country of origin is included to test the hypothesis 
that banks operating in less stable financial markets tend to establish in the more 
stable US market. That is to say that riskier countries are likely to have higher 
presence in the US market. The authors recognise however that banks with poor credit 
rating could find it difficult to maintain overseas offices. In particular, since overseas 
offices are likely to have a heavy exposure to the head office, they may find it
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difficult to raise funds abroad. This implies that banks from more stable countries are 
likely to have higher presence in the US market.
Finally, geographical distance is included in the equation to examine the impact of 
geographical proximity to the US market on foreign banking presence. The authors 
suspect that countries closer to the US are likely to have a higher presence in the US 
since it is less costly for these banks to establish in the US market. Furthermore, it is 
likely for these banks to be more familiar with the US market. On the other hand, 
banks require some form of foreign presence in order to provide services to their 
clients and hence more distant countries are likely to have higher presence in the US 
market. Because of these two competing effects, the authors do not assign any a-priori 
sign to this relationship.1
Since the independent variables did not show signs of high multicollinearity all the 
independent variables were included in estimation.2 The empirical results indicate that 
the higher the level of foreign direct and portfolio investment in the US, the higher the 
volume of trade in the US, and the larger the size of the financial sector in the country 
of origin, the greater is the foreign presence from that country in the US. The study 
also indicates that the greater the riskiness of the source country, the more likely that 
these banks would expand their activities in the relatively less risky US market. 
However, the coefficient on this variable was significant only in one specification and
1 Both exports and imports were used to measure the volume of trade. The size o f the financial sector 
was proxied by the total demand plus time deposits. The country risk measure was obtained from the 
Institutional Investor magazine. The countries are ranked according to a scale from 1 to 100 with 100 
indicating a very low risk country. The geographical proximity is measured by the number o f miles 
between the country o f origin and any o f the following three cities: New York, San Francisco and 
Houston. The number of miles to the closest city is chosen.
2 Given that Japanese banks account for a large share of foreign banking activity in the US, the original 
equations were re- estimated excluding Japan from the data set in order to check for the robustness of  
the estimated equations.
254
hence it is not possible to reach definite conclusions regarding this variable. The 
authors argue that this may be due to the measure of risk used (the Institutional
*■ • * 3Investor series) which does not capture precisely the relative riskiness of countries. 
Finally, the results indicate that the further the source country from the US, the greater 
the foreign presence from that country. However, it is important to note that this result 
is not robust to all specifications.
Fisher and Molyneux (1996) apply the same method to examine the major 
determinants of foreign bank presence in London. The specification in Fisher and 
Molyneux’s study differs slightly from that of Grosse and Goldberg (1991). The 
authors argue that the use of banks’ foreign assets as a dependent variable is naturally 
biased towards large banks. As a consequence, regressions that utilise this measure as 
a dependent variable may be only explaining the decision of large banks to establish 
overseas offices in London. One way to overcome this problem is to use the number 
of offices which captures the influence of small banks represented in London.4 In 
addition to the number of foreign offices in London, the authors use the number of 
staff of banks represented by country of origin.5 Furthermore, the authors make use of 
an additional independent variable: foreign direct investment out of the UK into the 
source country. The variable is included to test for the hypothesis that some foreign 
banks are likely to move into the UK in order to provide services to those 
corporations which have undertaken investments in its country.
3 The authors do not explain why the Institutional Investor risk indices are not able to capture precisely 
the relative country risk.
4 It should he noted however that the number o f offices might understate the importance of large 
foreign banks operating in London.
5 This measure is subject to the same problem as foreign banks’ assets since it gives greater weight to 
large banks.
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Cross-section and time-series data over the period 1980-1989 for 66 countries were 
pooled and the model was estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The results of 
the regression are in accord with Grosse and Goldberg’s study. The study indicates 
that bilateral trade, market size, country risk and geographical distance are the major 
determinants of banking activity in the UK. However, unlike Grosse and Goldberg's 
study, foreign direct investment indicators are not significant in explaining foreign 
banking presence in London. When the number of employees is used as a dependent 
variable, foreign investment out of the UK becomes significant, but again foreign 
direct investment into the UK is insignificant. The authors argue that this finding 
indicates that UK foreign investment abroad increases employment of foreign banks 
which benefit from this investment, but does not necessarily attract other foreign 
banks whose countries do not entice UK foreign investment.
The authors evaluate the robustness of their results by dividing the sample into two 
subgroups: European presence (EC) and all-countries’ presence minus the US and 
Japan (ALL).6 Focusing on the number of firm’s equation, only the coefficients on 
size of home country bank and country risk7 are consistent with the original 
specification. The significance and the sign of other variables alter significantly. For 
instance, in both sub-groups, FDI into the UK is found to have a significant positive 
impact on the number of offices and number of bank staff in London. On the other 
hand, the coefficient on foreign investment out of the UK becomes negative and 
highly significant suggesting that multinationalisation of UK companies may have a 
negative impact on the number of offices and bank staff in London. Surprisingly, the 
impact of trade is found to have a negative impact on foreign offices and the number
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of bank staff in London. Finally, the coefficient on distance is positive and significant 
in the ALL equation and negative and significant in the EC equation. The authors 
argue that the unstable sign on the distance variable may be due to the working of the 
two competing effects discussed previously.
Despite these mixed results, Fisher and Molyneux (1996) conclude that the size of the 
banking sector in the country of origin, trade relations and foreign direct investment 
from European and non US-Japanese sources are important determinants of foreign 
bank offices and foreign bank employees in London. The authors also conclude that 
banks in less stable countries are likely to have higher presence in the London market.
8.2.2 Foreign Bank Activity in Hong Kong
This section applies a similar method to examine the determinants of the number of 
foreign bank offices in Hong Kong. However, unlike the studies reviewed above, this 
thesis attempts to test few hypotheses related to banking centres, in particular the 
hypothesis that the large number of foreign banks can not be explained by the level of 
trade activity of the exporting country with Hong Kong alone, but with the region as a 
whole. The decision to establish in Hong Kong and not in any other centre can be 
explained by the relative efficiency and openness of the Hong Kong financial system.
Table 1 presents some evidence on the importance of foreign bank presence in Hong 
Kong. In 1990, 213 of the top 500 banks in the world had a physical presence in Hong 
Kong. This number increased to 236 in 1994 and declined to 215 in 1997. These
6 Since Japan and the US have a large number of foreign banks in London, it would useful to examine 
the impact of the exclusion of these countries on the regression results.
7 In the EC equations, the country risk index becomes insignificant.
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figures may not necessarily reflect a decline in bank offices, but rather a change in the 
rank of international banks.
Table 8.1 - Presence of World’s Largest 500 2 Banks in Hong Kong
______________ _________ (End ofDecember 1997)_________________________
World Ranking 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
1-20 18 19 19 18 19 19 19 19
21-50 26 22 24 26 28 27 26 26
51-100 37 34 35 37 38 39 36 36
101-200 55 53 53 58 65 57 57 51
201-500 77 78 80 71 86 86 75 83
\Sub Total 213 206 211 210 236 228 213 215 |
Others 110 107 99 101 93 109 121 122
Total 323 313 310 311 329 337 334 337
Key:
(1) Top 500 banks in the world ranked by total assets less contra items.
(2) The figures exclude banks incorporated in Hong Kong 
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority Annual Report 1997
A broader measure is the number of overseas banks in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s 
financial system is made up of three different types of financial institutions: Licensed 
banks, Restricted License banks (RLBs) and Deposit-Taking Companies (DTCs). 
These are collectively known as authorised institutions under the Banking Ordinance. 
Licensed banks provide all types of financial services and are the only financial 
institutions that can offer current and saving accounts and accept deposits of any size 
and maturity. RLBs are mainly investment and merchant banks engaged in securities 
underwriting and capital market activities. RLBs can only accept deposits in large 
denominations (not less than HK$500,000). DTCs are mainly finance companies 
which engage in specialised activities such as consumer finance, small and medium 
companies finance, trade finance and securities business. DTCs can only accept 
deposits of $100,000 or larger with an original term of maturity of at least three 
months. Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong’s financial system is not differentiated in the 
sense that banks with licences can operate in the offshore and onshore market without 
any restrictions.
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By the end of 1996, 337 foreign banks had some form of representation in Hong 
Kong.8 Japan has by far the largest representation in Hong Kong. By the end of 1996, 
Japan had 92 banks, followed by China (35), Indonesia (20) and South Korea (19). 
Germany has the largest European representation in Hong Kong (16), followed by 
France and the UK (12). The presence of US banks in the Hong Kong market is also 
substantial with a total of 32 bank offices. Notice that despite Hong Kong’s success in 
attracting a large number of bank from all over the world, Asian banks constitute the 
largest share of the HK market (about 70%) in terms of the number of overseas banks. 
This reflects in a sense the regional nature of Hong Kong’s banking market.
Table 8.2 - Foreign Banks in Hong Kong by country of Origin (end o f1996)
License
Banks
Restricted License Deposit Taking 
Banks Companies
Total Number o f  Banks 
in Hong Kong
Australia 4 0 0 4
China 18 3 14 35
India 4 0 3 7
Indonesia 3 1 16 20
Japan 46 11 35 92
Malaysia 3 2 3 8
Pakistan 1 0 2 3
Philippines 2 1 6 9
Singapore 6 2 2 10
South Korea 3 6 10 19
Thailand 1 4 1 6
Vietnam 0 0 I 1
Austria 2 0 0 2
Belgium/Luxembourg 3 0 0 3
Denmark 1 0 1 2
France 9 3 4 16
Germany 10 1 1 12
Italy 6 0 0 6
Netherlands 3 2 0 5
Spain 3 0 0 3
Sweden 2 0 0 2
Switzerland 3 1 0 4
UK 7 4 1 12
Bahrain 1 0 1 2
UAE 0 1 1 2
Canada 6 1 1 8
USA 14 11 7 32
South Africa 0 3 1 4
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority Annual Report 1997
8 The main objective o f this section is to explain the major determinants of bank offices in terms of 
bilateral and regional trade. Given that there are no restrictions on banks’ funding activity and no 
restrictions on any type o f banks when dealing with non-resident borrowers, the focus should be on 
total number of banks rather than only on one type of banks.
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The regional role of Hong Kong becomes more evident when we examine the external 
position of Hong Kong’s financial system against geographical regions. In 1997, net 
external claims against Asia and the Pacific vis-a-vis all sectors amounted to HK$ 550 
billion. The bulk of net external claims are against Japan, China, South Korea and 
Thailand. It is interesting to note that Japan is the major supplier of funds to banks in 
Hong Kong. These funds are mainly intermediated through the interbank market. 
Despite this fact, Hong Kong still has a total net claims of HK$229 billion against 
Japan. This position is achieved through lending heavily to non-bank customers in 
Japan. In a sense, there is a circular flow of funds by which Hong Kong attract funds 
from Japan through the interbank market and then re-lends these funds to Japanese 
non-bank customers. In the Asia and Pacific region, Singapore and to a lesser extent 
Macau and Vanuatu are net suppliers of funds to Hong Kong.9 Unlike the Japanese 
position, both banks and non-banks in these economies channel funds to Hong Kong.
9 The position o f Singapore against Hong Kong reveals two important facts. First, there is some sort of 
regional specialisation between the two centres each providing services to its neighbouring economies 
(Malaysia and Indonesia in the case o f Singapore and China, Japan and South Korea in the case of 
Hong Kong). Second, it seems that there is some sort of functional specialisation between the two 
centres with Singapore acting as a funding centre (attracting hinds to the region) while Hong Kong 
acting as an arrangement centre (arranging loans to the region). This functional specialisation may be 
the result of differences in regulatory environment during the 70's. Until the early 80's, Hong Kong 
imposed a withholding tax on interest income while banks' income from offshore operations was 
exempted from taxes. Singapore, on the other hand, did not impose any withholding tax, but 
maintained a 10% tax on banks' offshore income. Thus, a bank can minimise its tax liability by 
depositing funds in Singapore and arranging loans from Hong Kong. However, the complementarity 
between the two centres ceased to exist in 1982 when Hong Kong abolished its withholding tax on
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Table 8.3 -  Geographical Distribution of External Assets of Banks in Hong Kong vis-a- 
vis Banks and Non-Banks (end o f1997, in billions ofHK$)
Net claims on (Liabilities to) Banks Net claims on (liabilities to) non­
outside Hong Kong bank customers outside HK
Total net claims 
(liabilities)
Asia and Pacific -1105 1655 550
Japan -1288 1517 229
South Korea 54 53 107
Mainland China 47 54 101
Thailand 57 25 82
Australia 36 11 47
Indonesia 5 16 21
New Zealand 10 10 20
Taiwan 32 -15 17
Philippines 6 4 10
India 0 8 8
Malaysia -1 3 2
Vanuatu -4 -3 -7
Macau -15 -4 -19
Singapore -41 -25 -66
Others -4 0 -4
North America -16 27 11
Canada 4 14 18
United States -20 13 -7
Caribbean -69 -178 -247
Panama -1 18 17
Bahamas 14 0 14
Bermuda -1 5 4
Netherland Antilles 0 -57 -57
Cayman Islands -81 -122 -203
Others -2 -21 -23
Western Europe -276 -15 -291
Italy 1 7 8
Sweden 0 4 4
Switzerland 4 -1 3
Finland 0 1 1
Denmark -3 2 -1
Austria -9 0 -9
Germany -30 12 -18
Luxembourg -25 0 -25
Netherlands 10 -46 -36
Belgium -47 3 -44
France -65 5 -60
United Kingdom -105 -9 -114
Middle East -15 -2 -17
Bahrain -2 -1 -3
Saudi Arabia -3 0 -3
UAE -8 -1 -9
Others -2 -2 -4
Source: Monetary Authority of Hong Kong Annual Report 1997
foreign currency deposits. Singapore retaliated by abolishing taxes on income derived from the 
arrangement of syndicate loans in Singapore.
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The fact that the bulk of external liabilities and most of external claims are against 
economies in the region reflects the regional role of Hong Kong . In particular, Hong 
Kong plays an important role in channelling foreign capital to the region through 
arrangement, syndication and management of Eurocredits to Asia Pacific borrowers. 
Most of the capital is attracted from the western world. This can be seen by examining 
the position of banks in Hong Kong against the rest of the world. Western Europe, the 
Caribbean, and the Middle East are important net suppliers of funds to banks in Hong 
Kong. The Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom are by far the major supplier of 
funds to Hong Kong. 10 In Western Europe, France, Belgium and Netherlands are also 
important net suppliers of funds
2.3 Empirical Model, Method o f Estimation, Data and Empirical Results 
The main objective of this section is to examine empirically the major determinants of 
the number of foreign banks in Hong Kong. The general method used in this chapter 
is similar to that of Grosse and Goldberg (1991) and Fisher and Molyneux (1996) 
with few major differences. Unlike Gross et al (1991) who examine banks’ location in 
the world’s biggest and most dynamic economy, this chapter focuses on a small open 
economy. This difference has an important implication on the empirical model. For 
instance, the mere size of the US market is an attractive feature for a large number of 
banks. The US market provides foreign banks with profitable and risk diversification 
opportunities. Second, unlike Fisher et al* study (1996) which deals with a global 
centre, this study deals more with a regional centre. The regional aspect is important
10 This reflects the high interconnectedness among international financial centre’s and banking centre’s 
and among banking centre’s themselves. This may suggest that these centres are not competitors after 
all, but form a network aimed at expanding the circuit o f capital all over the globe giving banks 
opportunities to diversify their activities and minimise their tax structure.
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for explaining the major determinants of Hong Kong’s competitiveness as it may 
depend on the economic performance of the whole region rather than that of Hong 
Kong alone. This entails the use of a different list of independent variables. In 
particular, this section tests for the hypothesis that regional economic activity is the 
major determinant of the number of foreign offices in Hong Kong.
Empirical Model
Many empirical studies have suggested that trade activity is a major determinant of 
international banking activity. In fact, Chapter 6  shows that trade connections 
between economies are likely to cause banks to establish offices in each other’s 
jurisdiction. However, when examining banking centres, one additional insight must 
be taken into account. Because of its regional nature, banks tend to establish in Hong 
Kong in order to provide financial services for its regional clients rather than its Hong 
Kong clients. In other words, the number of banks is not determined by trade 
connections with Hong Kong alone, but rather by trade relations with the entire 
region. This has one important implication for the empirical model. Instead of using 
only a bilateral trade variable, a more broad measure of regional trade should also be 
included. Hence, two trade variables are included. The first is the level of exports 
between the home country and Hong Kong. This variable is the same one used in the 
reviewed studies. The additional trade variable is the level of exports between the 
home country and Asia and the Pacific region. Significant positive coefficients on 
both variables suggest that foreign banks provide services both for the local and 
regional economy. A positive significant coefficient on the latter suggests that banks 
establish in Hong Kong mainly to finance their regional operations.
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In addition to these variables, the thesis examines the impact of the rest of the 
explanatory variables suggested by Grosse and Goldberg’s study (1991). This allows 
us to draw comparisons with other papers. First, the market size of the source country 
is included to test for the hypothesis that countries with larger banking system are 
likely to have higher foreign presence in Hong Kong. The ratio of the total volume of 
demand and time deposits in the source country to GDP is used as a proxy for the size 
of the domestic banking system. Second, a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 
for the Asia - Pacific countries in included to test for the hypothesis that a banking 
centre is more likely to attract large number banks from regional economies. As 
Goldberg et al (1990) notes, it may be less costly for these banks to establish in the 
Hong Kong market or it may be the case that Asian banks are more familiar with 
Hong Kong market. Furthermore, as emphasised by Park (1982,1988) regional centres 
play an important role in regional payment clearing. This may be responsible for 
attracting banks to establish in regional centres. Finally, a measure of source country 
risk is included to test for the hypothesis that banks tend to diversify their activities 
into less risky markets. This may have some relevance for London, or US but not 
necessarily for Hong Kong, especially that many source countries (all developed 
countries and many Asian Countries) are less risky than Hong Kong. Hence, it is not 
expected for this variable to carry a negative sign or add any explanatory power to 
equation. The index for country risk used is the one suggested by the institutional 
investor magazine. 11 The table below describes the list of independent variables and 
data sources.
11 Due to data limitations, foreign investment related variables are not included in the equation.
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Table 8.4 - Description of Variables and Data Sources
Dependent Variable Proxy measures Sources
Foreign Bank Presence Number of Foreign Banks from 
Home country in Hong Kong
Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority Annual Reports, 
Various Issues
Independent Variables
Exports to Hong Kong Exports between source 
country and Hong Kong
IMF International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1997
Exports to Asian and Pacific 
region
Exports between source 
country and Asia
IMF International Financial 
Statistics Year Book, 1997
Source Country Market Size Total demand, savings and time 
deposits
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics, 
Various Issues
Source Country Risk Index of country risk Institutional Investor 
Magazine
Geographical Proximity A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for Asian and East 
Pacific countries and zero otherwise
Method o f Estimation
Data for the dependent and independent variables were collected for a sample of 28 
countries over the period 1990-1996 which gives us a maximum of 217 usable 
observations. This is compared to Fisher and Molyneux’s study which uses only 157 
observations and Grosse and Goldberg’s study which uses 228 observations in the 
final estimations. From all the countries that have some form of representation in 
Hong Kong, only South Africa and China were excluded from the data set. The 
former country was excluded due to data limitations while the latter was excluded 
since it was felt that Hong Kong and China should not be treated as two separate 
countries.
Since our data set contains only a few periods and relatively large cross section units, 
estimation techniques which focus on cross sectional variation or heterogeneity are 
more useful in this context (Greene, 1993).
However, this should not cause a major concern. However, many empirical studies (including mine in 
chapter 6) have shown that FDI is not a major determinant of the location of banks.
265
A basic regression model would take the following form:
y it =  a  +  (a i +  p x it +  Sit
Where x contains K regressors not including the constant term, s is the error term, 
and a  + ]u i is the individual effect specific to individual cross section unit, i. 12 If we 
make the assumption that parameters are fixed over time and across units, then OLS 
yields consistent and efficient estimates of a  and p. In this case, cross-section and 
time-series data are pooled and then the data set is estimated by ordinary least 
squares. However, it is possible that the source country may have some unique 
features that affect their banking presence in Hong Kong. In this case, it is important 
to capture the differences across units, otherwise OLS would not yield the most 
efficient estimates. One possible formulation is to assume that differences across units 
can be captured by the constant term. The least-square dummy variable (LSDV) 
model, which consists of running the original equation with dummy variables for each 
cross section unit, allows for such an exercise. The LSDV takes the following form
y = D a + Xp + e
Where D is the matrix of dummy variables with dimension of nT * n. It is possible to 
devise an F-test that compares the restricted sum and unrestricted residual sum of 
squares in order to test whether the constant terms are equal across units. Rejecting
12 The appropriate estimation procedure depends on the assumptions made about p i . If p; is assumed to 
be fixed, the model used is the least square dummy variable. On the other hand, if pj is assumed to 
have a random distribution, then the model used is the error component model.
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the null hypothesis that the constant terms are equal across units justifies the use of 
the LSDV model despite the fact that this model entails a loss in the degrees of 
freedom.
It is important to note that the above specification assumes that jLii are fixed. An 
alternative specification, the error component model, treats \i\ as random variables 
with E [ | L i j ]  = 0 and E[j_ij] = or2^ . If jij are random, then using the additional information 
increases the efficiency of the estimator. Hence, it is important that we choose the 
most efficient estimator. Given the nature of our data set, it is very reasonable to 
assume that p.* are fixed. As Greene (1993) notes, the random effect model is a 
reasonable approach when the sampled cross-sectional units are drawn from a large 
population. In this case, it is appropriate to consider the individual specific constant 
terms as randomly distributed. On the other hand, when the sample is exhaustive such 
that it includes all or most cross-sectional units, then the fixed effect model is more 
appropriate. Since our data set include all the countries that have overseas offices in 
Hong Kong, the fixed effects model seems appropriate. 13
In a recent work, Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue that pooled estimators may not 
produce consistent estimates. When the regressors are serially correlated, this is likely 
to produce serial correlation in the disturbances if the heterogeneity of the coefficients 
is assumed. As a result, the model may generate inconsistent estimates. However, this 
discussion is mainly applied in the context of dynamic models that include lagged
13 There is an additional reason for why the fixed effect model is more appropriate in this setting. Given 
that n is not sufficiently large, it is not possible to provide a reliable estimate o f cr2^  . As a consequence, 
the random effect model would yield inconsistent estimates (Judge et al, 1985). Furthermore, the 
Random effects model is based on the assumption that X and |ij are not correlated. If this assumption
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dependent variables which is not the case in our model. Interestingly, the authors find 
that cross-section regressions when based on time series averages do produce 
consistent estimates. In order to test for the robustness of the empirical results to the 
method of estimation, a cross sectional model based on time averages is also tested.
Model Specification and Regression Results
The basic model specification to be estimated is the following:
NOBy — ao + bj EXPy + 62 EXP{r + SIZE/ + £,•
Where NOBjj is the number of foreign offices from country i to Hong Kong ; EXPjj is 
the value of exports from country i to Hong Kong; EXPir is the value of exports from 
country i to the Asia - Pacific region minus exports to Hong Kong;14 Size is the size 
of the banking system in the country of origin proxied by the size of total deposits, e, 
is the error term.
Table 5 reports four different models of the major determinants of bank’s location in 
Hong Kong. In Model A, time series and cross section data are pooled and OLS 
procedure is applied. Both the US and UK studies reviewed above use this estimation 
procedure. The empirical results show that while regional export activity is an 
important determinant of the number of banks in Hong Kong, bilateral exports seem 
to have no significant impact. The size of the banking system in the country of origin 
also has a significant positive impact implying that countries with large financial
does not hold, then the Random effect model would result in biased estimates. On the other hand, the 
dummy variable approach does not need to make this assumption (Greene, 1993; Chamberlain, 1978).
14 One would expect to find a high correlation between EXPjj and EXP jr. However, the correlation 
coefficient between these two variables is only 0.54.
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system are likely to establish overseas offices in Hong Kong. In fact, according to 
Model A, the size of the financial system and regional exports explain more than 90% 
of the variation in the number of banks. Because the Goldfeld-Quandt and Breuch- 
Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity produce conflicting results, the model is estimated 
using generalised least squares (Model B). As can be noticed from the table below, 
Model B produces similar results to model A, except that the coefficient on the size of 
financial system in country of origin becomes slightly smaller in Model B.
Given that the source country may have some specific features concerning its 
relationship with Hong Kong or the region, it is important that we specify another 
model. This is done in Model C where the equation is estimated using the LSDV 
model. This method assumes that the differences across countries can be captured in 
differences in the constant term. It is possible to devise an F-test that compares the 
restricted sum and unrestricted residual sum of squares in order to test whether the 
constant terms are equal across units. Based on this test, the null hypothesis that 
constant terms are equal across units can be rejected at the 1% level. 15 Model C 
produces similar results to models A and B with two major differences. The 
coefficient on exports to Hong Kong remains negative but now becomes significant at 
the conventional levels. Second, the coefficient on regional exports becomes much 
smaller but still retains the same sign and significance. The coefficient on the size of 
the financial system does not alter much when compared to model B .16
15 The F-calculated is F(27,165) = 95.37 which is highly significant.
16 It is interesting to note all the country specific dummies (not reported below) are significant, except 
for Ireland, Norway and New Zealand.
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Table 8.5 -  Determinants of Foreign Banks* Location by Country of Origin in 
Hone Kone1— (Sample:1990-1996. 28 countries)
ReRressors
Model A 2 Model B 3 Model C4 
(LSDV)
Model D 
(LSDV)
Intercept 2.381* 1.255*
Sizej 0 .0 1 1 * 0.008* 0.006* 0.006*
Expir 0.252* 0.264* 0.114* 0.113*
Expij -0 .2 2 1 -0.079 -1,23* -1.23*
DRisk« 0 .0 1 0
Key:
(1) The dependent variable is the number o f bank offices from country o f origin to Hong Kong,
(2) Model A is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
(3) Model B is estimated using generalised least squares (GLS).
(4) Model C is the least square dummy variable model (LSDV). Based on an F-test, we can reject the
hypothesis that the constant terms are equal are rejected at the 1% level, hence we use LSDV 
model. All the country specific dummy variables are significant except for Norway, Ireland, and 
New Zealand.
* Significant at the 1% level.
Finally, Model D uses the least squares dummy specification but also includes the 
index for risk obtained from the Institutional Investor magazine. This variable does 
not add much to the explanatory power of the estimated equation. As mentioned 
somewhere else in this chapter, this factor can explain the expansion of banks into the 
US, but may be expected to be less decisive in explaining the location of banks in 
regional centres.
In order to evaluate the robustness of the results with respect to the method of 
estimation, data are averaged over the period and then estimated using OLS or GLS. 
According to Pesaran and Smith (1995), this method produces consistent estimates of 
the average long run coefficients. Table 6  reports the cross-section regression results. 
Since the Goldfeld-Quandt and Breuch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity produce 
different results, the equation was estimated using both OLS (Model A) and GLS
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(Model B). As can be inferred from table 6 , the results using cross sectional analysis 
are similar to those obtained previously. The size of the banking system in the country 
of origin has a significant positive coefficient implying that countries with a large 
financial system are likely to establish overseas offices in Hong Kong. The size of the 
coefficient does not alter much. The empirical results also show that while regional 
export activity is a major determinant of the number of banks in Hong Kong, bilateral 
exports seem to have no significant impact. Notice that the coefficient on regional 
exports is higher than the coefficient obtained in the previous estimations. In addition 
to Models A and B, Model C which includes a dummy variable for Asian countries is 
included to test for the hypothesis that a regional banking centre is more likely to 
attract a large number banks from regional economies. The coefficient on the dummy 
is positive and highly significant indicating that regional economies are likely to 
establish offices in Hong Kong. This could be the case because banks are more 
familiar with the Hong Kong market or because such centres play a central role in 
regional payment clearing attracting a large number of banks from the region. In 
model D, the index for risk is included in the equation. Again, this variable seems to 
play no role in explaining the number of foreign banks in the Hong Kong market.
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Table 8 .6  -  Determinants of Foreign Banks’ Location by Country of Origin in Hong 
Kong1 (.Average of the 1990-1996 period. 28 countries)__________________________
Regressors
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Intercept 1.781** 1.183** 0.252 0.789
Size; 0.008* 0.008* 0 .0 1 2 * 0 .0 1 1 *
Expir 0.365* 0.370* 0.203** 0.265*
Expjj -0 .1 0 -0.11 -0.032 -0.044
Dummyasia 2.694** 1.304
DRISK -0.048
(1) The dependent variable is the number of bank offices from country of origin to Hong Kong.
(2) Model A is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
(3) Model B is estimated using generalised least squares (GLS).
* Significant at the 1% level.
All the results taken together clearly indicate that regional trade is a major 
determinant of foreign banks’ location in Hong Kong. Bilateral trade with Hong Kong 
alone is insignificant in explaining the number of banks, which reflects the regional 
nature of Hong Kong. The results are highly robust to the specification and the 
method of estimation being used. Other significant variables are the dummy for Asia 
and the size of the exporting economy. The index for risk does not add any 
explanatory power to our equation and hence was dropped from the equation. These 
results are quite different from the ones obtained by Grosse and Goldberg (1991) and 
Fisher et al (1996). These differences mainly arise due to the different nature of the 
financial centres that are being examined. This exercise makes clear that the sources 
of each centre’s competitiveness are different. Despite the possibility of identifying 
some common sources, generalisations on the determinants of competitiveness of 
financial centres can lead to erroneous conclusions.
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8.2.4 Time series analysis
In this section, cointegration analysis is used to examine the long run relationship 
between the number of banks in Hong Kong and regional trade. If we can reach 
similar conclusions using a different method of estimation and different data set, then 
we can be more confident about the obtained results. Furthermore, cointegartion 
analysis has an additional advantage since it allows us to address the issue of 
causality. After all, it could be the case that regional trade is affected by the number of 
banks rather than the other way around or there may be a reverse causality by which 
banks and regional trade reinforce each other.
Since we are interested only in the relationship between regional trade and number of 
banks in Hong Kong, we utilise two variables employing quarterly data for the period 
1975-1996. These two variables are the logarithm of real exports and logarithm of 
total number of banks in Hong Kong. First, we test for the unit roots in the data. Then 
we estimate the VAR and test for cointegration. The vector(s) is then normalised to 
the variable which shows a strong evidence of error correction. Finally, we test for 
weak exogeneity of the variables and test whether all the variables should be in the 
system. This analysis is carried in the table 7.
Both the trace and the eigenvalue statistics indicate the existence of one cointegrating 
vector which suggests that there is a long run relationship between the number of 
banks in Hong and regional exports. The interpretation of the cointegrating vector is 
straightforward. It shows a positive relationship between number of banks and 
regional exports. The cointegrating vector also shows that regional export activity is
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weakly exogenous to the system which suggests that our use of the number of banks 
as dependent variable in the cross section analysis is very sensible.
Table 8.7 -Total Number of Banks and Regional Trade ( Cointegration Analysis!
Variables entered
LREXPORT = Logarithm of regional exports 
LNOB= Logarithm o f total number of banks
Lag Length of VAR = 8 (Based on Sim Likelihood Ratio Test)
Sample period: 1975 Q1 - 1996 Q4
Ho: Rank = p Trace Statistics Eigenvalue Stat
P=0 30.16* P=0 25.09*
P<=1__________________5,07_____________________ P=1 5.07_____________________
System exogeneity test: Chi Squared (1) LR test
LNOB exogenous to the system 19.54
LREXPORT exogenous to the system 0.40
Cointegrating Vector
Vector: LNOB = 1.441** + 0.126 LREXPORT**_________
* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level
8.2.5 Hong Kong’s Funding Activity 
Based on different methods of estimation, it is possible to conclude that the ability of 
Hong Kong to attract banks is directly linked to regional trade. The next step is to 
consider whether Hong Kong funds regional trade. In order to do that, we need to 
examine the external position of Hong Kong banks against economies in the region 
and test whether there is a relationship between Hong Kong’s external assets and 
regional trade. This relationship is first tested using time series data against 
individual countries in the region. The monetary authority of Hong Kong provides a 
geographical breakdown of the external assets/liabilities vis-a-vis individual countries 
which helps us examine the sources and uses of funds. Unfortunately, annual data are 
available only from 1984. Given the small size of the sample (12 observations), it is 
not possible to apply time series analysis. Instead, the analysis is limited to plotting 
two series (banks’ external position and country’ trade) and examine their movements
p-value
0.00
0.53
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during the last 10 years. This relationship is then tested more rigorously by pooling 
data from different countries and then estimating a simple equation relating regional 
lending to regional trade and regional GDP. The last variable is included to test 
whether Hong Kong also funds regional investment opportunities.
The graphs in appendix I plot Hong Kong’s external assets against China, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Korea17 and the volume of trade in each of these economies 
(both expressed in US dollars). As can be noticed, in most of these economies, Hong 
Kong’s external assets and trade tend to move together. This is most obvious in the 
case of China and Indonesia. A similar trend can also be observed in Korea and 
Thailand although in Malaysia this trend is not very evident. Also notice the 
difference among countries in the volume of Hong Kong’s external assets relative to 
their total trade. While this ratio is relatively high in case of China and Thailand 
(more than 10%), it is quite small in case of Malaysia (2%).
We provide more rigorous analysis to test whether Hong Kong’s regional lending is 
related to trade. To do that, we pool data from 7 economies over 12 years and estimate 
a simple equation. In this equation, the dependent variable is the size of external 
assets of Hong Kong banks within the 7 regional economies. The independent 
variables are regional trade and regional GDP. Since these two variables are highly 
correlated, they are not included in the same equation. As can be seen from the table 
below, the coefficient on regional trade is positive and highly significant indicating 
that regional trade is an important determinant of the volume of external lending. In 
fact, regional trade explains 79% of the variation in external assets against these
17 These countries are chosen according to the importance of the size o f their external assets.
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regions. Since regional GDP and regional exports are highly correlated, we expect to 
obtain similar results with regards to regional GDP. In fact this is reflected in the table 
below where the coefficient on regional GDP is the same although it explains 71% of 
variation in external assets against the region.
Table 8.8 - Determinants of Hong Kong’s External Assets
Regressors Model A Model B
Intercept -6.99* -27.15*
Regional Trade 1.37*
Regional GDP 1.37*
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.71
F-Test 385.04* 249.78*
Notes
1. The dependent variable is the size of external assets o f Hong Kong against 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, India, Philippines, Australia and 
New Zealand.
8.3 Financial and Economic Development in the Case of Hong Kong
Following the existing empirical literature on finance and development (Demetriades 
and Hussein, 1996; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997), we examine the relationship 
between financial development and economic development in the case of Hong Kong. 
Various empirical studies have analysed this relationship using cross-section analysis 
(King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1996). Despite its wide application, this 
method of estimation suffers form many shortcomings, especially since those studies 
do not address adequately the issue of causality (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). In 
this chapter, we use cointegration techniques to analyse the relationship between 
banking and financial development in Hong Kong. However, unlike existing studies 
we take into account the special features of financial centres, in particular the fact that 
a banking centres’ financial development is linked to its regional economies and that
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these links can run in both directions i.e. regional economic development contributes 
to centre’s financial development or banking centre could contribute to regional 
economic activity. Therefore, in addition to a measure of domestic economic 
development, we include an indicator of regional economic activity.
8.3.1 Method o f Estimation
We test for the proposed hypotheses using cointegration analysis. The first step in any 
application of cointegration techniques is to establish the order of integration of the 
variables concerned. To do that, all the variables are pre-tested for the presence of unit 
roots using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. If we find that the variables are of the 
same order, the next step involves testing whether these variables are cointegrated. In 
other words, we need to examine whether there is a long run stable relationship 
among the variables concerned. This is done using the Johansen methodology (1988). 
This method is chosen because there is evidence that the Engle-Granger approach 
suffers from some problems in finite samples. For instance, Phillips and Durlauf 
(1986) show that asymptotic distribution of the OLS estimator and its associated test 
statistics are not normal and hence inferences about the significance of the parameters 
of the long run equation can not be made. Another problem is related to the issue of 
whether cointegration tests based on the residuals from long run OLS estimation have 
good power properties. In fact, despite the many attempts to modify the OLS 
estimator (Phillips and Hansen, 1990), it is generally agreed that estimates of the long 
run relationship can result in biased estimates (Inder, 1993). Due to these problems 
and the existence of evidence that the Johansen technique performs better than single 
equation estimation (Gonzalo, 1994), the Johansen method was chosen.
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As a preliminary to the Johansen procedure, it is important to determine the lag length 
to be used in the VAR model. The sensitivity of the Johansen technique to the (VAR) 
length is very well known. In order to determine the appropriate lag length, Sim’s 
(1980) likelihood ratio test is used. This test involves examining cross equation 
restrictions. Sim’s likelihood ratio has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions in the system. It is important to check that 
whether with the lag structure obtained from applying Sim’s likelihood ratio, the 
residuals approximate white noise.
We test next for the weak exogeneity of each of the variables in the system. The test 
for causality is essentially a test of the statistical significance of the lagged 
cointegrating vector (Johansen, 1992). This involves testing whether the speed of 
adjustment coefficient (a) is significantly different from zero. If a  related to variable 
xi is zero, then this means that when estimating the parameters of the model, there is 
no loss of information of not modelling the Axi. Hence, this variable is weakly 
exogenous to the system and could be transferred to the right hand side of the VAR 
model. This restriction is maintained in the system in case we find that the variable is 
exogenous to the system. Next, we test the zero restriction on the parameters of the 
cointegrating vector. These tests are carried sequentially and in cases where we do not 
reject the null, the variable is dropped from the equation. Finally, we impose 
restrictions on the contegrating system in order to reduce the system into interpretable 
economic relationships (Peseran and Shin, 1995).
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8.3.2 Empirical Results
We start our analysis by examining the relationship between a broad measure of 
financial development, which includes the ratio of external and domestic lending to 
GDP, and economic development proxied by real GDP. We test for the existence of a 
stable relationship between these two series using the Johansen procedure (Table 4). 
Using a variety of lag structures, we can not reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating vector. This result implies that there is no stable relationship between 
broad financial development and domestic economic development. In fact, this is 
partly reflected in the size of the banking system which is six times larger than the 
size of the domestic economy. Despite the fact that Hong Kong experienced rapid 
economic growth, such economic performance alone can not explain the high level of 
Hong Kong’s financial development. In other words, broad financial development 
needs not be solely attributed to economic trends within Hong Kong itself.
Table 8.9 - Financial and Economic Development in Hong Kong (Johansen Procedure)
________________ (Sample period; 1975 01  - 1996 04)______________________________
Variables entered
LBCLAIMY = Logarithm of the level of domestic claims and external claims to nominal GDP 
LRGD= Logarithm o f real GDP
Lag Length o f VAR = 8 (Based on Sim Likelihood Ratio Test)
Ho: Rank = p Trace Statistics Eigenvalue Stat
P=0 13.05 P=0 9.85
Lag Length o f VAR = 12
P=0_____________________17/70_________________________ P=0 9.53__________
Due to the special features of Hong Kong, it is clear that the relationship between 
financial and economic development need to be approached in quite a different 
manner. An alternative approach should distinguish between domestic and external 
lending activity as well as introduce regional economic activity to the analysis. We do 
this by including four variables in the cointegration analysis. We differentiate between
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the extent of domestic financial development, measured by claims on private sector in 
Hong Kong to nominal GDP, and external financial development, measured by 
external claims on non-banks to nominal GDP. In addition to real domestic GDP, we 
include the level of regional exports to proxy the level of regional economic activity. 
While domestic economic and financial development are likely to be linked, external 
financial development is likely to be linked with regional economic activity, proxied 
in the analysis by the region’s exports to the rest of the world.
Data for claims on private sector and external claims were obtained from Hong Kong 
Monthly Digest o f Statistics (various issues). Nominal and real GDP data were 
obtained from Census and Statistics Department, Estimates o f GDP 1961 to 1995 and 
Hong Kong Monthly Digest o f Statistics (various issues). Data for regional exports 
were obtained from IMF, International Financial statistics (CD-ROM 1998:6).
The results of applying DF and ADF to the level of variables series indicate that the 
null hypothesis of a unit root can not be rejected for the level-series. Applying the DF 
and ADF test on the first differenced series indicates that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at conventional levels and hence we conclude that all the variables are 
integrated of degree 1. Table 10 reports the maximal eigenvalue and the trace 
statistics which suggests the existence of two cointegrating vectors at the 5% level. 
Hence, a cointegration rank of two is imposed on the system and further tests are 
carried out. First, we test for the weak exogeneity of the each of the variables in the 
system which correspond to the notion of long run causality (Johansen, 1992). Tests 
for weak exogeneity on each of the variables show that none of the variables is 
weakly exogenous to the system at the 1 0 % level and hence, no restrictions are
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imposed on the system. Next, we test for zero restrictions on parameters of the 
cointegrating vectors. These tests show that none of the variables should be excluded 
from the system. Finally, we impose restrictions on the cointegrating system in order 
to reduce the system into interpretable economic relationships (Peseran and Shin, 
1995).
After imposing restrictions on the [3 vectors, we obtain the two cointegrating vectors 
shown in table 10 below. The estimates show some interesting results. The first 
cointegrating vector shows that the level of domestic financial development (or the 
extent of domestic financing) is positively linked to the level of economic 
development with causality running from the latter to the former. This piece of 
evidence is consistent with the existing empirical literature which persistently reports 
a stable relationship between financial and economic development although the 
direction of causality can differ across countries (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; 
Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). More interestingly, this result clearly shows that in 
the context of financial centers, it is important to differentiate between the domestic 
and external lending activity of the center. A broad measure of financial development 
based on these two aspects of lending activity can not be solely attributed to economic 
trends within Hong Kong itself and hence we are unlikely to find an overall 
meaningful relationship between financial and economic development. On the other 
hand, if we consider a narrower measure of financial development based on domestic 
lending activity only, then we are likely to find links between the level of domestic 
economic development and banking activity.
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Table 8.10 - Financial and Economic Development in Hong Kong (Johansen Procedure)
________________(Sample period: 1975 01 - 1996 04)_______________________________
Variables entered
LDOMCLAIM = Logarithm of the ratio of claims on domestic private sector to nominal GDP 
LEXTCLAIM = Logarithm o f the ratio o f external claims to nominal GDP 
LRGDP = Logarithm o f Hong Kong’s GDP in real terms 
LREXP = Logarithm o f regional exports in real terms
Lag Length of VAR = 8 (Based on Sim Likelihood 
Ho: Rank = p Trace Statistics 
p=0 115.42* 
p<=l 39.49** 
d <=2 14.90
Ratio Test)
p=0
p=l
n=2
Eigenvalue Stat 
75.93* 
24,60**
12.17
Analysis assuming two cointegrating vectors
System exogeneity test: Chi Squared (2) LR test p-value
LDOMCLAIM exogenous to the system 36.63 0.00
LEXTCLAIM exogenous to the system 6.55 0.04
LRGDP exogenous to the system 14.46 0.00
LREXP exogenous to the system 9,01 0.01
Exclusion of variables in the long run LR test p-value
Chi Squared (2)
LDOMCLAIM included in the system 38.62 0.00
LEXTCLAIM included the system 26.88 0.00
LRGDP included in the system 31.66 0.00
LREXP included in the system 5.94 0.05
Constant included the system 39.54 0.00
2 Cointegrating Vectors:
LDOMCLAIM = -21.330* +2.261 LRGDP*
LEXTCLAIM = -19.019 + 2.172 LDOMCLAIM* + 0.704 LREXP**
LR test p-value
Joint test on all restrictions:Chi-squared (1) 0.95 0.33
T- test p-value
LRGDP exogenous to the first vector 3.870 0.00
LDOMCLAIM exogenous to the second vector 7.128 0.00
LREXP exogenous to the second vector 1.231 0.20
*significant at the 1% lev e l; ** significant at the 5% level
The second cointegrating vector reveals some interesting observations regarding 
regional trade activity and Hong Kong’s external lending activity. The results show 
that external banking development (or the extent of external lending activity) depends 
positively on the region’s trade activity. The second cointegrating vector also shows a 
positive relationship between the extent of domestic and external lending activity with 
causality running in both directions. In the context of the model of chapter 7, this 
evidence is consistent with complete transferability of knowledge in which the
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financial centre finances both domestic and regional economic activity. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the evolution of the lending activity of a financial centre 
depends on transferability of technical knowledge across countries. When 
transferability of technical knowledge is complete, the financial centre would not 
specialise completely. In this case, we expect foreign and domestic financial activity 
to move together. On the other hand, when technology is not perfectly transferable, 
polarisation of financial activity, by which the centre finances either domestic or 
foreign financial activity, can occur. The above evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis of complete transferability of knowledge.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide two pieces of empirical evidence on the links between a 
financial centre and its regional economies, using Hong Kong as a study case. First, 
using two different data sets and various econometric techniques, we show that the 
large number of foreign banks in Hong Kong is related to regional and international 
trade rather than merely to Hong Kong’s own trade activity. Specifically, trade links 
between a “home” country and Hong Kong cannot explain the number of banks from 
that country with a presence in Hong Kong. On the other hand, trade links with the 
region are found to be a major determinant of the number of banks there. Using 
cointegration analysis, this result is re-confirmed where we found a cointegrating 
vector between the number of offices in Hong Kong and regional trade activity with 
positive causality running from the latter to the former suggesting that the number of 
banks in Hong Kong is linked to trade activity in the region. Second, we explore the 
relationship between Hong Kong’s financial development and regional economic 
activity. The empirical results reveal some interesting observations regarding the
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above relationship. First, they show that in the context of financial centres, it is 
important to differentiate between the domestic and external lending activity of the 
centre. A broad measure of financial development based on these two aspects of 
lending activity cannot be solely attributed to economic trends within Hong Kong 
itself and hence we are unlikely to find an overall meaningful relationship between 
financial and economic development. On the other hand, if we consider a narrower 
measure of financial development based on domestic lending activity only, then we 
are likely to find links between the level of domestic economic development and 
banking activity. The results also reveal a few interesting patterns regarding regional 
trade and Hong Kong’s external lending activity. The results show that external 
banking development depends positively on the region’s trade activity. Given Hong 
Kong’s position as a financial centre which does not only attract deposits from 
abroad, but also arranges and extends Euroloans for its region, we expect that Hong 
Kong’s external banking development to depend positively on the region’s economic 
activity. The results also provide evidence which is consistent with complete 
transferability of knowledge in which the financial centre finances both domestic and 
regional economic activity.
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APPENDIX: Hong Kong’s External Assets against Individual Countries (China, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea) and Volume of Trade in each Country
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Chapter 9 - Conclusions
The purposes of this thesis have been, first, to provide a general framework to analyse 
the location of financial activity, second, to study the emergence and evolution of 
financial centres and finally, to test empirically several hypotheses related to banking 
centres. In this chapter, I describe the thesis’s major contributions to the literature on 
banking centres and indicate some ideas for further research.
9.1 Agglomeration and Dispersion Forces in Banking Activity
In the first part of the thesis, we explore the impact of information asymmetry on the 
centralisation of credit activity. In contrast with existing models which analyse the 
process of financial intermediation in a space-dimensionless world, we incorporate 
spatial factors into recent models of financial intermediation. Specifically, we extend 
Williamson’s (1986) model of credit rationing by making the additional assumption 
that monitoring costs are increasing and convex with distance. Based on this extended 
model, we show that there is a certain distance beyond which the profits of the bank 
would fall below the required return and as a consequence, the bank may decide to 
ration credit to borrowers located beyond that distance. In order for the bank to have 
access to previously credit rationed borrowers -  for instance in an attempt to increase 
its market share - the bank may find it necessary to locate near borrowers. Given that 
the distribution of borrowers is highly scattered, information asymmetry can act as a 
powerful dispersion force.
We argue that this type of dispersion force is likely to be very strong in retail banking 
services while its impact is less on wholesale banking services for two main reasons. 
First, wholesale borrowers mainly MNC headquarters and other financial institutions
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show a high degree of centralisation. Second, wholesale financial products are more 
standardised than retail services. These two factors enable banks to engage in cross 
border lending and deposit taking activity from a central location, typically a banking 
centre. It emerges from this analysis that although cross border lending activity and 
international branching occurred simultaneously during the last three decades, these 
two forms of expansion reflect the internationalisation of two types of banking 
activity: wholesale and the retail banking and it is only the former which is associated 
with the emergence of financial centres.
The literature on financial centres has mainly focused on technological externalities in 
the form of informational spillovers to explain the agglomeration of banks. While we 
recognise the importance of informational spillovers in enhancing the size and 
liquidity of interbank markets, we move the analysis one step further and examine 
other factors that may generate agglomeration force. Specifically, the main 
contribution of chapter 4 lies in exploring in details how pecuniary externalities can 
generate a powerful agglomeration force, using the insight of the emerging literature 
of economic geography. Using a simple model, we show how banks and other 
financial institutions’ desire to employ a wide variety of specialised intermediate 
services and to have access to a pool of skilled labour force provide banks with 
incentive to locate near each other. Specifically, we explore the possibility of 
identifying a distinct producer service complex in banking centres similar to the one 
found in industrial centres. Although the importance of access to specialised 
intermediate inputs and skilled is recognised in the literature, the conditions under 
which these agglomeration forces are generated remain unexplored. For instance, in 
Chapter 4, we show that without the assumptions of internal economies to scale in the
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service industry and non-tradability of intermediate inputs, these pecuniary 
externalities can’t arise. These issues are completely ignored in the qualitative and 
historical analysis of financial centres.
Banking centres are usually characterised by a path dependence process which can act 
as a powerful agglomeration force. Chapter 5 contributes to the existing literature by 
analysing the path dependence process in banking centres in some details. 
Specifically, we extend Arthur’s (1988, 1989) benchmark model by including in the 
general payoff some dynamic geographical benefits that contribute significantly to the 
attractiveness of banking centres. We emphasise three such dynamic benefits: the 
ability of a centre to reduce the cost structure for financial firms, to generate 
profitable business opportunities for them and to attract timely, reliable and useful 
information flows. Based on this dynamic framework, we show how self reinforcing 
mechanism generates multiple solutions to the location problem. We then analyse the 
conditions under which the path dependence process can be broken. Specifically, we 
show that a reduction in dynamic benefits over time due to a strong shock or due to a 
series of small shocks can place an established centre on a negative growth path.
9.2 Determinants of Banks’ Location
Our empirical approach to the determinants of bank location involves a number of 
novelties. First, unlike the existing literature which tend to examine the location of 
bank all over the world, we focus more on the major determinants of banks’ location 
in the world’s largest banking centres. In order to do that, we construct an original 
index of financial diversity using new data series and aimed at ranking the importance 
of financial centres. The diversity index is then used to test the hypothesis that banks
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locate in financial centres to participate in larger and more diversified financial 
markets and capture agglomeration benefits. Specifically, we test for the hypothesis 
that after controlling for bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, regulatory and tax 
factors and the country of the size of origin, agglomeration benefits and greater 
access to deeper and liquid markets influence the banks’ decision to establish in 
banking centres. The importance of these two latter aspects, which we think are the 
most relevant for banking centre, has not been examined in the existing literature on 
financial centres. Second, our empirical approach also utilises more than one 
econometric technique. Specifically, we propose that given the nature of the 
hypothesis being tested, it is more meaningful to examine the impact of explanatory 
variables on the probability that a bank would establish abroad. Hence, we also 
estimate the empirical model using the probit and logit models. Finally, we 
distinguish between the different forms of physical presence in order to examine 
whether the same determinants can explain the number of subsidiaries, branches and 
offices.
The empirical results of chapter 6 reveal some interesting observations. They show 
that bilateral trade and the size of country of origin are important determinants of 
trade in banking offices. More importantly, the results show that after controlling for 
variations in regulatory and tax structure, the size of the country of origin and bilateral 
trade, banks’ desire to capture agglomeration benefits and participate in larger and 
more diversified financial markets influence greatly their decision to establish offices 
in banking centres.
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9.3 Emergence and Evolution of Banking Centres
The thesis also makes an important contribution by providing a theoretical framework 
to explain the emergence and evolution of banking centres. Specifically, in chapter 7, 
we build an original model of emergence of banking centres based on combination of 
efficiency and economies of scale in intermediation. This model allows to capture 
many important features of banking centres. First, unlike the existing literature which 
attributes the emergence of banking centres only to differences in regulatory and tax 
structure or other inherent geographical attributes, we emphasise the importance of 
economies of scale in financial intermediation as being the major determinant of 
emergence. In particular, in our model, comparative advantage - in terms of 
regulatory and tax concessions for instance- does not determine emergence on its 
own. Instead, emergence is directly linked to the ability of a centre to attract sufficient 
foreign savings and fund a critical mass of investment opportunities in the domestic 
economy and/or abroad. This allows for an element of indeterminacy in the model and 
hence other elements such as historical chance or “first mover” advantage can play an 
important role in determining which country emerges as a financial centre. It also 
allows for the possibility of co-ordination failure. For instance, if there is co­
ordination failure such that surplus countries channel their savings through various 
countries, emergence of a regional centre could not occur. This suggest that the 
emergence of a certain country as a financial centre may be hindered by conditions 
that are beyond the control of national governments.
Chapter 7 also makes an additional contribution by examining the evolution of 
banking centres over time. This helps explain the major determinants of the nature of 
banking centres; an issue which is not explicitly addressed in the literature on
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financial centres. Specifically, we show that when transferability of technical 
knowledge is complete, the banking centre funds both domestic and foreign 
production. On the other hand, when transferability of knowledge is incomplete such 
that economies can grow at different rates, polarisation may occur. As a result, a 
banking centre can either finance domestic production - an extreme case of an 
“inward transformer” where the financial centre transforms all foreign inflows into 
domestic loans - or finance foreign production -an extreme case of an “outward 
transformer” where the financial centre transforms all inflows into foreign loans.
9.4 Regional Links of Banking Centres
Another contribution of the thesis lies in exploring empirically the relationship 
between centres’ banking development and regional economic activity. Although 
many economists suspect that there exist links between banking centres and regional 
economies, I am not aware of any study that puts this hypothesis to the test. Chapter 8 
contributes to the literature by providing two pieces of empirical evidence on the links 
between banking centres and its regional economies, using Hong Kong as a study 
case. The following two important results emerge from the empirical results. First, the 
large number of foreign banks in Hong Kong is related to regional and international 
trade rather than merely to Hong Kong’s trade activity. Specifically, trade links 
between a host country and Hong Kong cannot explain the number of banks from that 
country to Hong Kong. On the other hand, trade links with the region are found to be 
a major determinant of the number of banks there. Second, in the context of financial 
centres, it is important to distinguish between the domestic and external lending 
activity of the centre. Our empirical results suggest that a broad measure of financial 
development based on these two aspects of lending activity cannot be solely attributed
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to economic trends within Hong Kong itself and hence we are unlikely to find an 
overall meaningful relationship between financial and economic development. In fact, 
the results show that Hong Kong’s external banking development is positively linked 
to the region’s trade activity.
9.5 Areas for Future Research
We conclude the thesis by identifying some areas for further research. As we have 
seen, the study of banking centres didn’t attract the attention of economists. Hence, 
topics such as the importance of these centres in the world economy and their 
contribution to the domestic economy remain under-researched. One fruitful area for 
research consists of identifying the benefits and costs associated with attracting a 
large number of foreign banks. In this respect, it is important to note that most of the 
debate has focused on the “direct” benefits and costs associated with establishing a 
banking centre. A more fruitful avenue to explore is to examine the indirect effects of 
attracting foreign banks. Two such effects are worth mentioning. First, attracting 
foreign banks may allow national governments and domestic corporations to have a 
greater access to international capital markets. Second, foreign banks may improve 
the efficiency of the domestic banking system by inducing competition and 
introducing new banking practices and financial products. These two benefits are 
quite substantial and can provide justification for some policy makers to pursue 
policies aimed at establishing a banking centre. Assessing empirically the importance 
of these two benefits can prove very fruitful area for future research.
Another related fruitful area for research relates to the impact of banking centre on the 
process of industrialisation. Specifically, by introducing the industrial sector in the
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model of chapter 7, it is possible to show that under certain circumstances, the 
development of a banking centre can lead to a de-industrialisation process by which 
labour moves from the industrial sector to the banking sector. This is likely to have 
important implications on the relationship between finance and growth. This 
interesting issue is worth some serious theoretical and empirical research.
Finally, a very fruitful area of research relates to the impact of financial 
agglomeration on regional economic development. For instance, the framework 
developed in this thesis can be easily modified to analyse the impact of differential 
treatment of borrower classes within one country and the consequences of large 
transfers of financial resources from the periphery to the centre. These complex issues 
deserve serious thinking and research, especially that they entail serious economic and 
social implications.
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